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ABSTRACT

Incorporating the use of wetlands as a technology to enhance water quality trading
programs requires the consideration of many political, economic, ecological, and legal issues. It
is desirable to include wetlands as a nutrient reducing practice in certain water quality trading
programs because these wetlands can provide additional benefits, beyond those of other
technologies, such as carbon dioxide sequestration and increased habitat area and biodiversity.
There is a great deal of interest from policymakers in extending the implementation of the United
States EPA’s Water Quality Trading Policy to include the use of constructed or restored
wetlands. However, is the incorporation of wetlands technology to enhance water quality trading
programs economically and politically feasible at the watershed scale?
This study evaluated the economic and political feasibility of establishing water quality
trading programs that incorporate constructed or restored wetlands as a type of nutrient abatement
technology. A review of the current literature concerning water quality trading and wetlands
combined with selected case studies was used to identify critical knowledge gaps that could
encumber the implementation of trading programs for both point and non-point sources as
stakeholders. Four case studies provided various examples from a national perspective that
illustrate the feasibility of implementing a wetlands and water quality trading program based on
current practices managed by existing programs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem
Modern industrial societies like the United States face dual challenges in coordinating
efforts to protect vital elements of the natural environment that are essential for life. Current
growth pressures and complexities of common-access resources have generated creative new
approaches to address environmental management problems and the notion of market failure in
effective and equitable ways.
The first ongoing environmental challenge deals with the magnitude of some emerging
threats to environmental quality on a global scale with specific emphasis on atmospheric changes
and loss of biological diversity. This challenge cannot be easily handled by independent nations
throughout the world. These global problems need global solutions.
The second challenge deals with the direct regulatory approaches that implement uniform
control methods to decrease pollution. Regulatory approaches are utilized to combat the issues
that arise from common pool resource problems. In many cases common pool natural resources
like air and water tend to be over-utilized and public goods tend to be undersupplied by the
marketplace because individual free-riders within an institutional setting are hard to limit or
exclude. In the past, ambient air or water quality legal standards have been set to allow for
maximum concentration levels of pollutants. These standards are then enforced by making
specific technological choices or certain types of behaviors mandatory. These conventional
methods to regulating the environment have been referred to as “command and control”
regulations because they provide minimal flexibility in the means of achieving pollution emission
targets. These regulations have been established in order to contend with market failures that do
not capture the expensive effects of pollution discharge through the prices and costs generated

during the market process. The inability to account for pollution discharge through production
leads to increased negative external pollution effects that are not internalized by producers or
consumers. A vast number of negative environmental externalities attributable to market failure
have been limited by some extent through the use of command and control methods, but
increased reliance on this type of approach could prove to be expensive, disruptive, and counter
productive to overall economic well-being (Buchanan & Tullock, 1975).

These regulatory

approaches have been used in an attempt to counteract market and policy failures that produce
negative external
To combat this second challenge many policy analysts have in recent years advocated
the use of incentives or market-based approaches to improve environmental protection policy
tools.

Market-based theory and practical environmental policy are currently separated by

information and transaction cost barriers, but the continual incremental approach to
environmental policymaking over the past twenty years has resulted is various types of markettype innovations within traditional regulatory frameworks at all levels of government. The most
well-known example of this type of approach is the sulfur dioxide trading program established
under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
After learning from successful experiences with emission trading programs focused on
reducing acid rain, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) now actively
supports the application of emission trading to water quality.

This approach seems quite

attractive because it could provide financial incentives for increased pollution control activities in
unregulated sectors. Agriculture and urban runoff are major contributors to effluent load levels in
many watersheds, but with a few exceptions these sources do not fall under regulatory guidelines
because of political sensitivities and perceived monitoring difficulties (Crutchfield, 1994).
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Vast improvements in water quality throughout the United States over the past three
decades can be traced primarily to conventional regulation approaches and financial support
given to point sources, municipalities, and traditional large pipe dischargers.

Regulatory

initiatives concerning surface water policy in the United States have been guided by the 1972
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, also known as the Clean Water Act (CWA). This, act and
amendments in 1977 and 1987, set the overarching principles and implementation mechanisms
that direct the efforts to prevent water pollution. The USEPA has been granted a primary tool to
regulate water pollution through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).
The NPDES requires point sources to obtain state and USEPA approved permits of defined
number of pollutant discharges. The USEPA and other federal agencies use a variety of subsidies
and grants to mitigate point source (point source) and non-point source (non-point source)
pollution that does not fall under the NPDES criteria.
The combination of regulations and subsidies has met with considerable success in
controlling and reducing point source pollution during the past thirty years. By 1990 87% of the
major municipal facilities and 93% of the major industrial plants were in compliance with
NPDES standards (King, 2003). However, many waterbodies within the United States are not in
good condition. In 2000 the USEPA’s National Water Quality Inventory Report claimed that
approximately 40% of assessed rivers, 45% of assessed streams, and 50% of assessed lakes in the
United States did not meet water quality standards. The report lists sediments, bacteria, metals,
and nutrients as the major causes of impairment. Agricultural non-point source pollution and
urban runoff are the two single greatest sources of pollution according to the USEPA’s report.
For example, one of the most polluted areas in the United States, the Chesapeake Bay watershed,
receives most of its effluent from agriculture: 40.8% of nitrogen inputs and 47% of phosphorus
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inputs. Point sources contribute 22.1% of nitrogen inputs and 22.3% of phosphorus inputs (King,
2003).
Various pollutants that are associated with non-point source pollution include fecal
bacteria, toxic organic compounds, heavy metals, suspended solids and sediments, phosphorus,
nitrogen, and other oxygen-demanding organic material. Unlike point source pollution, which
tends to be a steady discharge, non-point source pollution occurs during different times based on
periods of rainfall or the melting of snow. If unchecked, these non-point source pollutants
eventually reach our lakes, rivers, oceans, and even underground sources of drinking water as
they seep into the ground. “Despite the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars over the
last 30 years, the 1972 Clean Water Act goals of fishable and swimmable waters have not been
achieved, largely because contaminants from diffuse [non-point] sources have not been controlled
successfully” (National Research Council, 2001).
Recent water quality challenges in the United States have stimulated sustained interest
from policymakers to incorporate the use of non-traditional market mechanisms to lower costs of
compliance and improve aquatic environments. This type of approach allows facilities with high
pollution control costs to purchase lower cost pollution reduction from another source to meet
their effluent reduction requirements (USEPA, 2004). Water quality trading is conceptually
similar to air emissions trading, but effluent trading has lagged in development. A few effluent
trading programs were developed in the early 1980s and during the 1990s, but in recent years new
interest has sparked conversations about policy changes that would improve the capabilities for
local and state authorities to implement water quality trading programs.
In January of 2003 the United States Environmental Protection Agency issued rules
through its water quality policy statement to encourage the trading of nutrients and sediments
among point and non-point sources. The policy states that its purpose is “to encourage states,
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interstates agencies and tribes to develop and implement water quality trading programs for
nutrients, sediments, and other pollutants where opportunities exist to achieve water quality
improvements at reduced costs” (USEPA, 2005).

In that document the USEPA states that

market-based approaches like water quality trading provide greater flexibility and have the
potential to achieve levels of environmental benefits that would not otherwise be attained under a
traditional command and control approach. The policy focuses on the idea that different sources
within a watershed may face significantly different costs to control the same pollutant. When
working with non-point source pollution problems, the USEPA is required to work with
individual states and local agencies because of the provisions defined in the revision of the Clean
Water Act in 1987. The law leaves non-point source control planning to the states and local
agencies because of local environmental and economic considerations. “The actual site-specific
selection of particular management practices to control non-point source pollution (called “Best
Management Practices”) will involve local environmental and economic considerations, as well
as considerations of effectiveness and acceptability of the practice (USEPA 1984a)” (Portney,
2000).
In order to provide information to state and local policymakers the USEPA published a
Water Quality Trading Assessment Handbook in 2004 (USEPA, 2004). This guidance is very
general, and it focuses on setting the institutional arrangements of the necessary processes that
take place during trading. But, the handbook does not discuss the changes in policy that are
necessary in order to create supply and demand for these types of markets. Despite the guidance
and support by USEPA, nutrient trades have been relatively scarce to date. Scarce pollution
credit supply from non-point sources and lackluster credit demand from point sources are
primarily responsible for this weak market performance (King, 2005; King & Kuch, 2004). To a
limited extent point source to point source trading has been effective, and programs have shown
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signs of further development. In 2004 there were more than 70 water quality trading initiatives in
the United States (Breetz, 2004). (Map 1.1 and Map 1.2) This rise in interest has been noted, but
there are still significant obstacles that stand in the way of many water quality trading approaches.
King and Kuch (2003) found in an analysis of thirty-seven approved trading sites in the
United States that only three programs had engaged in water quality trading. At the time, six
nutrient trades had occurred, and only one involved a non-point source. But, even with this
lackluster performance, there has also been a considerable amount of interest given to extending
the implementation of the USEPA’s Water Quality Trading Policy to include point source to nonpoint source trades. Over the past few years particular interest has been focused on the use of
constructed or restored wetlands, in addition to traditional abatement technologies, as non-point
sediment and nutrient credit producers within a water quality trading program (Raffini &
Robertson, 2005). This type of approach seems attractive because it could inevitably assist in
enhancing, restoring, and protecting wetlands as well as improve water quality. In certain cases
the approach could provide additional benefits like carbon dioxide sequestration or habitat
creation which is specifically supported by the USEPA’s Water Quality Trading Policy.
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Map 1.1. Watershed Scale Water Quality Trading Programs in the United States (2006)
(Source: U.S. EPA Office of Water: Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, (2006)

7

Map 1.2. U.S. States that have Developed Water Quality Trading Program Rules (2006)
(Source: U.S. EPA Office of Water: Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, (2006)
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Purpose of the Study

Incorporating the use of wetlands as a technique to enhance water quality trading
programs requires the consideration of many political, economic, ecological, and legal issues.
Despite theoretical arguments for the implementation of water quality trading programs, actual
trades have hardly taken place. What economic and institutional arrangements are necessary in
order to allow the programs to operate efficiently and effectively? In relation to water quality
trading, policy analysts understand the importance of wetlands in natural systems as nutrient
transformers or immobilizers, but there is much debate concerning how water quality aspects of
wetlands function at the watershed scale. Therefore, is the incorporation of wetlands technology
to enhance water quality trading programs economically and politically feasible at the watershed
scale?
To assess this question this study evaluates the economic and political feasibility of
establishing water quality trading programs that incorporate constructed or restored wetlands as a
type of nutrient abatement technology. A review of the current literature concerning water
quality trading and wetlands combined with selected case studies are used to identify critical
knowledge gaps that could encumber the implementation of trading programs that include both
point and non-point sources as stakeholders. Four case studies provide various examples from a
national perspective that illustrate the feasibility of implementing a wetlands and water quality
trading program based on current practices managed by existing programs.

Economic and

institutional impediments that are brought forth from the literature provide outline for analysis of
these cases and a comparison synthesis, conclusions, and policy recommendations provide a
better understanding of the knowledge obtained from the literature and cases.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

History of U.S. Surface Water Quality Policy
Protecting water quality was not a major concern to the federal government until the
beginning of the 20th century. Three early acts defined federal government involvement with
water quality issues. The first federal act that dealt with controlling water pollution was the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. This act was established in order to prevent impediments to
navigation and serves as a reminder that at one time the physical volume of waste in waterways
threatened to block some rivers and channels. The Public Health Service Act of 1912 allowed
federal investigation of water pollution that affected public health, and the Oil Pollution Act of
1924 disallowed the discharge of oil into Coastal Waters (Portney, 2000). These early acts set
precedent, but none of them were broadly interpreted or widely enforced in a way that greatly
influenced water quality policy.
As the U.S. population grew and waterborne disease rates increased the federal
government began to become more involved with water quality issues. The Water Pollution
Control Act of 1948 was the first federal legislation to deal explicitly with conventional forms of
water pollution. This act authorized the federal government to make loans to municipalities in
order to construct sewage treatment facilities, and it also allowed the federal government to
engage in investigation, research, and surveys dealing with water pollution problems. Prior to
1948 there was no direct federal role in water pollution control policy, and the new law opened
the door for future federal organizational responses to state actions concerning water quality
policy (Kneese, 1975).
The 1956 amendments to this act strengthened the role of the federal government, but
primary responsibility for dealing with water quality issues was left to the states.
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The Water

Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956 established a mechanism for joint state/federal
enforcement directed by the Public Health Service. This act also established a grant program that
allowed municipalities to share costs to construct sewage treatment facilities (Kneese, 1975).
The first federal act that mandated state actions with respect to water pollution policy was
the Water Quality Act of 1965. The Water Quality Act of 1965 directed states to set minimum
water quality standards for portions of interstate waters within individual borders. Individual
state monitoring, standard-setting, and enforcement became significant problems in relation to
this act, and many policymakers viewed this approach as ineffective and unworkable (Zwick,
1971). There were three main reasons why this particular arrangement did not work. First of all,
there was a great deal of difficulty experienced by states in determining how much each
individual source would have to cut back in order to meet quality standards. Secondly, state
agencies did not have the organizational structures in place to handle the enforcement issues
associated with discharge. Implementation plans were needed in each state to do this. Lastly,
states varied enormously in their commitment to pollution control objectives; the expertise of
their personnel; the monetary resources that allocated for implementation monitoring, and
enforcement; and their willingness to compete for new industry by offering a lax regulatory
environment (Portney, 2000).
In 1972 Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). This act
established new federal goals and standards for water quality, set deadlines for cleanup actions,
and provided new means in which new tools could be used for regulation and enforcement. All
discharges of pollutants into navigable waters were to be eliminated by 1985 (Portney, 2000).
This legislation specifically focused on point source pollution while establishing a national goal
for water pollution policy. One of the major departures of the FWPCA from past policies was
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that the major responsibility for issuing permits to dischargers was shifted to a federal agency:
the United State Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) (Portney, 2000).
In 1977 and 1987 Congress adopted revisions to the FWPCA. The amended act, now
known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), expanded USEPA’s powers to address non-point
pollution through voluntary programs. The 1977 revisions further defined the distinction between
conventional pollutants (suspended solids and organic matter) and toxic water pollutants. The
revisions also established new technology procedures and deadlines for determining toxic effluent
limitations.

The 1987 act established funds to continue support of sewage treatment plant

construction and set new requirements for states to establish non-point source pollution control
programs.
Additionally, Congress passed legislation creating the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974
and revised it in 1986. Both of these mandates focus on mitigating existing pollution and
constructing new wastewater and drinking water treatment plants, but these laws can also
potentially fund initiatives focused on protecting source waters through land conservation
initiatives.
The USEPA funds three water quality programs under the CWA: the clean water state
revolving fund, non-point source program, and national estuary program. In 2003, states were
awarded over one billion dollars and provided almost five billion dollars in assistance for
wastewater, non-point source, and estuary projects.

Five percent of the clean water state

revolving funds are used for mitigating non-point source pollution while the other ninety-five
percent goes toward wastewater treatment infrastructure (USEPA, 2007). The non-point source
program receives less than twenty percent of the clean water funding despite the fact that this type
of effluent now accounts for over sixty percent of all effluent in the U.S. (USEPA, 2007).
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Water quality throughout the United States has improved since the passage of the Clean
Water Act in 1972 largely because of point source reductions of toxic and organic chemical
loadings. Toxic pollution discharges have been reduced by an estimated billion pounds per year
since the early 1970s (Adler, 1994). Between 1970 and 1992 sewage treatment plants show a
reduction in ammonia (Mueller & Helsel, 1996).

A widely applied national surface-water

monitoring network has provided evidence that fecal bacteria and phosphorus concentrations
have declined (Knopman & Smith, 1993; Mueller & Helsel, 1996). Additional information
provided by case studies and anecdotal information suggest that reductions in pollutants since the
beginning of the 1970s have improved the health of aquatic ecosystems (Knopman & Smith,
1993).
Great strides have been made concerning water quality during the past few decades, but
significant challenges still remain. In fact, the FWPCA set a national goal of achieving zero
discharge by 1985, but over the past decade significant evidence suggests that we are moving in
the opposite direction away from this goal. More than one-third of all surface waters are deemed
impaired in the United States, but larger regional problems continue to experience significant
environmental degradation. The Chesapeake Bay is the largest estuary in the world and it has
experienced significant water quality problems linked to nutrients including phosphorus and
nitrogen. Excessive fish kills in 1997 were attributed to inflated nutrient levels that provided a
catalyst for the outbreak of a micro-organism, pfiesteria (Mlot, 1997). Poor water quality is also
the suspected cause of declining shellfish harvests (Chesapeake Bay Commission, 2002). The
Gulf of Mexico has also experienced dramatic water quality problems caused by increased levels
of nitrates. The oxygen-deficient “dead” zone is now larger than 7,000 square miles (Rabalais,
Turner, & Wiseman, 1997), and is growing in size from year to year. The major source of
increased nitrate levels has been identified as fertilizers from the Upper Mississippi Basin
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(Antweiler, Goolsby, & Taylor, 1995). Since 1954 the amount of nitrate that is discharged into
the gulf has tripled (Goolsby & Battaglin, 1997).
One of the reasons why the Clean Water Act has failed to achieve proposed goals is that
water quality problems have gotten bigger with increased population pressures, an expanding
economy, and more demand placed on watersheds as receptors of pollution while also providing
drinking water, recreation, and other services. The second major reason for failure concerns
fractured policy formulation and implementation. At the federal level both the USEPA and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) address water quality problems in splintered and
inconsistent ways. Both agencies use a variety of policy tools, including grants, regulations, and
subsidies, to decrease point and non-point source discharges, but most agency efforts have been
individually undertaken and disjointed from other agency initiatives. This gap between the two
agencies concerning water quality may be shrinking because of increasing concerns over
environmental degradation to our watersheds and the potential opportunities to make significant
positive impacts linked to contemporary dynamic polices like water quality trading. On October
13, 2006 the Assistant Administrator of the Office of Water at the USEPA, Benjamin Grumbles,
and the Under Secretary of Natural Resources and the Environment at the USDA, Mark Rey,
signed a partnership agreement to encourage water quality trading nationwide (USEPA, 2007).
Policymakers are extremely interested in moving forward with water quality trading initiatives.
Positive outcomes from trading, as an adjunct to regulation, could lead to lower compliance costs
while meeting or exceeding water quality goals.
The evolving nature of water quality challenges in the United States over the past two
decades has spurred a reassessment of conventional approaches to water pollution control.
Traditional regulatory approaches like the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) cannot easily address non-point source pollution without the development of new
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statutory authority, and federal grants and subsidies have proved to be insufficient in mitigating
non-point source pollution. One prominent policy solution to regulatory constraints and subsidy
limitations is water quality trading. Water quality trading has been promoted by economists for
years, and during the past few years many political leaders and upper-level government officials
have endorsed the idea as well. Theoretically, a water quality trading program allows regulated
point sources with high pollution costs to buy pollution reduction credits from unregulated nonpoint sources with low control costs.

From a conceptual standpoint water quality trading

achieves pollution control targets at lower total cost and reduces non-point source pollution. But,
in practice, the future of water quality trading depends on the resolution of many political,
economic, ecological, and legal issues.
Economic Rationale for Water Quality Trading
In order to better understand this increased interest in water quality trading policy it is
beneficial to review how market-based strategies evolved.

Incentive based solutions to

environmental externalities have been around for quite some time. In the early part of the 20th
century A. C. Pigou (1920) proposed a policy of using corrective taxes to counteract externalities.
He suggested that a specific externality could be internalized if taxes were set at a rate that would
discourage the output of a pollutant through additional cost. One of the major problems with this
type of approach is the concern that in many cases it is extremely difficult to isolate and calculate
a tax that is equal to the damage incurred by an externality. Other researchers like Baumol (1972)
expanded upon Pigou’s work by demonstrating that a per-unit emission tax on polluting firms
does not have to be set at the optimum level provided that the government continuously adjusts
that tax. Researchers like Collinge and Oates (1982) have contributed to the Pigouvian tax policy
instruments by presenting the notion of rental emission permits that theoretically follow the
marginal social damages curves. Therefore, in theory, marginal abatement costs would not need
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to be calculated, and permit charges would be set equally to the external costs to society.
Pigovian taxation has greatly influenced the economic analysis of public policy since the early
part of the 20th century. Today, there are many types of emission and pollution taxes set around
the world from emission taxes on industry in California to carbon taxes in Scandinavia. Other
notable work is more critical of Pigovian taxes emphasizing the distortion effects that occur in the
long-run (Gould, 1977; Rose-Ackerman, 1973). This research claims that per-unit taxes raise a
firm’s average cost curve.
There are also other methods of reducing pollution through incentives other than
imposing a tax or developing a charge for the purchase of permits. Midway through the 20th
century economists began to seek out other ways of internalizing the cost of environmental
externalities.

Ronald Coase (1960) arrived at a very different way of looking at pollution

problems after studying the Pigovian solution. Coase argued that if property rights are clearly
defined, the costs of negotiating are low, and the number of affected parties is small, then
externalities can be eliminated through private bargaining solutions. John Dales (1968) expanded
the idea of market-based approaches to the environment by suggesting that transferable property
rights could be used to promote environmental protection at a lower cost than conventional
standards. Tietenburg (1985) quantitatively compared the creation of environmental markets with
traditional command and control regulation to reveal that substantial economic and environmental
gains could be realized with a market trading system.
Many of these early market based studies focused on economic cost savings and
efficiency, but they failed to consider the underlying cost estimation concerning uncertainties that
pertain to the environmental modeling of a natural process. In most respects these studies did not
attempt to identify the political constraints that may be impressed upon a market-based
institutional design.

These studies also failed in many ways to accurately show how the
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promotion of social goals such as equity can be achieved without destroying the cost saving
efficiencies or the incentives that help to improve and expand abatement practices. Policymakers
are interested in incorporating institutional structures and stakeholder participant meetings into
the development of incentive based policy applications in order to evaluate the total private and
public good that is being generated from exchanges within the marketplace. In many cases, cost
is the determining factor for implementation.

Minimizing the cost of abatement is a very

powerful driver when developing plans for environmental protection, but the effects of a
proposed program must also be viewed from a political and equitable viewpoint as well.
For a trading market to reach the optimal allocation of pollution control, it will need welldefined property rights, a large number of buyers and sellers, good information about
consumption and production, low or no transactions costs, and rational behavior by the
stakeholders in the marketplace. Market failure is avoided if most of these conditions are met,
but this is not usually the case for markets that trade pollution control practices, environmental
goods, or services (Fullerton & Stavins, 2000). Many problems may arise because the assessment
of benefits and costs may be hindered because the environmental goods at hand are extremely
complex in nature. In many cases concerning trading programs there is typically not enough
reliable information to estimate the optimal allocation of pollution control, and in some cases
monitoring and verification expenses may be too great for a market to even exist. In spite of
these problems a trading market may prove to be more cost effective than traditional command
and control programs.

In fact, the air quality trading programs have experienced very

encouraging results from both a cost perspective and a pollution reduction perspective.
Transition From Air Quality Trading to Water Quality Trading
Pollution permit trading began in the United States in the mid-1970s as air quality offset
programs. Regional areas that did not meet air quality standards viewed offset programs as a way
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to move toward improving their environment while allowing for economic development. Offset
programs have been localized to specific areas. Over 90% of the 10,000 offset trades during the
past 30 years have occurred in California (USEPA, 2001). In 1977 Congress provided its formal
approval to offsets in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. These amendments allowed
emission reduction activities to be banked for the storage, consolidation, and future sale of
credits.
In 1978 the USEPA introduced its bubble policy. The bubble policy allowed polluting
firms with multiple emissions points in the same facility to face a single aggregate emission limit
instead of separate limits for each source. The process was hampered by a cumbersome approval
process, but some estimates revealed an estimated $435 million cost savings by 1986 (Hahn,
1989).
In 1986 USEPA presented the Air Emissions Trading Policy Statement, and air trading
programs began to be implemented around the country. Two of these programs that were
successful were the lead credit trading program and the acid rain program. The original lead
trading program limited averaging of lead concentrations to individual refineries. USEPA would
later expand the lead credit trading program to allow averaging among refineries. This change in
policy in many respects was very similar to the bubble policy. The averaging of concentrations
transformed certain areas into active lead credit markets. This development was enhanced by the
permission by the USEPA to bank credits in 1987. In the next couple of years over 10 billion
grams of lead were banked and these provisions saved $226 million in abatement costs (USEPA
2001).
The acid rain program was also successful in the late 1990s. Sulfur dioxide credits were
traded and banked by polluters, and pollution rates and costs of abatement declined rapidly. The
difference between the lead credit trading program and the acid rain program can be distinguished
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by observing the process of how the pollution credits were traded. The acid rain program was a
cap-and-trade program, and the lead credit trading program was a rate-based program. The acid
rain program had an absolute cap, and trades had to take place within that capped amount. The
lead trading program was set in terms of concentrations. A refinery could produce as much lead
pollution as it desire as long as the refinery’s average lead concentration met USEPA’s limit.
The acid rain program set a cap of 8.95 million tons of sulfur dioxide per year. Firms
over-achieved this reduction target from 1995 through 1997 with less than half the cost of a
command and control structure. Initial estimates of abatement costs determined by USEPA and
the industry placed reductions per ton between $750 and $1000. But, allowance prices have
remained below $200 and prices reached a low of $66 per ton in 1995. Estimates suggest that
allowance trading could save from $700 to $800 million a year compared to a uniform emission
standard regulatory approach (Stavins, 1998).
Air emissions trading is conceptually similar to water quality trading, but effluent trading
has lagged in development and has not produced any success stories similar to the acid rain
program. In 1983 the bubble policy debuted in USEPA’s water programs after several years of
application to air quality. The effluent bubble policy was the result of a settlement agreement
between the USEPA, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the American Iron and Steel
Institute. The bubble policy only applied to facilities within the iron and steel industry, and
consequently, the program saved approximately $122 million versus the $435 million saved with
the initial air program bubbles (Kashmanian, 1995).
Besides the iron and steel bubble policy a few effluent trading programs were developed
in the early 1980s. The state of Wisconsin created one of the earliest programs for point sources
along the industrialized Fox River. During this early stage of trading the Wisconsin program
hampered buyers and sellers by placing restrictions on the suppliers of credits. Suppliers could

19

only sell credits to three types of firms: new entrants, those that could not meet required
discharge limits after complying with government required technological controls, and those that
intended to increase production (USEPA, 2007).
In the air quality trading programs point sources trade with other point sources similarly
to the Fox River example above, but many water quality trading programs would likely take place
between a point source credit purchaser and a non-point source credit producer. Several water
quality trading programs have been set up between point and non-point sources, but over its
twenty year history effluent trading has not had the same type of robust development that has
occurred from air emissions trading. Despite this lack of success, in the last several years water
quality trading has experienced increased interest by many political leaders and upper-level
government officials.
Institutional Barriers to Water Quality Trading
Economists and more recently, policy makers, have advocated water quality trading
programs as a way to improve efficiencies of environmental protection initiatives, minimize or
postpone costs for abatement activities, offer flexible paths toward compliance, while continuing
to allow population growth and economic development to occur. Unfortunately, at the present
time water quality trading markets fall far short from the ideal benefits that may be gained
through various implementation strategies. The literature has revealed that uncertainties and risk
that arise from non-point source nutrient reduction activities, the complex interactions between
nutrients and individual waterbodies, and the temporal discharge differences between point
sources and non-point sources on a yearly or multi-year timescale have presented obstacles for
water quality trading programs. Issues of liability between point sources and non-point sources
also play a role in preventing water quality trading programs from developing fully. Water
quality trading programs around the country are immature. There are a number of programs that
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have been developed, but at the present time only a few trades have taken place because of the
obstacles that have been created.
Many water quality trading programs are not able to realize the potential benefits that
could be gained from trading because of institutional, political, or informational barriers that
exist. Unlike markets for most commodities, many water quality trading programs do not have
the public or private institutional structures to provide market information, to locate potential
trading partners, or to enforce rules for exchange. The lack of these types of institutional,
political, and informational structures cause potential trading parties to expend considerable
amounts of resources in order to engage in water quality trading transactions.
The analysis of the incorporation of wetlands technology into emerging water quality
trading programs can be guided by the transaction costs economics literature originated by Oliver
Williamson (1985, 1996). Transaction costs theory focuses on why various governance structures
emerge and how they adapt in response to the challenge of mitigating transaction costs. The costs
that are considered by this type of theory are ex-ante costs including: negotiating, proposing, and
safeguarding agreements. Ex-post costs are also considered. These may include costs associated
with contractual breakdowns, enforcement costs, and rent seeking behavior.
Transaction cost theory assumes that agents are subject to bounded rationality. Bounded
rationality stems from Simon’s (1957) principal-agent theory.

Principal-agent theory is an

economic concept that refers to the idea of motivating one party to act on behalf of another.
Many types of incentives may be used to align the goals of the agent with those of the principal.
A very common example of this type of relationship is that of stockholders and corporate
executives.

Chief stockholders sit on a board of advisors that hire and dismiss corporate

executives. These individuals are considered to be the principals. They hire an individual, the
agent, to perform in such a way as to increase the value of their respective stock. The agent has
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certain expertise, knowledge, or other considerations that make him valuable to the principals.
The principals lack the time or resources to operate the company.

The principals in this

relationship may entice the executive with forms of profit sharing, commissions, efficiency
wages, or even through the risk of being fired. Simon (1957) emphasized that agents face
information costs in the present and uncertainty about the future. This status forces agents to
make decisions by seeking the first satisfactory solution rather than optimizing a rational decision
based on perfect knowledge. Simon suggested that classical "economic man" is familiar with all
alternative courses of action and their consequences and make decisions based on maximization
of welfare. Simon claimed that agents face cost and uncertainty issues in acquiring information
in the future. Thus, he proposed the idea that agents would “satisfice” themselves by not
maximizing their behavior through fully rational decisions. Simon claimed that people are only
rational to a certain extent. He argued that their rationality would relax when it was no longer
required.

This process is known as “bounded rationality.”

From a water quality trading

standpoint the principal-agent relationship is similar to the relationship between point sources and
non-point sources. Non-point sources are employed to reduce their nutrient output levels in order
to meet the permit limits of the non-point sources.
Williamson’s transaction costs theory contends that transactions will be organized so as
to economize on bounded rationality while continuously protecting against the hazards of
opportunism. Through an evolutionary process competition will occur between firms and the
most efficient forms should prevail (Williamson, 1996). If transaction costs are relatively high
concerning water quality trading transactions between point sources and non-point sources then
there becomes a need for an institutional structure or mechanism to manage the transactions.
Some form of initial regulation is necessary in order to set discharge limits for water quality
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trading, but other institutional structures may also be necessary in order to assist in the actual
trading process.
Colby (1995) suggested that the conflict that exists between market-oriented and
regulatory approaches to resource allocation stems from disputes over the appropriate balance
between market forces and laws promulgated to protect the broader social values of a particular
resource. Colby argued that transaction costs reflect the costs associated with the collection of
information concerning the legal, scientific, and economic needed in order to address externalities
in an efficient manner.
Anderson and Snyder (1997) suggested that only minimal government intervention is
necessary in order to set up a market for water resources. They suggested that there are three
justifications for government involvement in water resource markets: imperfect capital markets,
monopoly, or externalities. They acknowledged that the most legitimate concern deals with
externalities, but they warned that rent seeking behavior can stem from too much government
regulation. They argued that much of the governmental regulation during the 20th century dealing
with reclamation projects in the western United States resulted from rent seeking behavior instead
of an interest to protect public water supplies.
From a comparative approach Williamson (1985) argued that the transactions being
conducted and the people involved in the transactions should be analyzed in a way to determine
the costs of contractual governance. The governance structure with the least transaction costs
will be chosen from the best available options. For instance, if a transaction involves a high level
of uncertainty or transaction-specific assets, and the participants are subject to opportunism, then
the transaction should be organized in a hierarchical structure rather than in a market. This can be
interpreted from transaction cost theory because in this case the authority is believed to be a
stronger mechanism than price to curb opportunism.
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Reasoning for Including Wetlands into a
Water Quality Trading Program
An analysis of U.S. water impairment patterns based on section 305 (b) of the Clean
Water Act report was submitted by the states through the 1998 National Water Quality Report to
Congress (USEPA, 2007).

This analysis supports the notion that was discussed earlier

concerning the position that non-point sources of pollution are the leading sources of pollutants
responsible for the majority of the impairments to waters in the United States.
Managing nutrients like nitrogen pollution is a significant and growing problem for U.S.
waters. There is ever-increasing evidence that suggests that human intervention in the nitrogen
cycle has dramatically changed the distribution and movement of nitrogen in the landscape, and
that these alterations pose risks to human health and the environment (Vitousek, 1997). More
recent scientific reports link nitrogen pollution to lake acidification, soil degradation, and
eutrophication. Recent reports have established that nitrogen pollution from air and water sources
can pose a significant threat to lakes, streams, rivers, and coastal waters leading to toxic algal
blooms (Smayda 1989) and creating dissolved oxygen problems (Rabalais & Nixon 2002). These
concerns have been extended beyond water resources to include impacts on climate change
(Vitousek, 1997), forest declines (Aber, 1998), and reductions in grassland biodiversity (Tilman,
1996). Nitrogen inputs to the nation’s aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems are likely to increase in
the future, but there is positive recent analysis that suggests that natural systems recover from
nitrogen pollution through natural processes over time.

Thus, natural systems can absorb

nutrients like nitrogen, but many of our current natural systems are overloaded or too few to
affect the large portions of nutrients that flow through the waterways of the United States.
Wetlands have recently been targeted for their ecological function of absorption and
transformation of nutrients like sediments and nitrogen. In a 2005 National Wetlands Newsletter
article, Eric Raffini and Morgan Robertson speculated on what a water quality trading market
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could learn from wetland mitigation banking and observed that “a market could emerge that
would provide non-point source credits to point source dischargers, helping them meet permit
obligations in much the same way that the wetland credit market emerged to help section 404
permittees meet Clean Water Act mitigation requirements.” This notion generated a great deal of
interest in incorporating wetlands into a water quality trading program. Over the past two years,
federal agencies have sponsored workshops on the use of wetlands in generating water quality
trading credits (USEPA, ORD, 2006), a workshop concerning the similarities between wetlands
mitigation banking and water quality trading (National Forum, 2005), and a national water quality
trading conference (ETI, 2006). Robertson and Mikota (2007) followed the experiences shared at
these venues, and gave the assessment in the March-April 2007 edition of the National Wetlands
Newsletter that “it has become increasingly apparent that point-to-non-point water quality trading
faces very different challenges than wetlands mitigation banking did in its formative stage and,
thus, must be designed to solve these different problems.” There is a great deal of interest in
developing an institutional structure that will incorporate wetlands into a water quality trading
program design, and there are many reasons why this particular concept shows promise.
Currently, constructed wetlands are being effectively used to remove excess nutrients
from wastewater treatment plant effluents. (Kadlec & Knight, 1996) Some experts, (Hey &
Philippi, 1999), have suggested that a strategically planned arrangement of constructed, restored,
enhanced, and natural wetlands could be used to reduce the nutrient and sediment impacts from
surplus non-point source loadings. The USEPA is currently discussing this approach as a means
of reducing nitrogen loading to the Gulf of Mexico from the Mississippi River Basin in order to
reduce the annual hypoxia problem that has been occurring for a number of years. Hey (2002)
coined the term “nitrogen farming” as a way of describing the process of removing nitrogen from
watersheds through wetland economical functions. Technical issues related to how wetland
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functions operate still must be investigated, and economic values must be assigned to these
functions in order to create credits. These investigations must be attended to before wetlands can
be incorporated into a water quality trading program.
Designs for watershed trading for control of nitrogen loadings have been proposed from
various researchers. However, there is a tremendous amount of research that remains concerning
the policy design and implementation utilization of wetlands in a water quality trading program.
Under certain conditions markets can lead to efficient and effective outcomes, but the policy
structure that creates overarching institutional structure must be firmly in place for this to occur.
In some cases trading may not be feasible at the present time because the desired ecological
outcomes may not be match accordingly to the transaction costs of implementation. Wetlands,
however, in some situations may prove to be the most applicable and most effective nutrient
abatement technology that could be implemented into a water quality trading program.
If wetlands were similar to other nutrient abatement technology, there would not be any
debate concerning wetland types for use in water quality trading. Producers would choose from a
suite of various abatement options based on minimizing their costs. If certain types of wetlands
represented the least cost method of creating nutrient credits then those wetlands would be
employed.
Wetlands have other functions that benefit humans directly or indirectly unlike other
abatement techniques or technology. These benefits are refered to wetland services. These
services include habitat creation, flood control, and carbon sequestration. Wetlands that are
restored for water quality purposes also would provide additional services. These services are
called positive externalities by economists and may not simply accrue to those involved in the
restoration of a specific wetland area.

USEPA considers these positive externalities to be

ancillary benefits of water quality trading which could accrue to the general public or just to the

26

private landowner. Regulators will need to determine whether the ancillary benefits actually
should contribute to the generation of credits for water quality. Accurate assessment is vital in
order to achieve the most optimal levels of increasing net wetland acres throughout the nation.
Increases in wetland acres are important, but it is also very important to maintain wetland
diversity within a watershed and across eco-regions. Constructed monotype wetlands may not be
recognized as restored wetlands that count towards the increase in wetland acres, and certain
wetlands within a watershed may contribute more to nutrient removal based on their spatial
setting.
Byström et al. (2000) provide three criteria that must be met in order to use wetlands as a
method for nitrogen reduction:


Wetland abatement capacity must increase as the number of acres of wetlands
increase,



Wetlands must reduce the uncertainty (or variance) of total nitrogen load or keep
it the same, and



If the first two criteria are met, then wetlands must be the least cost technology.

The first two criteria require a knowledge of the wetland abatement function in a
particular location and may have to be answered by wetland experts. The last criterion creates
part of the incentive for wetlands to be used in the water quality trading program.
Byström estimates the abatement costs of wetlands in Sweden. Costs are based on acres
of wetlands and construction costs. Construction costs include the opportunity costs of land or
the value of its next best use. Byström calculates that, in the region of Kattegatt of Sweden,
wetlands have a lower marginal control cost compared to using cover crops or catch crops to take
up the nutrients, but a higher marginal control cost than reducing fertilizer. Hey et al. compare
wastewater treatment technology and wetland abatement in the District of Greater Chicago.
Depending on the season, Hey et al. (2005) find that marginal control costs for wetlands ranged
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from $960 to $3000 to remove a ton of nitrogen. The common technology ranged from $2810 to
$10,100 per ton. However, both Byström and Hey et al. used private costs only and did not
consider the potential benefits of wetlands.
Opportunities to trade credits exist, and some trading programs have included wetlands in
their approved lists of best management practices (BMPs).

Very few farmers have taken

advantage of wetlands for conservation purposes, and there have been no official trades between
point and non-point polluters that included wetlands. Demand for credits that are generated from
wetlands from agricultural sources may be low because of uncertainty over the credits it can
produce.

Much of agricultural pollution is considered to be non-point and may also be

contributed to through runoff, groundwater leaching, or the atmosphere. Therefore, it is difficult
to predict with certainty the amount of discharge reduction (or production of credits) the
implementation of management practices will produce at the point in the watershed where credits
are measured. This may discourage demand for agricultural credits by regulated firms that are
legally responsible for meeting discharge limits. Uncertainty could be reduced by more intensive
monitoring, but that may be challenging and possibly even expensive. Such transaction costs
could negate the benefits of trading. Future research is needed in order to better estimate the
costs of monitoring for certain types of nutrients within watersheds, and the applicability of
monitoring nutrient uptake efficiencies of wetlands in a watershed context. One reason why the
Acid Rain Trading Program has been so successful is that the cost of measuring emissions is low.
The commodity, SO2, is easily measured and tracking is relatively inexpensive.
Uncertainty over the production of credits affects the supply side as well. Because of the
nature of pollution from agriculture, and the need to assess credits at the point where regulated
sources actually discharge, land owners may be unaware of the number of credits they can
actually produce. There is also the problem of price. If there is not a general understanding of
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what a credit is then there are not many ways a land owner can assess the price that he may
charge for the service he is providing.
Land owners also may be reluctant to participate in a program that is partly regulatory,
even with compensation. Some have suggested that land owners are fearful that information
about their contributions to water quality and costs of pollution abatement could eventually be
used to develop regulations for agricultural pollution. Risk and uncertainty are the leading
reasons why trades have not occurred, and this uncertainty is increased in many aspects when
discussing the role of wetlands in water quality trading.
Another supply-side issue is the treatment of credits generated on farms through publicly
funded conservation programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). Since credits from conservation programs
are already partly or fully funded, some trading programs do not allow them to be traded. A
farmer participating in a conservation program would have to implement additional conservation
measures to participate in a trading program. This would raise the cost of credits, making them
less attractive to those wishing to purchase credits.
The coordination of policy guidelines between trading programs and the farm subsidy
programs could be helpful in creating supply of credits. But, monitoring, verification, and
enforcement are three factors that are essential for trading to function in an efficient and effective
way. The incorporation of wetlands into water quality trading shows promise, but there must be
verification standards and analysis that better distinguishes how wetlands operate within a
watershed. As well, water quality standards must be desirable and enforceable for a trading
program to have a demand and supply driver. Lastly, performance measures must be derived in
order to provide more precise estimates of what is actually being traded.
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Trading Ratios for Wetlands
Trading ratios are used to translate the ecological effects of pollution from different
sources into a common unit. Ideally, they must capture the impacts, uncertainty, and transaction
costs related to the individual sources and trade (Horan, 2005). These ratios affect the trades
accepted for allowing point sources to purchase pollution control from non-point sources. A 2:1
ratio means that point sourcess would be required to purchase two units of non-point pollution
control for every unit of pollution released. Non-point sources are encouraged to reduce more
pollution, but the ratios do not necessarily encourage non-point sources to construct or restore
wetlands that will produce the ancillary benefits previously discussed. In fact, in most cases
current ratios do not express any attempt to assess performance levels or spatial considerations.
Nutrient trading ratios can be designed to account for the location of a wetland or other
BMP within a watershed. This can be referred to as a delivery ratio. Currently, delivery ratios
are based on distance from the BMP project to the location of the pollution source that is
purchasing the credit. Delivery ratios vary greatly in current trading programs from 100% in
riparian areas to 10% in areas greater than ¼ mile from the receiving water body. Ratio discounts
range from 1:1 to 3:1 (Breetz et al., 2004). The general reason why trading ratios are currently
applied to trading programs is to ensure that water quality in a watershed is protected and trades
between sources distributed within the watershed positively affect the overall condition of the
water body. Ratios in most programs do not distinguish between BMPs and they do not provide
accurate accounts of nutrient removal. Future delivery trading ratios will need to provide for the
transmission loss of nutrients within the river system, and further research will be required in
order to understand how distance and other watershed parameters affect nutrient uptake within
wetlands at the watershed scale.
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Ratios also may be constructed to better ascertain the actual nutrient reduction of the
applied abatement technology. A higher level of certainty of nutrient reduction would yield a
lower ratio that would approach a 1:1 scale. Increased levels of uncertainty would yield higher
ratios. In this respect, wetlands may outperform other abatement technologies like buffer strips
because of the ability to measure direct nutrient discharge. Further study is needed in order to
provide information regarding the types of wetlands that would provide more certainty
concerning direct nutrient reduction as compared to other abatement technology.
The performance of wetlands concerning nutrient uptake must be assessed and verified to
ensure that a trading program will be successful. In many trading programs BMPs are certified
when they are installed, and some programs recommend annual spot checks for assessment
purposes (Breetz, 2004). Monitoring does not occur in most trading programs because it has been
suggested that it would be prohibitively expensive and a long monitoring period is required to
provide conclusive results. The Great Miami River Watershed Water Quality Trading Program is
currently active in monitoring and verifying reductions within the watershed at points that are
located downstream from non-point source BMPs. This monitoring is currently being funded by
National Resource Conservation Service Grants. This program also uses site-specific inspection
at 5-10% of the BMPs. (Kieser & Associates, 2003) This type of monitoring and verification is
not the most accurate method for assessing the performance of BMPs, and further research is
needed in order to better ascertain the correct level of monitoring that is necessary for specific
types of BMPs, especially wetlands. Non-point sources within the Miami Watershed are not
being monitored, and therefore there is not an assessment of how individual BMPs are affecting
the nutrient loading that is taking place within the water body. Within the field of monitoring and
verification, there is a need to also further analyze how different wetland types reduce nutrient
loads at the watershed scale.
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Wetland Location: Determining Nutrient
Load Reduction Credits
Monitoring and verification of nutrient removal performance of a wetland within a
watershed context has advantages and disadvantages.

Increased monitoring can lessen

uncertainties in terms of modeling nutrient loss and the extent to which nutrients are found in
downstream water bodies. The major disadvantage of monitoring the effectiveness of nutrient
reduction is that it can be difficult in natural and restored wetlands to measure nutrient inputs
because inlets often extend over relatively broad areas. Cost considerations have been raised as
obstacle to monitoring, but there are not any current cost models that have been developed to
assess nutrient reduction capabilities of wetlands within a watershed context.
Constructed wetlands are much easier to monitor because they can be designed with
limited inlets and outlets. Specific measurements can be made at the inlet and outlet areas and
differences can be compared to quantify nutrient removal efficiency. However, monitoring
approaches should also account for seasonal and spatial variability in nutrient uptake efficiency
(Wetzel, 2001).
Temporal factors are very important in analyzing nutrient removal efficiency, but spatial
factors are very important as well. Removal efficiency levels can vary significantly depending on
the position of the wetland in relation to the surrounding landscape and watershed. Wetlands
located at the headwaters of a watershed may have limited opportunity in some cases to intercept
nutrients. On the other hand, wetlands located in lower areas of the watershed may experience
higher flow rates that limit efficiency. A study of wetlands used for 40 years to treat wastewater
in Florida found that total phosphorus in wetlands sediments was significantly correlated with
depth and distance from the point of surface water inflow (White, 2003). Variability in flow
patterns and velocity are the two greatest limitations to maximizing retention capacities of
nutrients in wetlands. Tracer experimentation can be used in order to better understand the water
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flow patterns or the hydraulic residence time distributions for specific wetland areas (Wetzel,
2001).
Water Quality Trading and Wetland
Policy Considerations
An essential factor of incorporating wetlands into water quality trading is the need for
verification of various wetland type capacities for nutrient reduction. Monitoring data will be
necessary in order to provide information on the efficiency levels of wetlands to reduce nutrient
loads in a watershed. This information is necessary in order to differentiate wetlands from other
BMPs. If wetlands are not somehow differentiated from other BMPs then least cost applications
will prevail.
In the future, multiple markets may exist to better account for the ancillary benefits of
wetlands.

If well-functioning markets were to exist for the different services provided by

wetlands, the ancillary benefits would be accounted and the externalities would be internalized.
Currently, there are not markets for some of the services provided by wetlands. Therefore, the
focus of differentiation for wetlands would not be more services, but a higher level of service for
nutrient reduction. The higher level of efficiency that might be attained with the implementation
of wetlands for water quality trading could prove to be the differentiation that distinguishes
wetlands from other BMPs.
A word of caution should also be acknowledged with the focus of wetlands as nutrient
reducers. Trade-offs could exist in most cases between wetland functions that supported the
highest nutrient storage capacity versus increased ancillary benefits. Wildlife habitat or flood
mitigation benefits may not be realized if specific types of wetlands are restored or created. It
may be necessary for regulators or wetland experts to determine the combination of plant species
and hydrologic functions in order to improve water quality and increase wetland acres. However,
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consider how the regulator or wetland expert could direct the revenues and costs of a particular
producer (e.g., location, mix of plants, etc.).
Ecosystems generate societal values and benefits supplied by their resources that
resemble ecological stock and flow designs. Value identification and establishment for these
resources is important to policymakers. The total economic value of an ecosystem is the amount
of money that all people who benefit from the watershed would be willing to pay to see it
protected (Whitehead, 1992). This total economic value is the amount society would be willing
to pay for the services and attributes of the ecosystem if they were not provided free of charge.
This value comprises: market economic value, which is established by transactional precedent,
and non-market economic value, which is approximated by public opinion or alternate strategy.
The value that society places on wetlands and watersheds is based on their existence and
services provided. As well, values are attributed to these resources because of current and future
consumptive and non-consumptive uses. For example, consumptive uses of wetland outputs
include fish harvests from fisheries dependent upon wetlands. Consumptive uses of wetlands
may also include conversions of acreage to cropland. Non-consumptive benefits usually have a
more long-term aspect assigned to them. These types of benefits could be attributed to aesthetics
or flood control. Each of these values is multi-dimensional and could be assessed from several
perspectives including: individual owners, individual users, regional perspectives, and societal
perspectives (Leitch & Frigden, 1998).

Some analysts have determined that market values are

lower than non-market values for watersheds and wetlands (Stedman & Hanson, 2005).
Public policy makers face short-term and long-term strategic decisions that have great
impacts on the productivity and health of natural resource systems like wetlands and watersheds.
Various alternatives are always available for managing theses systems, and economic valuation
provides a metric for comparing the performance of strategic alternatives over time. The cost of
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establishing the market economic value of a natural system is directly proportional to the
complexity of the system being analyzed. The diversity of preferences given by the valuing
stakeholders, and the volatility of defining markets both contribute to multifaceted interpretation
of environmental public and private goods.

Interpretations of how to value resources like

wetlands and watersheds can be vastly different. Some of the causes of these differences include:
lack of well defined scientific or economic information, site-specific natural variability,
communication barriers among various research disciplines, unclear context of why valuation is
needed, and economic principles are not followed (Leitch & Frigden, 1998). Many of these
challenges are readily overcome when adequate time is made available and sufficient resources
are invested for analysis.
Non-market valuations are essential in assessing the economic value of a policy to direct
a water quality trading program that focuses on wetlands. Water quality controls, stream flow
controls, and habitat management are all examples of non-marketable natural services that are
considered public goods. These values are hard to quantify, but it is essential to include these
values in the economic assessments of the value of wetlands in a water quality trading program.
Wetlands and watersheds perform multiple biological and hydrological functions that produce
both public and private goods and services.

The functions and values that they elicit are

intricately intertwined and ecologically linked. Non-market economic valuation techniques are
widely used in the valuation of policy planning, and these techniques are very important in the
valuation of natural resources policy because the non-market component of natural resources
economic value typically outweighs the market component of economic value (Fausold &
Lilieholm, 1999). However, in many cases it is difficult to complete a non-market economic
valuation rapidly enough and with enough detail to inform decision makers. Focus should be
place on the effective interpretation of the results and not just the numeric results themselves.
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Economic considerations must support the idea of wetland’s incorporation into a water
quality trading program, and the constructed market must be able to consider the true valuation of
and exchange between point and non-point sources. But, the scientific understanding of how
wetlands remove nutrients from a watershed must be thoroughly analyzed as well.

The

establishment of sophisticated methods of decision making and evaluating risk are negligible if
information gaps understanding the science of wetland functions are not filled.

Better

assessments and valuations of wetland functions will enable policy makers to quantify the value
of investing in a water quality trading program that incorporates wetland technology as a
pollution management strategy of choice.
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CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Wetland Nutrient Removal Capabilities
Water quality trading policy is still in its infancy, but wetland resources, on the other
hand, have been studied, regulated, and politically interpreted in the United States for well over a
hundred years. Yet, with all of this attention there is still a great deal of mystery that surrounds
the natural services that they provide. The word, wetland, is a generic term that represents a vast
universe of wet habitats that include marshes, swamps, fens, bogs, and similar areas. The
definition of wetland informally refers the interface between truly terrestrial ecosystems and
aquatic systems making them inherently different from each type of system while at the same
time dependent on both (Mitsch & Gosselink, 2000). Wetlands are known as ecotones and serve
as transition areas for two different types of ecological communities, ecosystems. The word,
ecosystem, was coined by A.G. Tansley (1935), a plant ecologist almost fifty years after the
concept was defined by Stephen Forbes, a zoologist with interests in aquatic environments. In
1887 Forbes wrote an essay describing the architecture of the environment by specifically
discussing how the organisms of a lake constantly affect each other through a complex interaction
of predation and competition. This holistic scientific and policy viewpoint lay dormant for many
years because of the demand for scientists and engineers to produce information and analysis on
the basis of specifics. Over the past couple of decades federal agencies have started to create
policy guidelines based the ideas of holistic ecosystem management. Yet, there is still much
private confusion over the meaning of this approach (Christensen et al., 1996). In fact, wetland
definitions over the past century have been created based on the specific functions being studied
at one particular time or another.

Nathaniel Shaler’s General Account of the Freshwater

Morasses of the United States was one of the earliest reports on the nation’s wetlands published
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in 1890. At the time, Shaler’s report focused on the relationships between wetlands and farming.
His definition of a “swamp” was:
all areas in which the natural declivity is insufficient, when the forest cover is removed,
to reduce the soil to the measure of dryness necessary for agriculture. Wherever any
form of engineering is necessary to secure this desiccation, the area is classified as
swamp. (Shaler, 1890)
By the end of the 20th century scientists were beginning to classify wetlands by focusing
on particular attribute types as noted by Lefor and Kennard (1977). These attribute types spanned
a large environmental gradient. There are no overarching truths that apply to all wetlands.
Wetland types are very diverse and wetland scientists are becoming aware that in their pursuit to
restore and create wetlands many unknowns provide obstacles to defining guidelines for
successful wetland assessment and design for policy applications. In some instances wetland
scientists have an understanding of how certain functions operate within a specific area. It is very
important to note all the specific functions that wetlands provide, but it is also important to
understand how these various functions interact and correspond with each other to provide
benefits at the watershed scale.
Wetland Policy in the United States
Wetland science and wetland regulation policy are both relatively new and rapidly
evolving branches of ecosystem and sociopolitical science. Both wetland science and regulation
policy develop in a highly charged political atmosphere.

The two areas have an intense

relationship that “in many ways is reminiscent of the relationship between nuclear physics and
national defense 50 years ago” (Lewis, 2001). In many cases regulatory initiatives and policy
applications raise unanswered scientific questions.
For over 150 years the U.S. Government has been involved with wetland issues. From
the 1850s to the 1970s the Federal Government promoted the elimination of wetland areas. Over
the past 30 years the importance of wetlands to water quality, marine fisheries, flood abatement,
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and biodiversity has been acknowledged and valued to some extent by federal, state, and local
policies. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act deals with wetlands, and this regulation has
required the replacement of wetlands lost to development under a policy now known as “no net
loss of wetlands” (USEPA and USACE 1990; NWPF 1987). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) issues permits to those individuals who wish to dredge or fill wetlands, and these
permits often require “compensatory mitigation.” This type of mitigation usually refers to the
restoration of former wetlands to balance the effects of wetland loss. Wetlands mitigation
banking represents the oldest existing market for ecosystems services. In 2005 the USEPA
sponsored a workshop on the lessons for water quality trading to be drawn from wetland
mitigation banking (ELI, 2005). From the proceedings it became quite clear that water quality
trading faces very different challenges than wetland mitigation banking did in its formative stage.
Thus, the policy features and regulatory influences must be designed differently in order to solve
different problem sets. Water quality trading and wetlands mitigation banking do share two very
important aspects concerning wetlands: wetland condition and functionality. Water quality
trading programs incorporate wetlands to improve water quality, and mitigation banking
programs assess and offset wetland areas in order to provide “no net loss of wetlands.”
Robertson and Mikota (2007) provide an analysis of why the two types of policy programs are
different, but from a wetland science perspective there are very similar functions that take place
within wetland systems regardless of whether they are incorporated into a water quality trading
program or a wetland mitigation banking program. The nutrient removal function of water
quality improvement is very necessary to understand in order to set policy guidelines for water
quality trading. At the present time mitigation banking policies focus on the condition of the
wetland and water quality trading policies focus on the nutrient reduction or transformation
abilities of a type of wetland, but condition and functionality are intertwined. A review of what is
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known about wetland functions for nutrient reduction is very necessary in order to guide water
quality trading program policies that incorporate wetland technology.
For a long period of time environmental economists have advocated the implementation
of market mechanisms to promote ecosystem services on the grounds that the prices that
customers pay for these services should fully consider the financial costs of degradation
(Costanza et al., 1997; Daily & Ellison, 2002). Some wetland scientists have also contended that
the scientific evidence explaining wetland conditions and functions should guide public policy
concerning wetland resources (Lewis, 2001).

In order for market mechanisms to promote

ecosystem services, the services themselves must be identified and understood. The condition of
a wetland may be quite variable over time, and certain functions of wetlands may depend upon
climate, temporal, regional, or hydrological conditions. All of these factors must be reviewed to
analyze the possibility of incorporating wetlands in to a water quality trading program at the
watershed scale.
Wetland Nutrient Removal for Water Quality Trading
The function of specific wetlands areas as nutrient transformers depends on the wetland
type, hydrologic condition, and the length of time the wetland is subjected to nutrient loading.
Wetlands have been shown to be sinks or storage places for nitrogen and phosphorus, but many
wetlands do not exhibit this trait. The function of wetlands is closely related to adjoining land
and water bodies, and this is why it is important to research wetland nutrient uptake capacities at
the watershed scale. Also, the capacity of natural wetlands to store and transform nutrients is
directly related to the amount of nutrients available within an ecosystem. Vast changes in the
amount, increases or decreases, could have an effect on the performance of the wetland to provide
water quality improvement (Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000). Constructed wetlands may require
significant maintenance in order to sustain a specific level of nutrient removal, and it may be
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economically and ecologically challenging to maintain this or a greater level of uptake in
perpetuity without the proper investment.
The results of many wetland nutrient removal studies have been inconsistent.

A

compilation of data from over sixty studies of fifty-seven wetland ecosystems throughout several
countries suggests that the mean percentage change in nutrient load was between 67% and 27%
for nitrogen and between 58% and 23% for phosphorus. Estimates suggest that 80% of these
wetlands removed some level of nitrogen and 84% removed some level of phosphorus (Fisher &
Acreman, 2004). Braskerud (2002) contends that his study of surface flow wetlands in Norway
only provide nitrogen removal efficiencies that ranged between 3% and 15% because of high
hydraulic load and low temperatures. Luederitz et al. (2001) reported a total nitrogen and
phosphorus removal rate of greater than 90% in constructed reed bed wetlands in Germany.
Seasonality also plays a very important role in nutrient uptake efficiencies as discussed in some
of the studies mentioned. Nitrogen removal performances varied by up to 40% between summer
and winter months in Hungary according to Szabo et al. (2001).
Many generalizations can be made from a policy perspective regarding the function of
wetlands as transformers, sources, or sinks for nutrients, but the complex and unique situation
that involves individual wetlands limits these types of generalizations to actual applied policy
procedures. Wetlands can be a sink for a form of nitrogen at one moment in time and a source for
the same nitrogen element at another time depending on a range of factors. Inconsistent results
from studies also generate problems for generalizations because of the imprecise approaches to
measuring nutrient changes over time within various wetlands. There is little consensus in the
literature about nitrogen and phosphorus fate in wetlands (Mitsch & Gosselink, 2000). There also
seems to be a bias toward researching the vegetation and productivity that limits the
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understanding of soil and microbial processes specific to wetlands that enable some forms of
nutrient transformation (Johnston, 1991; Wetzel, 2001).
Regardless of the inconsistencies concerning wetland nutrient transformation mentioned,
constructed wetlands have shown in some cases to be effective at removing nutrients and
sediment from wastewater treatment plant effluent when the wetlands are co-located at a
discharging facility. Constructed wetlands at the watershed scale may be an effective method to
lessen the harmful effects of nutrients on waterbodies (Cooper & Findlater, 1990; Hammer, 1989
and 1996; Kadlec & Knight, 2004), but there are other issues that deal with the sustainability, the
implementation, and the long-term objectives of watershed plans that must be analyzed when
considering the use of incorporating wetlands as a potential water quality improvement technique
in order to improve water quality and increase restored wetland acres. Further research is needed
concerning the life-cycle of wetlands that retain nutrients and the long-term capacity of restored
wetlands to function as water filters.
At the present time there have not been any successful large scale projects that have
monitored, managed, or described the hydrological functions of natural or constructed wetlands at
the watershed level. As noted earlier, there have been small scale studies that have shown the
effectiveness of wetlands to absorb nutrients. But, what types of changes would be encountered
within a watershed based on the scale of wetland restoration activities or construction activities?
The formation, size, functions, and persistence of wetlands are controlled by hydrologic
processes. Other differences in wetlands depend upon variables like water quality, the movement
of water through the wetland, and the degree of natural or anthropogenic disturbance. Therefore,
wetlands are distributed unevenly throughout the United States because of differences in geology,
climate, source of water, and other natural and man-made factors.
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Scientists commonly investigate hydrologic questions by determining how much water is
moving through a system. This knowledge is then used to characterize how the system functions.
The hydrologic cycle is a dynamic process that includes the components of precipitation, surfacewater flow, ground-water flow, and evapotranspiration. Various wetland types receive different
water budgets throughout the year. The water budget that can be measured for a specific wetland
area would be derived from subtracting the total outflows from the total inflows.

But, as

mentioned earlier, this is a dynamic process that depends upon seasonality, climate, and other
factors. The accuracy of individual components of a water budget for a wetland depends on how
well they can be measured and the magnitude of the associated errors. This measurement is vital
in understanding how natural or constructed wetlands would fit into a water quality trading
program. Natural wetlands depend on a certain level of moisture in order to thrive, and variations
in hydrologic regimes during times of drought or abundance of rain may interfere with large-scale
constructed wetlands’ ability to treat nutrient loads (Mitsch & Gosselink, 2000).
The hydrologic cycle is also the most significant determinant of vegetation within the
wetland. This, in turn, affects water quality and biological diversity. Water chemistry also plays
a role in what types of plant species exist within a wetland.

Wetland types in many cases can be

identified by their hydrologic functions and hydrochemistry. For instance, bogs and fens are two
major types of peat land that are identified by the USEPA as being specialized wetland types.
Bogs and fens are mostly found in the in the northeast and Great Lakes regions, but some
southern bogs and pocosins can be found in the southeast. These types of wetlands may be hard
to distinguish by a simple glance, but further observation would conclude that the main difference
between the two is their water supply.
Various studies of the effect of hydrologic conditions have revealed inconsistent results.
Hydrologic conditions in a wetland can influence the efficiency of processes that remove
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nutrients from water (Sakadevan & Bavor, 1999). Residence time was negatively correlated with
total nitrogen and phosphorus removal in constructed subsurface flow wetlands (Schulz, 2003).
Dierberg et al. (2002) found that as residence time increased, nutrient reductions also increased.
Lin et al. (2002) found that nutrient removal efficiencies were unaffected by variation in loading
rates, and Knight et al. (2000) found that removal of nutrients was a function of inlet
concentrations and loading rates within a temporal scale.
In order for wetlands to be nutrient reducers within a water quality trading program the
outflows of water from a wetland area must have nutrient levels that are lower than the inflows,
and the reductions must be measurable. One of the key elements for nutrient reduction in
wetlands involves inundation. Inundation greatly affects the oxygen content of the soil and
produces anaerobic conditions. Though, in many wetland areas the surface soil tends to retain an
oxidized layer due to the proximity to the water column, microbial activity, and oxygen
translocation within rooted plants (Tanner, 2001). Inundation also affects nutrient transformation
because it helps to determine pH levels. Water within a natural wetland may be fresh, saline,
acidic, or basic depending upon the source and inundation periods. For instance, fens are a type
of wetland that depends heavily on ground water for their hydrologic cycle.

Fens can be

described as a stage in the succession from shallow lakes to bogs. In most cases fens also can be
distinguished from bogs in being alkaline of calcareous wetlands with pH levels that stabilize
above 6.0. These areas support calcicolous plant species that act as good nutrient uptake agents.
Nutrient uptake is highest in a neutral pH range of 5.5 to 8.2. Bogs, on the other hand, are
primarily supplied by rainwater. These ombrotrophic areas reside in poorly drained geographic
locations where precipitation exceeds evaporation. Growth of higher plants is curbed by peat
mosses in bogs because the mosses bind available nutrients and render the bog water acidic.
Also, because the water surface is trapped among a tight network of peat stems and leaves, water
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movement is almost completely lacking, and temperature exchange between air and water is
restricted. Some wetland scientists have contended that the amount of oxygen available to the
soil is the greatest limiting factor for nitrification (White & Reddy, 2003). Subsurface water
systems have been found to display marginal or negative nitrogen removal efficiencies because of
the lack of oxygen (USEPA, 1993).
Inundation in many ways also may affect storage times for nutrients that flow through
wetlands. Nutrients can be removed from inflow waters through storage within the soil, organic
matter, or biota. Phosphorus is a nutrient that is stored through soil by absorption through
sediment particles, through plant and animal biomass, and through peat and other aquatic plants.
Sediment that is rich with organic matter tends to have the capability of absorbing higher rates of
nitrogen and phosphorus (Tanner, 2001). On the other hand, some wetland scientists have shown
that aquatic vegetation can sequester twice as much phosphorus as sediment can, but this
phosphorus uptake could be mobilized again as absorbing plants decay (Dierberg et al., 2002).
The reduction of downstream export of soluble inorganic phosphorus can decrease the nutrient
load of downstream waters associated with eutrophication. Insoluble forms of organic and
inorganic phosphorus are generally not biologically available until they are transformed into
soluble inorganic forms (Mitsch & Gosselink, 2000).
Phosphorus and nitrogen removal rates have been shown to be larger in wetlands that
contain aquatic vegetation. Denitrification and plant uptake are two occurrences that assist in
removing nutrients (Lin et al., 2002; Stein et al., 2003; Tanner, 2001). Nutrient removal in many
cases is enhanced by macrophytes that assist in creating solid sedimentation, reducing algae
production, improving nutrient uptake, and releasing oxygen (Bavor et al., 2001; Jing et al.,
2002). Wetland scientists in Australia and Taiwan have conducted studies that revealed 96%
reduction efficiencies for both nitrogen and phosphorus for wetlands with plant life and
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approximately 16% for nitrogen and 45% for phosphorus without plant life (Huett et al., 2001;
Jing et al., 2002). Floating aquatic macrophytes have been used in constructed wetlands in Brazil
to improve drinking water supplies (Elias et al., 2001).
Different species of plants also perform better than others at nutrient removal.

In

Thailand a recent study suggests that aquatic plants increased phosphorus removal in wetlands
constructed to treat saline wastewater, and cattails were most efficient at nitrogen removal
(Klomjek & Nitisoravut, 2005). Other species that have proven to be good nitrogen transformers
include: Phragmites (Mayo & Bigambo, 2005), Typha angustifolia (Belmont et al., 2004), and
Schoenoplectus (Poach et al., 2003). On the other hand, there have been some studies that have
found that some wetland plants do not contribute at all to nutrient reduction processes (Huang et
al., 2000). Dierberg et al. (2002) found that species differed in their uptake and accumulation in
plant tissue, but did not contribute to nutrient reductions in a study in the Florida Everglades.
Variations within Wetland Types
Hydrology is the key component to understanding how a wetland will function within a
particular landscape. It has been noted by Mitsch and Gosselink (2000) that the notion of
hydrology as the fundamental forcing function of wetlands is well understood from a conceptual
level. But, this understanding is not always put into practice by many who are involved in
restoring or constructing wetlands.

Many problems that have occurred in relation to the

restoration or construction of wetlands have involved the problem of placing project sites in areas
that are characterize by human-altered landscapes, which cause changes in hydrologic conditions.
Unpredictable and rapidly fluctuating hydrology can lead to planting failure, washouts, decreased
biodiversity, and loss of water quality functions. Therefore, wetland restoration and construction
projects must consider watershed scale hydrology concerns when developing plans for integrating
wetlands into a water quality trading program.
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Nutrient input, transformation, and concentration within wetlands are highly correlated
with climatic influences that affect hydrology and temperature (Mitsch & Gosselink, 2000).
Temperature affects growth, productivity, and oxygen levels of wetland biota. Woodwell and
Whitney (1977) found that in some cases salt marshes immobilize phosphate in cold months and
export phosphate in warm months.

Increased levels of precipitation can dilute or increase

nutrient concentrations depending on the hydrologic surface or subsurface flow before entering
the wetland. Erosion may also play a role in increased nutrient loads through sediment.
Climate also has an affect on the types of vegetation and microorganisms that can grow
in a particular wetland ecosystem. The quantity and variety of these organisms in some cases
may affect the nutrient transformation capabilities of a particular wetland area.

Temperate

wetlands typically retain more nutrients in the growing season primarily because of the higher
microbial and macrophyte productivity. This productivity allows wetlands to function as nitrogen
and phosphorus sinks in summer months. This time of productivity corresponds favorably with
the need to reduce summer algae blooms in downstream waters as a result of elevated nutrients
(Klopatek, 1978; Lee et al., 1975).
There are four categories of wetland types listed by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency: bogs, fens, tidal and non-tidal marshes, and swamps (USEPA, 2005). These broad
categories are used to delineate wetland areas and to describe boundaries for the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers concerning “no net loss goals.”

All four types have different

characterizations that would be helpful to understand when focusing on incorporating wetland
technology into a water quality trading program.
Bogs are the first type of wetland described by the USEPA. The hydrologic cycle of
bogs does not lend itself well to being monitored for water quality improvement. In fact, in most
respects, bogs may not even remove nutrients from water because of the lack of water flow and
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the acidic nature of their environment. Therefore, it is unlikely that this type of wetland could be
applied to a wetlands and water quality trading program. But, bogs provide many benefits that
should not be overlooked, and some of these include water retention, habitat creation, and carbon
storage. Naturally existing bogs develop through a very slow process that may take hundreds of
years to complete (USEPA, 2005).
Fens, like bogs, provide many benefits in a watershed that include flood mitigation,
habitat creation, and the improvement of water quality. Fens are transitional wetlands located
between bogs and open waters, and therefore nutrient uptake is a part of a fen’s functions. In
most respects, fens absorb nutrients from groundwater, and therefore, monitoring must focus on
flow from the ground to fen, and finally to surface water, in order to understand the dynamics of
water quality improvement (USEPA, 2005).
Tidal and non-tidal marshes are types of wetlands that are also recognized by the USEPA
as being distinct types of wetlands. Tidal marshes function as coastline buffers and they also act
as nutrient uptake agents absorbing loads before they reach estuaries and oceans. Tidal marshes
also act as nurseries for clams, crabs, and juvenile fish, and several species of migratory
waterfowl. Within the category of non-tidal marshes there are four sub-categories that include:
wet meadows, prairie potholes, vernal pools, and playa lakes.

Non-tidal marshes recharge

groundwater supplies and moderate streamflow by providing steady supplies of water to streams.
This is an especially important function during periods of drought. These marshes also help to
mitigate floods by storing excess capacities of water during times of heavy precipitation. The
vegetation and microorganisms that thrive in marshlands are active in recycling excess nutrients
like nitrogen and phosphorus that can otherwise pollute surface water. This wetland type is very
important to preserving the quality of surface waters (USEPA, 2005).
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Swamps are other types of wetlands that are recognized by the USEPA as being distinct.
A swamp is any wetland dominated by woody plants.

Swamps can be very different in

appearance and may have different functions when compared to one another. Swamps are
usually characterized by saturated soils during the growing season. During other times of the
year standing water is the normal hydrology for many swamps. In general terms, swamps are
dominated by either shrubs or trees. Swamps are good nutrient recyclers and they also provide a
significant amount of habitat for many types of animal species. The ability for swamps to absorb
nutrients is highly dependent upon seasonality and also the life-cycle of the swamp itself. Some
swamps can be degraded or impaired by nutrient overloads (USEPA, 2005).
Marshes and swamps are types of wetlands that can have a direct impact on surface water
quality.

But, in order to implement a water quality trading program that uses restored or

constructed wetlands as nutrient reducers three wetland type issues must be addressed: the
understanding of individual wetland hydrology within specific regions, the understanding of
natural design, and the consideration of time.
Geographic Position and Temporal Issues of
Wetlands within a Watershed
Wetland restoration and construction projects must also consider the placement of
wetland types within a watershed. Wetlands are typically found in low-lying areas where the
hydrological regime is consistent with their demands for water.

Hunt, Krabbenhoft, and

Anderson (1996) investigated how wetland restoration compares to wetland creation. Their
definition of wetland restoration centered on the idea of restoring a wetland that was once drained
or filled so that it would again function as a wetland. Their definition of a created wetland
focused on those areas that had not previously been considered wetlands. They concluded that
the construction costs for the restored site was one-fifth the cost of the created wetland, and the
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restoration implementation time was much shorter (two weeks) than the created wetlands (six
months). The authors also identified the fact that in a 1993 delineation of the wetland restoration
and creation sites, 100% of the restored wetland had been delineated as a wetland and only 60%
of the created site was delineated as a wetland.
Upland and lowland positions of restored or constructed wetlands are just one factor of
many geographic considerations of wetland placement. Position and land use surrounding a
wetland site directly affect the nutrients flow (Mitsch & Gosselink, 2000). The size of the
watershed, soil texture, topography, and landscape features influence nutrient inputs. Land uses
can affect nutrient inputs by altering buffer features, affecting erosion rates, and disturbing
natural hydrologic flows. A wetland and its ability to transform nutrients may be altered by
adjacent land use practices over a short period of time (Gathumbi et al., 2005). Direct input from
urban runoff, industry, or wastewater can have dramatic impacts on nutrient loads within a
particular wetlands site.
If a water quality trading program also wants to contribute to increasing the number of
wetland acres then it is necessary to understand the capacity of nature to both recruit species for
water quality improvement and to make choices from those species introduced by humans
(Odum, 1989). The human design approach may serve to be successful in creating engineered
wetlands that will mechanistically extract nutrients from the watershed, but will the process be
sustainable over time? Reinartz and Warne (1993) analyzed the differences between 11 created
wetlands in southwestern Wisconsin that were naturally colonized with 5 wetlands in the same
region where 22 species were introduced through seeding. They found that the diversity and
richness of the natural colonized site were greater after a two year period of time. McKnight
(1992) has suggested that many studies have over-predicted the survivability of transplanted
species in designed wetlands. This is a very important detail to focus on when implementing a
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water quality trading program that incorporates wetlands. Restored wetlands may experience the
loss of species diversity, and constructed wetlands may be more costly to operate if plant species
have to be systematically replanted and maintained on a yearly or seasonal basis.
The notion of time should be another issue that has to be addressed when analyzing
wetland types for a water quality trading program. In many cases dealing with policy creation,
the legal and economic necessities seem to dictate the ecological patterns of nature, but there are
not always quick solutions to handling some of the environmental issues at hand.

Many

engineering plans for buildings and other types of infrastructure rely on five-year plans. But, in
some cases wetlands develop over longer periods of time, and it is important to understand what
types of functions may be added or subtracted from a watershed area based on the addition of
restored or constructed wetland areas.
Constructed wetlands function similarly to natural wetlands to buffer downstream
nutrients by storing and transforming nutrients (DeBusk, 1999). Hydrologic inputs generally
dominate elemental inputs into wetlands and determine the various geologic, chemical, and
biologic nutrient pathways. On a small scale the cycling of nutrients in constructed wetlands has
been extensively researched (Mitsch & Gosselink, 2000). Natural wetlands and their ability to
store or transform nutrients have also been researched to some extent. Natural wetlands exist
where water inundates land or groundwater is shallow enough to create hydric soils near the
surface. This inundation supports hydrophytic plants adapted to living in water or saturated
soils. Constructed wetlands have been developed to improve water quality by utilizing natural
processes involving wetland vegetation, soils, and their associated microbial assemblages to assist
in the treating of effluent or other water sources (USEPA 2000). Constructed wetlands can be
designed in a way that replicates the condition and function of a naturally occurring wetland like
mitigation banks strive to do, or they can be designed specifically to maximize a wetland function
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to provide for water quality treatment or stormwater management (Hammer, 1992). Restored and
enhanced wetlands are other types of wetlands that were historical naturally occurring wetlands
that have been disturbed through filling, dredging, water elevation changes, plant community
alterations, or land use modifications to surrounding areas. Disturbed wetlands can be restored
through the rehabilitation of hydrologic conditions and reestablishment of vegetation (Mitsch &
Gosselink, 2000).
Wetlands that have been degraded may be restored or enhanced through the careful
application and operation for water quality treatment. This approach is encouraged if water
quality of the wetlands would not be degraded, there was a net benefit to the wetland, and it
would promote a return of historic or natural conditions to the wetland (USEPA, 2000). The
addition of nutrient rich waters to wetlands with low productivity can increase productivity (Ewel
& Odum, 1984). Restored wetlands can be very effective in reducing agricultural non-point
source pollution. These systems in some circumstances can remove up to 90% of suspended
solids, between 85% and 100% of total phosphorus, and between 80% and 90% of total nitrogen
(DeLaney, 1995). A compilation of data from 60 studies of 57 natural occurring wetlands in 16
countries showed that 80% of the wetlands reduced nitrogen loading, and 84% reduced
phosphorus loading. The mean percent change in nutrient load between water entering and
exiting the wetlands was 67% for nitrogen and 58 % for phosphorus (Fisher & Acreman, 2004).
Constructed wetlands have been incorporated into plans to treat water for some time now,
and planning and design considerations for building constructed wetlands have been developed
by USEPA (1999). Natural and constructed wetlands exhibit plant and microbial metabolism
involved in nutrient transformation and retention that is highly dynamic on daily, seasonal, and
long-term annual scales (Ewel & Odum, 1984; Kadlec & Knight, 1996; Wetzel, 2001). The
amount and concentration of nutrient loading also influences these processes at all scales.
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Nitrogen and phosphorus were reduced by over 90% according to a 50 year study of discharged
wastewater into an existing forested wetlands in the Mississippi Delta (Day et al., 2004).
Despite the similarities in natural and constructed wetland, there are several differences
between the two wetlands types. Constructed wetlands often vary in the shape and structure from
natural wetlands. In many cases constructed wetlands are shaped to fit into the landscape with
other features such as roads, buildings, or other man-made structures. This type of structural fit
can limit the ability to create a natural looking and functioning wetland. Most research studies of
constructed wetlands use conveniently sized plots, mesocosms, that provide straightforward
control of soils, plants, and water levels as well as inflow and outflow controls. These highly
controlled areas are used to precisely measure water quality parameters affected by the wetland
(Dierberg et al., 2002; Jing et al., 2002). In many cases as well constructed wetlands have
engineered substrates composed of gravels or artificial liners. This aspect affects the sub-surface
nutrient removal processes as well as other interactions with groundwater.
From a broad perspective many natural wetlands reveal larger amounts of biodiversity
while constructed wetlands are typically planted with certain highly productive macrophytes and
are occasionally inoculated with microorganisms (Wetzel, 2001). The increased species diversity
and productivity maximizes nutrients retention, recycling, and storage in the long run. This
greater diversity often allows more light to penetrate deeper into the water, and this increases the
capability of photosynthesis and survival of microorganism assemblages (Wetzel, 2001).
Externalities of Constructed Wetlands
In 2000 the USEPA provided guidelines for constructing wetlands. This report described
more than 600 active projects using constructed wetlands to treat municipal, industrial,
agricultural, and storm wastewater sources (USEPA 2000). These projects were analyzed to
develop wetlands that improve water quality as well as provide wildlife habitat (USEPA, 2000).
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U.S. EPA also has provided two technical assessments of different types of constructed wetlands:
Free Water Surface Wetlands for Wastewater Treatment: A Technology Assessment (USEPA,
1993) and Subsurface Flow Constructed Wetlands for Wastewater Treatment: A Technology
Assessment (USEPA, 1999). These research analyses are helpful in determining the selection and
design of a constructed wetland.
Although natural and constructed wetlands have been used for water quality treatment
purposes for many years, there is still a great deal of knowledge that has yet to be gained
concerning the performance and design factors of wetlands. Further research is still needed to
better understand the chemical and physical characteristics of various nutrient fractions in runoff
as well as the nature of nutrients that remain after passage through wetlands (Dierberg et al.,
2002). Further monitoring and verification at the regional and national level have been suggested
by some wetland scientists in order to provide a more detailed evaluation of wastewater treatment
systems to identify variability and factors contributing to variability (Szabó et al., 2001). The
wide spectrum of wetland types, positions, climates, geology, hydrology, nutrient inputs, and
geographic landscapes needs further analysis in order to identify and compare nutrient removal
capabilities in an attempt to better inform policy decisions that incorporate wetland technology
for water quality trading purposes.
Constructed wetlands in many circumstances can provide extra benefits in addition to
water quality treatment (Kadlec & Knight, 1996). These benefits include: increased habitat,
biological export to adjacent systems, aesthetics, hunting, recreation, and research (Knight 1992).
Constructed wetlands provide habitat for plants and animals, and many periodically use wetlands
as foraging areas, breeding sites, or drinking sources. One summary of 17 case studies conducted
by the USEPA assessed a series of sites throughout 10 states and found that constructed wetlands
can provide valuable wetland habitat for waterfowl and other wildlife (USEPA, 1993).
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Additional water resource benefits have been demonstrated by using wetlands for nutrient
treatment purposes. Day et al, (2004) has shown significant increases in sedimentation and
increased accretion rates in the Mississippi Delta related to the application of nutrient rich
wastewater over a 50 year period of time. The results of the study suggest that the application
nutrient enriched water can increase wetland elevations and counteract some of the negative
effects of sea level rise on coastal wetlands. Adding nutrient rich water into natural wetlands has
also been demonstrated to increase productivity of woody vegetation and to also increase the
growth of herbaceous emergent and aquatic vegetation (Day et al., 2004).
Constructed wetlands play a role in providing additional benefits by buffering against
flood waters, storing water for multiple uses, and recharging groundwater (Knight, 1992).
Wetlands can be very valuable in watershed management strategies in areas where wetlands have
been lost. Watersheds that are comprised of 5% to 10% wetlands are capable of providing a 50%
reduction in peak flood period compared to those watersheds that have none (DeLaney, 1995).
There are many benefits that can be received from incorporating wetlands technology
into a watershed, but there are some negative externalities associated with them. For example,
the optional use of farmland to construct a wetland results in land being taken out of production
for another land use. Constructed wetlands located in other water bodies or adjacent to water
bodies may have a negative nutrient affect on the natural water quality or quantity of these waters
(USEPA, 2000). The design of the constructed wetland and the quality of the natural waterbody
both affect the positive and negative externalities in this situation.
Wetlands may present other negative externalities like unpleasant odors. Other potential
impacts to air from constructed wetlands include the emissions of nitrous oxide through the
denitrification process that is released into the atmosphere as microbes convert nitrates. This
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release of gas has negative effects on local ground level ozone (DeBusk, 1999). The release of
methane gas is also a potential concern of the denitrification process (Wetzel, 2001).
Some studies provide guidance on optimizing the ancillary benefits created by
constructed wetlands while avoiding the undesirable negative externalities (Knight, 1992).
Planning and design factors of future wetland areas are key essentials to assessing the benefits
and problems associated with these resources. Monitoring and maintenance activities are also
important after construction of the wetland. These factors are necessary in order to prolong and
enhance the nitrogen and phosphorus removal efficiencies while maintaining ancillary benefits.
The monitoring and maintenance requirements for wetlands are needed in order to
compare performance of constructed wetlands and impacts of external factors on wetlands.
Monitoring implementation strategies should include the surrounding area as well as the
constructed wetland site to assess watershed scale nutrient transport factors. Further research is
needed concerning the temporal nature of constructed wetlands.

An example of one case

demonstrated that nitrogen removal efficiency dropped from 79% to 21% over a one year period
of time (Tanner et al., 2005). Constructed wetlands technology could benefit from additional
monitoring, maintenance, and planning performance evaluation studies that would provide
information concerning the long term life cycle, dynamic conditions, and nutrient reduction
functions of multiple types of wetlands at the given watershed scale.
Wetland Nutrient Removal Policy Considerations
Various studies have investigated the function of wetlands in the removal of pollutants,
including high levels of nutrients (Cooper & Findlater, 1990; Fisher & Acreman, 2004; Hunt &
Poach, 2001; Mitsch & Gosselink, 2000;).

These studies have been used to guide the

development of constructed wetlands to treat water high in nitrogen and phosphorus (Mitsch &
Wilson, 1996).

The natural chemical processes that take place within wetlands have been
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mimicked by constructed treatment wetlands in an effort to improve water quality. Most of these
studies have taken place in a confined experimental setting where the hydrology and flora have
been specifically defined and managed. These efforts have encouraged scientist and policy
makers to optimize the water quality functions of wetlands within a watershed framework.
However, the undertaking of a watershed scale research initiative in order to study how wetlands
improve water quality has not been applied at the present time.
Wetland characteristics are almost unique from wetland to wetland, and, more
importantly, from the social and economic context. For example, calculations can be developed
to better interpret the different values that riparian wetlands, coastal marshes, or prairie potholes
may elicit based on the variation in functions and services they provide. It is more difficult to
identify the range of contributions that are provided by wetlands based on their surrounding area
in relation to land use, population, income, education, and other characteristics. Hypothetically,
identical wetlands that provide similar services could be valued differently in isolated and remote
areas compared to those that are found in densely populated areas. Likewise, the social or
political landscape may define the values that are attributed to wetlands compared to their actual
services. Increasing population and development in many places throughout the U.S. have
amplified the pressure on current wetlands to provide their natural services. This increased
pressure will continue to occur in the near future, and new policies will need to provide
guidelines that improve the success levels of restored and created wetlands.
Aside from these social, political, economic variables, basic wetland characteristic
diversity must be better understood within the context of a watershed framework in order to
provide insights into how wetlands may play a role in improving water quality. There are various
gaps in the scientific knowledge associated with the understanding of the connections between
structural measures (plant diversity, productivity, vegetation density) and the various functions
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that wetlands provide (nutrient retention, organic sediment accretion, or wildlife use). There is a
need to quantitatively account for these connections through designed experiments located in
various eco-regions. Simple lists of flora or fauna species are inadequate determinants for
regulators or wetland managers to set wetland typologies or estimate ecosystem function. This
research is needed in order to better ascertain natural and constructed wetlands function within
watershed types in different eco-regions with various climates and hydrological regimes. This
scientific understanding would better inform policymakers considering the opportunities to use
specific wetland types as an option for reducing nutrient loads at a watershed scale.
Economic Considerations of Point to Non-Point
Water Quality Trading
Point source discharges have traditionally held three choices for managing their
discharger liability: meet standards by investing in technology or addition control measures, meet
standards by trading for credits, or try to evade regulations by using the political or legal process
to minimize enforcement penalties (Kydland & Prescott, 1977). Direct enforcement action from
a federal or state level over the course of the past thirty years concerning water quality has been
expensive and increasingly ineffective. Many point and non-point pollution dischargers have
recently incorporated strategies involving avoidance or liability transfer in an attempt to delay,
evade, or reduce penalties they cannot avoid (King, 2005).
Water quality trading is a voluntary regulatory option for achieving compliance. This
policy application is a relatively new process that includes various stakeholders that may meet
their discharge standards through trading. From a theoretical standpoint discharges with high
costs of pollution control buy credits from other dischargers with lower costs. Savings can be
realized from this type of exchange, and an example of this type of cost savings was a simulated
trade incurred in the Lower Boise River Idaho Trading Program. Instead of installing point
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source controls a constructed wetland and sediment basin estimated reduced costs to range from
$10 to $158 per pound of phosphorus (Breetz et al., 2004). The credits may be generated by
various means of pollution control, and overall cost of pollution management for the various
stakeholders should be reduced. The Tar-Pamlico Basin Association estimated potential costs of
pollution reduction controls at $1 million for non-point controls compared to $7 million to
achieve a comparable level of nutrient reduction through point source controls (DeAlessi, 2003).
Water quality trading policies presume that point source dischargers will prefer to meet
pollution standards by purchasing nutrient reduction credits from non-point source providers if
the is transaction cost is less expensive than installing and operating new controls. Likewise, if
risks and returns on investments are favorable then non-point dischargers will elect to generate
and sell credits to point sources. Despite these presumptions, established market infrastructure,
and political support, water quality trades have been scarce. Programs, on the other hand, have
continually developed since the 1980s, and by 2004 more than 70 water quality initiatives have
been set up in the United States (Breetz, 2004). Some trades have resulted from these initiatives,
but a lack of supply of credits from non-point source producers and a lack of demand from point
sources are the two primary reasons for this scarcity of trading. One of the hesitations that hinder
participation in a water quality trading program is the assessment that there is an incomplete
economic valuation of the trading commodity, the reduction of nutrients from the non-point
sources. In order to better place a value on options for trading, stakeholders will need a stronger
approach to credit pricing (King, 2005; King & Kuch, 2003). As well, there is a need to better
understand the costs of creating a market that links point sources with non-point sources.
Transaction Costs
Stakeholders have various types of transaction costs that they must consider before they
become involved in a water quality trading program. Stavins (1995) points out that there are two

59

potential types of transactions costs in permit markets. Information costs and bargaining costs are
both impediments to the implementation of property rights. Stakeholders are faced with many
decisions during the implementation stages of a water quality trading program. These decisions
are driven in most cases by the available information that is easily accessible and the potential
ease of bargaining for trades. Transaction costs in a water quality trading program are generated
by the regulator and by the traders. In theory, costs should be internalized in the price of the
credits to provide an estimate of the cost of trading. An excess amount of transaction costs have
been identified as a primary reason for limited trading within markets that have been established,
and most scholars suggest that transaction costs should be minimized in order to promote trading
(Andersson, 1997; Gangadharan, 2000; Stavins, 1995).
Information and bargaining costs can be described in two broad categories when
discussing water quality trading. Transaction costs can be incurred by either the agency or
institution overseeing the program and they can be incurred by the traders.

Agency or

institutional development, execution, and oversight of trades are all part of the regulatory
expenditures for operation and maintenance of the program. Other operational costs may include
monitoring and verification, trade oversight, and enforcement. Monitoring and verification would
consist of the costs for regulatory site inspection, discharge tracking, confirmation reports, and
data management. Trade oversight would refer to costs for regulatory review of and approval of
trade applications and external reporting for agency review. Enforcement refers to the costs of
identifying and restricting point and non-point sources from discharging excess loads beyond
their individual allocations.
Some of these agency or institutional trade support activities overlap other normal agency
duties, and in some cases this would distort details of agency costs to support trading. In some
cases documentation presents the overall costs that are separate for water quality trading
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participants. An example of this type of process occurs in the Cherry Creek Water Quality
Trading Program just outside of Denver, Colorado. For this program applications cost $100 and a
discharger must pay an additional $500 to cover costs incurred by the managing institutional
authority to evaluate the request for credit withdrawal from the phosphorus bank. The cost to
apply for credits from the reserve pool is $2,500, and this is regardless of the number of credits
that may be involved (Breetz, 2004).
Transaction costs also may accrue directly to the traders, and these costs may include
consulting costs, legal costs, or possible broker costs. Consulting costs refer to fees that would be
paid to a scientist or engineer that would advise a trader of the technical risks and returns based
on using a BMP in order to reach compliance or generate a credit. Legal costs refer to those fees
that would be paid by credit generators and credit buyers to provide contracts for trades or to
ensure that trades are executed with adequate legal protections. In some cases fees may also be
paid to a broker or agent to gather credits and sell them to potential buyers. All of these tradespecific transaction costs are incurred by the producer or buyer of credits and these costs are
proportional to their activities in the trade (Fang & Easter, 2003).
Credit producers would expect to generate a profit from the implementation of a water
quality trading program. These non-point source reducing credit providers in some cases commit
capital to water quality trading programs in order to create value for their organizations. At the
present time participation in a water quality trading program may present several risks to value
creation. Some risks may include the potential loss of government subsidies, negative cash flow
because of upfront costs of construction, or possible assumption of regulatory discharge
restrictions. Likewise, credit producers may also gain from opportunities associated with the
implementation of certain types of BMPs. These benefits may include reduced operating costs,
improved land value, or increased revenue generated from credit sales or payments for enhanced
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land usage like hunting permits, eco-tourism, or other types of recreation. Credit producers could
possibly use consultants and analyses of BMP costs and effectiveness to lessen the risks and
increase the opportunities of trading pollution credits. Producers must also assess program risk
before committing to develop BMPs for water quality trading purposes.
It has been suggested that point sources and non-point sources do not compete equally on
a cost basis because non-point sources receive subsidies and green payments to implement
voluntary programs. Some arguments have demanded actions that would make the compliance
standards for both entities more equal in nature by: reducing subsidies and regulating point
sources and non-point sources equally (USEPA, ORD, 2006; ETN, 2006; National Forum, 2005).
The non-point source discharger may place more emphasis on the risks of a water quality trading
program compared with the benefits. These risks may include non-compliance risks, subsidy
risks, discharger risks, performance risks, and production risks.
Non-compliance risks refer to those risks that are incurred through the acceptance of
regulatory audits and inspections of ongoing BMP operations. If the BMP is not constructed or
maintained properly then the credit producer could be faced with non-compliance penalties.
Subsidy risks are those risks that focus on additional regulatory oversight that might lead to the
loss of subsidy compensation for perceived control BMPs installed under a different green
payment system. Likewise, most non-point sources are unregulated, and discharger risk refers to
those risks that increase regulatory involvement in their current operations. Performance risk
refers to those risks that deal with the expectation that the BMP will perform as a nutrient
reduction technology. There is no guarantee that all BMPs will perform at the levels that they are
expected to. Production risks also may be of concern. This risk is the risk that non-point sources
produce credits for pollution reduction, but they are unable to sell their credits because the market
structure may have collapsed, there were no buyers, or the price for the credits was too high for
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available buyers. These perceived risks could be allocated as costs into the price of the potential
credits to be sold. However, in most water quality trading programs contingencies reflecting risks
to private interests were not accounted for (King, 2005). Agencies could reduce many of these
risks by correctly structuring the water quality trading market. By providing legal protections and
removing regulatory uncertainty agencies could increase the benefits of trading by encouraging
participation and influencing credit supply.
Costs of Creating a Water Quality Trading Market
The selection of the best market structure for water quality trading involves professional
collaboration, research, consultation, and careful assessment of stakeholder perspectives. Open
trading, closed trading, and full closed trading market alternatives are available. Initial decisions
determine the types of trades that are allowed and the geographic limit of completed trades.
Market structures must balance the needs for low-cost trades that ensure environmental protection
with minimal oversight (Woodward, 2002).

Clearly defined rules, responsibilities, and

conveyance of liability are crucial initial considerations.
Market structures can be categorized as exchanges, clearinghouses, bilateral negotiations,
and sole-source offsets based on several criteria. These criteria may include: the commodity
traded, the market size, the market structure, the purpose of the program, and the governing
authority for water quality (King & Kuch, 2003).

Regulators have the important role of

structuring exchanges so that credit pricing is attractive based on the criteria mentioned.
Regulators also have a great deal of influence over the trading organization responsible for
approving trades, protecting the environment, and administering the data generated by trading.
Market designers create demand in a water quality trading market by assigning source
responsibility for effluent control and setting discharge limits. Allowances must be measurable
and easily quantified by all parties. Demand for credits increases as the spread increases between
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internal cost of compliance and trading costs. When regulations are weak and the cost of
enforcement or penalties are low then demand will not increase (King, 2005). Market designers
and regulators must also define the watershed water quality objectives during the initial phases of
program formation. Total maximum daily loads (TMDLs), or other types of limits must be set
and enforced at early stages of the program implementation. Regional watershed water quality
objectives, such as TMDLs, provide the primary driver for water quality trading (Stephenson &
Shabman, 2001). These types of water quality objectives can be expressed as pollution caps,
step-down caps, fractional rate reductions, or other metrics that are clearly measurable in space,
time, and mass. These objectives must be set early on in the trading development process, and
they must be enforced. This was not the case in a specific example concerning water quality
trading markets in a Maryland jurisdiction. TMDLs in that location according to King (2005)
were not enforced, and buyers and sellers did not appear because they lacked a tradable
commodity. In the meantime, regulators used traditional command-and-control methods to direct
point source investment in traditional wastewater treatment technologies while at the same time
providing subsidies to non-point sources to install BMPs.

These actions led to an overall

pollution reduction at a much higher cost than what would be expected in a trading program
(King, 2005). These extra funds could have been spent elsewhere in the watershed to create
additional ecosystem value without additional pollution management cost or risk.
Increased supply of BMPs and interactions between point sources and non-point sources
can be effective in producing increased ecological benefits to a watershed at a lower cost than
traditional methods. Supply increases occur when non-point source polluters implement BMPs.
This reduces their discharges and creates allowance credits that can be sold to point sources.
Many factors may influence supply including: financial risk, BMP cost, and other transaction
costs. In the Cherry Creek Basin market some restrictions on BMPs limited supply. Credits in
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the basin had to be generated where previous BMPs had not existed. Modifications to existing
structures to decrease phosphorus loadings were not counted as credit generators in the program
(Breetz, 2004).
The four fundamental criteria of an effective trading program involving non-point
sources include: equivalency, additionality, accountability, and efficiency. (Fang & Easter,
2003) Equivalency is a measure of how pollutant loads from various sources relate to the
pollutant of concern to be offset. This measure is vital to understanding what pollutant is being
traded.

In many cases conversion ratios account for temporal, spatial, and/or chemical

differences in the sources. Additionality refers to any non-point source offset that would have
occurred regardless of the trading program. These actions cannot count towards credits in a
market. This prevents double counting by ensuring that a nutrient control activity counts toward
only one objective if multiple objectives are met. For example, phosphorus reduction from a
BMP that is already necessary for land development activities is not eligible for trading as was
the case in the Cherry Creek Basin restrictions (Breetz, 2004).

Accountability mandates

appropriate monitoring and oversight to ensure proper implementation of all program
requirements. Monitoring and verification directly affect the first three criteria that address
technical and administrative issues necessary to evaluate efficiency. The question as to what
level of monitoring is needed on the non-point side of trading has not been analyzed to date.
Most of the time trading ratios are incorporated instead of implementing a monitoring plan. In
most circumstances the last criterion of Fang and Easter’s fundamentals of an effective trading
program is the one that receives most attention. Efficiency implies that the trade will proceed
only when one source is able to more cost-effectively reduce its discharges as compared to
another source. This condition is critical to making the program financially attractive and cost
effective (Fang & Easter, 2003).
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Another crucial element of a trading program is the link between point sources and nonpoint sources. This element is vital to the creation of a water quality trading market that seeks to
decrease nutrient loads on a watershed. From a rational standpoint it seems clear that point
source discharge sources would initially search for inexpensive ways to improve their internal
pollution reduction technology in order to avoid paying another source to make reductions for
them. In many cases small internal adaptations are implemented before long-term compliance
strategies are adopted. But, when costs for pollution control become incrementally high for a
particular firm, then the firm may decide to implement their next best alternative. King (2005)
has suggested that in many cases the next best alternative for regulated firms is to game the
system. According to King (2005), the expected marginal cost of gaming will approach zero
based on weak trading rules, non-enforcement, and trifle penalties for non-compliance. He has
also suggested that state and/or federal limits on individual discharges will be required before
their will be any credits to trade despite well-designed exchanges for trading (King, 2005).
These monitoring and enforcement activities will have to addressed in order for water
quality trading programs to thrive, but they do not affect the concept development and market
development costs of setting up a water quality trading program. Several one-time setup costs
will occur when a market is being formed.

Once the market is operation then certain

administration and maintenance transaction costs occur. Initial one-time costs may include, but
are not limited to:

program review and approval costs, baseline assessment costs, credit

allocation costs, market development and stakeholder buy-in costs, and BMP development and
credit pricing costs. In order to cut costs and improve internal efficiencies some lead agencies
hire dedicated staff for water quality trading market development (Jaksch, 2000).
Program review and approval costs can be considerably variable based on watershedspecific physical conditions, stakeholder views, and other agency factors. Agencies that are
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interested in conducting water quality trading in a specific area consider watershed-specific
criteria such as geology, hydrology, ecology, biology, and point and non-point source pollution
distribution.
Baseline assessment costs refer to the assessments that take place before the market
begins to operate.

Agencies oversee field studies that focus on the current state of the

ecosystems, hydrology, biota, and other natural systems in the watershed. Approximate discharge
histories for point sources and non-point sources are studied as well. An example of this type of
baseline assessment took place before the Tar-Pamlico Trading Program was implemented. An
association of prospective point source traders paid $300,000 to develop a special estuary model
to track and predict the behavior of pollutant behavior in the river (Gannon, 2005). Grants,
subsidies, or other types of contributions might be available to offset most baseline assessment
costs, and these costs would not become a transactional burden for trades to occur.
Credit allocation costs refer to the assessment of the distribution of the total point source
and non-point source pollution loads on a watershed.

The total load for a water body is

determined by the sum all pollution loads accounting for seasonality, projected growth, and a
margin of safety. Watershed management action plans usually help to determine allocations with
caps being determined by total maximum daily loads (TMDL) or a total maximum annual load
(TMAL). Modeling and monitoring techniques are used to calculate the distribution among
individual discharges (Michigan DEQ, 2002). The likelihood and value of an exchange is based
on the urgency for stakeholders to trade. Regulators can create a marketable commodity by
allocating allowances (pound per day). The tools used and costs incurred to set allowances
depends upon the complexity of the pollution problem within a given watershed. Site specific
characteristics determine the allocations based on program review and baseline assessments.
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Lead agencies are responsible for identifying and engaging stakeholders at the water
quality trading program level and at individual project levels. Governments, private parties,
institutions, and other stakeholders create trading structures that fit their stakeholder needs based
on the ecological situation, regulatory jurisdiction, local economy, and impacted natural
resources. Some obligations may include leading public hearings, addressing stakeholder
concerns, developing and maintaining communication channels, and arranging education and
public outreach. Specific costs for these services vary depending on stakeholder sensitivities,
special interests, and the regulatory structure proposed (Fang & Easter, 2003). Agencies also are
able to develop the market by establishing supply and demand by creating a marketable
commodity, proposing an attractive price structure, and retaining control of pollution discharge
risk. For example, 40% of the Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority’s (Authority) budget
is assigned to monitoring, special studies, planning documents, technical reports or memoranda,
and administrative costs (Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority, 2006). Some of these
costs overlap into other transaction cost categories, but most of these costs fall into the market
development category.
Costs of Generating a Water Quality
Trading Credit
One very important factor concerning information and bargaining costs in the type of
pollution technology that will be implemented at a non-point source location. This kind of
technology to reduce non-point source pollution is most commonly referred to as best
management practices (BMPs). In order to generate credits to create the supply for a market
potential credit producers are faced with costs of producing an effective BMP. There are three
sub-costs that must be considered by the party seeking to generate credits. These costs include
the cost to create the opportunity to trade, the cost to implement a best management practice
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(BMP), and the cost to manage the BMP. At the watershed level the sum of all three of these
costs must be compared with other costs like point-source controls, zero-growth, or gaming the
system in order to better estimate the cost-effectiveness of a credit generation decision (King &
Kuch, 2003).
Private and public benefits can be gained from the implementation of certain types of
BMPs. More efficient farming techniques and increased property values can be realized by
private landowners, and these benefits can be assessed by traditional market-use valuation
techniques. Public benefits also can be realized through the incorporation of some types of
BMPs.

Raffini and Robertson (2005) have suggested that the incorporation of restored or

constructed wetlands as BMPs could reduce nutrient loadings under a water quality trading
program. Heberling, Thurston, and Mikota (2007) further develop this point by suggesting that
public benefits like habitat creation and carbon sequestration could be realized through the
implementation of this type of BMP. A thorough net benefit valuation would be appropriate in
some cases when involving stakeholders, selecting a BMP to implement, or valuing credits in the
marketplace.
The cost of implementing a BMP is established from the investments made to design,
permit, and install the technology that is potentially tradable. Certain BMPs are not tradable and
these include practices that are required by law, funded by subsidies, or government programs
that do not involve water quality trading. In some cases these competing BMP incentives or
regulations reduce a producer’s potential to generate credits (King, 2005).
The cost of implementing a BMP is the responsibility of either the point source without
compensation, the non-point source with compensation, or by a third-party. This cost includes
expenses that resulted from the design, installation, and management of the BMP during
construction or implementation. Some BMPs are quite simple and involve changes in processes
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like a change in tillage or a relocation of livestock. On the other hand, some BMPs involve
constructed vegetated filter areas or even wetland restoration initiatives. The cost of BMP
implementation can range widely.

For example, in the Tar-Pamlico program values for

agricultural BMP ranged from $1 to $80 per pound of nitrogen. Similar values for wetland
restoration ranged from $11 to $20. Values for stormwater BMPs ranged from $57 to $86 per
pound of nitrogen removed from urban runoff (Gannon, 2005).
Private landowners and other non-point dischargers would typically account their cost of
BMP implementation in terms of dollars. These costs can be referred to as sunk costs once a
BMP is constructed or implemented regardless of whether a credit is generated or a trade is
enacted. On the other hand, the regulatory agency that oversees the trading program values the
BMP investment from a public perspective. Their value is determined by the public benefits that
are created from the BMP. Therefore, long-term measures like easements and re-vegetation
efforts (buffers, wetlands, etc.) are the most effective of BMPs because they provide pollution
reduction with minimal change in practice. Likewise, the lifetime of these types of controls is
more similarly comparable to the lifetime of the pollution reduction estimation. This minimizes
risks and provides more certainty for prospective trades (Fang & Easter, 2005).
At the present time, many state regulatory agencies are charged with identifying and
listing BMPs that non-point sources could implement to generate credits. The USEPA and US
Army Corps of Engineers do not identify or maintain a list of BMPs at the national or local level.
In many cases, the list is created from a larger and more complex list of effluent reduction
technologies and strategies that have been used in site-specific instructions to dischargers (Breetz,
2004). The cost for acquiring these assessments is minimal, but there are no standard lists, and
individual programs include various types of BMPs with various cost and performance
valuations.

70

The performance of a BMP is a very important component of ascertaining the credit
value. Ineffective or inconsistent BMPs are worth proportionally less than more effective ones,
and this value is reflected in both the trading ratio and the trading price. The trading ratio is a
figure that represents the number of credits that a buyer must purchase in order to receive one
pollution credit. The trading ratio usually includes the BMP effectiveness, safety factors, and
administrative factors.

USEPA’s water quality trading policy suggests methods to address

uncertainty in non-point source pollution control. USEPA suggest the implementation of ratios
greater that 1:1. Trading ratios express the quantity of expected non-point source pollution
reduction that is necessary to generate a given quantity of pollution credits for use by a point
source. Ratios can fall into a range from 2:1, 3:1, or even 4:1. Trading ratios conceptually serve
as tools to address uncertainty, but are unnecessary. Risk-adjusted pollution reduction of certain
non-point source pollution abatement activity is what is important. However, USEPA’s policy
does not indicate that trading ratios depend on the type of abatement activity (USEPA, 2004).
Trading sites may not discriminate between types of BMPs. For instance, a reduction in fertilizer
application, a buffer strip, and a restoration of a wetland may all be grouped together as BMPs,
but they definitely have different levels of uncertainty based on their abatement performance over
time.

By grouping abatement activities together this way, trading ratios make sense as an

averaging technique. In order to maximize gains from trade and encourage active pollution credit
markets, ratios should approach 1:1. In order to achieve a trading ratio of unity, the uncertainty
of non-point source pollution abatement activities must be reduced. The verification of load
reductions by non-point sources through increased monitoring could move trading ratios closer to
unity. At the present time, almost all of these trading ratios in any given program will exceed one
because safety factors and uncertainty usually exceed one (Breetz, 2004). Ratios are usually
determined near the beginning of program development, and some programs like the Great Miami
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River Watershed Water Quality Credit Trading Pilot Program have used initial ratio offerings to
encourage trades between point sources and non-point sources (Kieser & Associates, 2003). As
trading ratios increase then the price differential between buyers and sellers decreases. In the
Great Miami River Watershed Water Quality Trading Pilot Program initial offerings were set at
1:1 ratios.

This initial offering was not based on monitoring information concerning the

uncertainties and risks of various BMPs. It was initially arranged to increase the involvement of
stakeholders in the program. After a TMDL is set in place during the next couple of years, the
ratios will change to 2:1 or 3:1 (Kieser & Associates, 2003). BMP credits in certain programs
should also reflect their specific lifetimes.

Tar-Pamlico credits for non-structural BMPs

(activities like no-till farm techniques) were assigned a credit life of three years. Structural BMPs
were assigned a credit life ten years (Breetz, 2004).
When a BMP is chosen and implemented, it is the responsibility of the installer to meet
credit requirements.

Appropriate maintenance, monitoring techniques, organized data

management, and compliance reporting are all duties that should be performed. Failure to meet
credit requirements may result in penalties paid by either the BMP discharger or the point-source
discharger depending on the institutional structure of the program and types of contractual
agreements. Monitoring criteria may be judged by performance or by activity (King & Kuch,
2003). Costs will be negligible for simple practices, such as rearranging agricultural field sites.
Performance costs for network monitoring will be low to moderately expensive depending on:
the applied technology, the size and density of the monitoring network, and the frequency of
monitoring events. In some cases capital costs for fixed monitoring devices can add to the costs
significantly.

Activity costs may be negligible for simple practices like rearranging ranch

grazing, but other activity costs like restoring wetland acres may be significant.
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Impediments to Incorporating Wetlands into a
Water Quality Trading Program
The literature suggests that water quality trading markets that incorporate wetlands may
prove to be successful if they are created with well defined property rights, include a large
number of buyers and sellers, acquire and maintain good information concerning nutrient
reducing capabilities of wetlands, minimize transaction costs, and exhibit rational behavior by
stakeholders. These conditions are necessary for an effective water quality trading market to
exist, and the literature provides background information of the applicability of these key
components to a water quality trading program that incorporates wetlands at the watershed scale.
Property rights in water quality trading programs are defined with the use of a watershed
cap on nutrient loads (Stephenson & Shabman, 2001). These caps are referred to in the Clean
Water Act as total maximum daily loads (TMDL). Discharge restrictions that enforce this cap
must be binding and set at an optimal level to reflect scarcity (Coase, 1960; Dales, 1968;
Tietenburg, 1985). Therefore, an derived value is given to those entities that can reduce nutrient
loads in the most efficient and least costly way. Supply and demand for water quality markets is
dictated by this cap (Faeth, 2000; King, 2005).
A certain number of buyers and sellers must be accounted for when assessing the
applicability of water quality trading programs. Unlike the air quality trading programs, water
quality trading programs are confined to watershed basins, and only a certain number of point
sources and non-point sources may be located within a particular area. There is no reference in
the literature that suggests how large or small a water quality trading program can be, and this
question of scale will be better determined as more markets are defined and become fully
functioning (Faeth, 2000).
Good information is necessary for water quality trading markets to work, but at the
present time there is little consensus concerning the nitrogen and phosphorus fate in wetlands
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(Mitsch & Gosselink, 2000). Site specific examples have provided a great deal of information
concerning the applicability of wetlands to absorb or immobilize nutrients, but at present, no
successful watershed scale wetland assessment projects have been monitored, managed, or
described. Increased information concerning the ability for wetlands to reduce nutrient loads
within a watershed context would be very helpful in defining the commodity (pounds of nutrient)
that could be traded between point source and non-point source.
Transaction costs could be a big impediment to water quality trading programs that
incorporate wetlands (Andersson, 1997; Gangadharan, 2000; Stavins, 1995).

The literature

supports the idea that monitoring and verification of credits are substantial transaction costs.
There are also transaction costs that take place between point and non-point sources. These costs
of exchange of credits may be lessened with government taking on the responsibility for nonpoint source reductions, but there may also be large governmental transactions costs because of
inefficient transaction processes or cumbersome application and assessment of credit processes
(King & Kuch, 2003; Williamson, 1985).
Lastly, from an economic impediment standpoint, stakeholders must exhibit rational
behavior (Williamson, 1986). This idea of rational behavior reflects the choice by a non-point
source to install a wetland BMP versus some other type of BMP. The stakeholder may choose to
do this if he were to receive a better credit price because of the efficiency of wetland to reduce
nutrients, or a particular program may ascribe higher credit value for wetlands versus other best
management practices.
As the literature suggests, environmental trading markets are not natural. In fact, these
markets are contrived to approximate market conditions with environmental conditions imposed.
Therefore, proper institutional arrangements are vital to the performance of these types of
markets.
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From an institutional standpoint the initial setting and allocation of a cap must be
arranged. There must be an institutional enforcement mechanisms in place in order to enforce
this type of cap. The literature suggests that one of the reasons that water quality trading markets
might not work depends upon the costs of noncompliance. If the costs of noncompliance are not
high then there is no demand to trade (King, 2005).
Secondly, the literature suggests that environmental trading markets are inherently risky.
If these risks are not assigned to the buyer or seller of water quality credits, then by default, they
fall on the public (Fang & Easter, 2003; King, 2005). Information about the nutrient reducing
capabilities of wetlands may decrease the level of risk that buyers, sellers, or the public faces, but
other institutional mechanisms may spread out risk and more directly focus liability.
One of the more challenging issues described in the literature that affects the supply side
of water quality trading is how credits are generated, or how baselines for trading are defined.
Credits are usually determined by ratios, and in most cases there is not any direct monitoring
application for a type of wetland. In accordance with additionality (Fang & Easter, 2003), trading
programs usually prohibit farmers from selling credits for undertaking land use/land management
changes that the farmer has received green payments for. Although farmers are being paid
through green payments to undertake best management practices (BMPs), the real intention of
these programs is to provide subsidies to agriculture.
Monitoring and verification of nutrient reductions could be an institutional impediment as
the literature describes. Water quality trading markets are never self-regulating, and trades can be
visualized in a three way fashion that entails the point and non-point source and the regulator.
Monitoring and verification is necessary in order to define what amount of a nutrient is being
reduced (Wetzel, 2001). Water quality trading transaction costs may not allow for monitoring of
every BMP, but some of the risk needs to be removed from the trades without increasing
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transaction costs to the extent that it stifles the programs. The right amount of monitoring and
verification must be assigned through an institutional setting.
Lastly, from an institutional standpoint, it is necessary that government entities account
for the positive and negative environmental externalities that may be associated with wetlands
that are incorporated into a water quality trading program (Leitch & Frigden, 1998; Whitehead,
1992). The literature has revealed that, at present, markets fail to account for the externalities that
are associated with wetlands, and institutional mechanisms must be clearly defined to account for
and distinguish these externalities that are associated with wetland BMPs versus other BMPs. By
identifying and focusing on the positive externalities associated with wetlands an institutional
arrangement would provide the public goods that are generated from wetlands while at the same
time minimizing the negative externalities that may be associated with these types of BMPs.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
Research Design
The outline for the research design was developed based on the question:

Is the

incorporation of wetlands technology to enhance water quality trading programs economically
and politically feasible at the watershed scale? The research outline was arranged in a way that
focused on economic and institutional failures. Economic failure issues that were identified in
the literature included: the setting of an optimal nutrient cap, property rights issues (initial
distribution of credits), current available and readily accessible information, the positive and
negative externalities generated from incorporating wetlands into a trading program, and the
transaction costs of creating a trading program. Institutional failure issues many of which relate
to the establishment and maintenance of a market framework were identified included: the
setting of a cap (TMDL), the assigning of property rights concerning current transactions that
focused on risk and liability issues, information that dealt with the starting point (baseline) for
trades between point and non-point sources, and the role of monitoring and verification to
identify positive and negative externalities and minimize transactions costs.
Information for this study was collected from four water quality trading programs:
Cherry Creek WQT Program in Colorado, Tar-Pamlico River WQT Program in North Carolina,
Lower Boise River WQT Program in Idaho, and Neuse River WQT Program in North Carolina.
Face-to-face interviews took place with state and federal environmental officials, professionals
and private technical consultants contracted by trading programs, representatives of trading
program organizations, and other stakeholder group representatives during the month of April
2007 (see Appendix A.1). Two local stakeholder meetings were observed: the Lower Boise
River Watershed Council (April 12, 2007) and the Tar-Pamlico Association Meeting (April 25,
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2007). Both of these meetings included representatives from point sources, non-point sources,
government, and environmental organizations.
The case study selection process began with the study of approximately 70 water quality
trading programs in the U.S. and 10 other programs throughout the rest of the world. Information
for these programs was acquired mainly through resources provided by Virginia Kibler. She is an
economist with the Office of Water at the USEPA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
Supplementary information was gathered for programs in the U.S. from compiled reports on the
status of water quality trading programs (Breetz, 2004; Evironomics, 1999). A matrix was
constructed to compare the 37 major water quality trading programs in the U.S. as of 2006 (See
Table 4.1). Selection criteria incorporated into the matrix to help identify the potential case study
candidates for the research. Criteria included: location defined by state, name of the project, the
year trading applications were defined, the type of pollutant being traded, the types of trades
(point source (point source) to non-point source (non-point source), non-point source to non-point
source, etc.), if wetlands were incorporated into the trading program, and an assessment of
whether the program was a candidate for the research study based on the six other factors. From
the matrix nine programs were identified as being candidates for the research study based on the
six stated selection criteria. Each of these nine programs were further reviewed and assessed for
the applicability of their inclusion into the study. The nine programs that met the candidate
criteria were Boulder Creek, Cherry Creek, the Lower Boise River, the Massachusetts Estuary
Project, the Minnesota River, Rahr Malting Co., Southern Minnesota Sugar Beet Cooperative, the
Neuse River, and the Tar-Pamlico River.
After further review of these nine programs more in-depth information revealed that
several of the trading programs were labeled as trading programs, but they were structured as
offset programs that were inclusive within one particular entity. For instance, the Boulder Creek
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trading Program was not a formal trading program. The City of Boulder, CO simply created an
offset framework to purchase land and implement stream restoration projects. This was also the
case for the Rahr Malting Co. Trading Program, and the Southern Minnesota Sugar Beet
Cooperative. The Massachusetts Estuary Project and the Minnesota River Water Quality Trading
Program did not have trading structures in place, and they did not have regulatory drivers to
initiate the trading process as of 2006. Therefore, the four case studies that met the criteria for
research concerning the economic and political feasibility of incorporating wetlands into a water
quality trading program at the watershed scale were: the Colorado Cherry Creek Water Quality
Trading Program; the North Carolina Tar-Pamlico River Water Quality Trading Program; the
Idaho Lower Boise River Water Quality Trading Program; and the North Carolina Neuse River
Water Quality Trading Program.
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Table 4.1. Decision Matrix of Current Effluent Offset or
Trading Programs in the United States

Year
Trading
Adopted

Pollutant

Types of
Trades

1998

Selenium

NPS-NPS

no

no

2003

Mercury

not
determined

no

No

2002

Mercury

PS-NPS

no

No

1990

phosphorus

PS-PS

no

No

Boulder Creek

1990

Nitrogen

PS-NPS

yes

Yes

CO

Cherry Creek

1998

PS-NPS

yes

Yes

7

CO

Clear Creek

1994

phosphorus
Heavy
metals

PS-NPS

no

No

8

CO

Lake Dillion

1984

phosphorus

no

no

9

CO

Lower Colorado

2002

Selenium

no

No

10

CT

1997

Nitrogen

PS-PS

no

No

11

ID

12

Ref.
#

Location

1

CA

2

CA

3

CA

4

CO

Grassland Area
Farmers
San Francisco
Bay
Sacramento
Regional County
Offset Program
Bear Creek

5

CO

6

Project

PS-NPS
and
NPS-NPS
PS-PS, PSNPS, NPSNPS

Wetlands
Candidate
Used in
for Study
Trading?

2001

phosphorus

PS-NPS

yes

Yes

IL

Long Island
Sound
Lower Boise
River
Piasa Creek

2001

Sediment

PS-NPS

no

No

13

MA

Town of Action

1998

phosphorus

PS-NPS

no

No

14

MA

Charles River

2003

water flow

PS-NPS

no

No

15

MA

Edgarton

1999

Nitrogen

PS-NPS

no

No

16

MA

2003

Nitrogen

PS-NPS

no

No

17

MA

2001

Nitrogen

PS-NPS

yes

Yes

18

MA

2002

temperature

PS-NPS

no

No

19

MA

1998

phosphorus

PS-NPS

no

No

20

MA

Falmouth
Massachusetts
Estuaries Project
Specialty
Minerals
Wayland
Business Center
Nashua River

2005

phosphorus

PS-NPS

no

No

21

MI

Kalamazoo River

1996

phosphorus

PS-NPS

no

No

22

MN

Minnesota River

1998

phosphorus

PS-PS

yes

Yes
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Table 4.1. Decision Matrix of Current Effluent Offset or
Trading Programs in the United States (continued)

Project

Year
Trading
Adopted

Pollutant

Types of
Trades

MN

Rahr Malting Co.

1997

phosphorus,
nitrogen,
Sediment

PS-NPS

yes

Yes

24

MN

Southern
Minnesota Sugar
Beet Coop.

1999

phosphorus

PS-NPS

yes

Yes

25

NC

Cape Fear River

2005

undefined

PS-NPS

yes

26

NC

1997

yes

NC

PS-NPS

yes

Yes

28

NV

Truckee River

2001

PS-PS,
NPS-NPS

no

No

29

OH

Clermont County

1994

PS-NPS

no

No

30

OH

Greater Miami
River

2004

PS-NPS

no

No

31

PA

Conestoga River

2003

nitrogen
Nitrogen and
phosphorus
nitrogen,
phosphorus,
Sediments
Nitrogen and
phosphorus
nitrogen and
phosphorus
nitrogen and
phosphorus

PS-NPS

27

Neuse River
Tar-Pamlico
River

Initial
planning
stages
Yes

PS-NPS

no

No

32

VA

Colonial Soil and
Water

2005

nitrogen and
phosphorus

PS-NPS

no

Initial
planning
stages

33

VA

Henry County

1997

Total
Dissolved
Solids

PS-PS

no

No

34

WI

Fox-Wolf Basin

1997

phosphorus

35

WI

Red Cedar River

1997

phosphorus

36

WI

Rock River

1997

phosphorus

37

WV

Cheat River

2005

Ref.
#

Location

23

1992

Wetlands
Candidate
Used in
for Study
Trading?

PS-PS and
PS-NPS
PS-NPS
PS-PS and
PS-NPS

no

No

no

No

no

No

heavy metals not defined

no

Initial
planning
stages

(Compiled from EPA documents provided by Virginia Kibler (Kibler, 2007), Hanna Breetz et. al.,
2004, and Environomics 1999.)
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The outline for the interviews was constructed in a way that would uncover information
related to the background of the program, the track record of the program, and the market and
institutional impediments that were associated with the particular program being studied.
Specific information under these headings was identified, and the interviews followed the format
listed:
Background
• History
• Issues
• Driving force for the establishment of trading system
• Administrative Unit – oversight
• Stakeholders
• Structure of trading system
Track Record
• # of permit trades (point to point and point to non-point)
• Water quality impact
• Costs of program
Impediments
• Market failure issues
o Info – current available info – is info readily accessible
o Externalities
o Initial distribution of credits
o Transaction costs of creating a trading program
•

Institutional failure (arrangements/impediments)
o Current transactions
o Setting of a cap (TMDL, TMAL, etc.)
o Starting point for trading between point sources and non-point sources
(baselines)

Additional market, institutional, and wetland specific questions were encapsulated into
this format. Market association focused on assessing the market structures of the programs, the
standards used to make the programs efficient, and the transaction costs and alternatives to
incorporating a trading program that includes wetlands technology. The institutional questions
centered on the discussion of the regulatory drivers for the program, the administration of the
programs, and the interactions between point and non-point source entities.

82

The wetland

questions focused on the reasons for incorporating wetlands into the specific program being
studied, the methods of monitoring and verifying wetland credits, and the desire to incorporate
wetlands as the preferred type of restored BMP for the program versus other types of BMPs (See
Appendix B.1).
A semi-structured interview protocol was constructed to gather descriptive data regarding
the experiences of the various stakeholders concerning the adoption of the water quality trading
program, the political debates that took place concerning effluent allocation loads, the structural
factors influencing actual trades, the performance record of the program, and the economic and
political feasibility of incorporating wetlands technology into the program. The semi-structured
interview process used a core set of structured emphasis areas and specific questions to branch off
into less structured questions in order to explore responses in greater depth. The interview
protocol was directed by a list of primary questions that were followed by a set of secondary
questions.
The interview protocol was designed to allow open and flowing conversation. Through
open-ended questions respondents were able to discuss their understanding of the motivations for
the programs, the existing obstacles for the programs, and the general strengths and weaknesses
of their existing programs. The type of semi-structured arrangement of the interview protocol
allowed the individuals being interviewed to provide contextual and specific undocumented
information. Water quality trading programs across the U.S. are in their infancy, and the best
way to interpret what is occurring within these programs is to collect in-depth face-to-face
interview data from various stakeholders, program administrators, state officials, and federal
officials. This type of methodological approach provides insight into organizational processes,
contextual situations, factors that inhibit trades from occurring, issues of actual trades concerning
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wetlands technology, and an understanding of what information and policy gaps need to be filled
in order for these types of programs to work efficiently and effectively.
The case studies presented were chosen to represent water quality trading programs in
different regions of the country, and they illustrate specific regional issues that may limit the
feasibility of incorporating wetlands technology into a water quality trading program.

The

research design was structured strictly to address the research question to define the economic
and political feasibility of incorporating wetlands technology into a water quality trading program
at the watershed scale. The data collected from the cases are presented in a geographic order.
The two western cases are discussed first, and then the two North Carolina cases are presented.
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CHAPTER 5
CHERRY CREEK WATER QUALITY TRADING
CASE STUDY
Background
Cherry Creek Reservoir was created in 1950 by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) to protect Denver, Colorado from flooding. Several devastating floods had inundated
the young city during the early part of the 20th century, and the USACE built an earthen dam just
to the southeast of the city to control the flow of Cherry Creek and the tributaries that fed into it.
The damming of the creek created a reservoir for the City of Denver. Cherry Creek Reservoir is
approximately 850 acres and is owned by the USACE. The USACE leases the reservoir and
3,915 acres of land surrounding it to the state of Colorado. The state of Colorado developed this
land into a state park and created the Cherry Creek State Recreation Area. The Cherry Creek
Watershed is located within one of the fastest growing areas in the country (R. Parachini,
personal interview, April 10, 2007). As shown on the Cherry Creek Basin Watershed Map 5.1
(Annual Report, 2007), the watershed includes approximately 245,500 acres and 32 subwatershed. The northern portion of the watershed has been experiencing extensive urban growth
during the past 20 years. Only a small portion of the watershed, in the southern upstream area,
still has agricultural influences. The Cherry Creek Reservoir and State Recreation Area serve as
an important urban recreational site that receives extensive use including hiking, horseback
riding, bird watching, bicycling, boating, swimming, and sport fishing. The recreation area is
currently the most visited state park in Colorado with over one million visitors in the 2005-06
fiscal year (R. Parachini, personal interview, April 10, 2007). Development pressures in the
watershed have led to increases in urban runoff, in-stream erosion, and higher levels of
phosphorus discharges by point sources.
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Map 5.1. Cherry Creek Reservoir Watershed Map (Wind, 2007)
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s a series of fish kills were recorded in the reservoir. The
reservoir was closed several times for recreational purposes during the 1980s because of extreme
fish kills and the contamination due to e-coli. The CDPHE reported that “body contact” activities
should not take place within the reservoir because of the extreme outbreaks of cyanobacteria in
the reservoir (R. Parachini, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
Because of these harsh environmental episodes the state of Colorado undertook a massive
study with financial support from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) to
determine the causes of the fish kills. The Water Quality Control Division (WQCD) of the
Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment (CDPHE) collected data between
November 1981 and October 1982 on the reservoir as part of their Clean Lakes Studies (J.
Minter, personal interview, April 11, 2007; R. Parachini, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
Phosphorus was identified as the nutrient that had acted as a catalyst to increase the levels of the
toxic blue-green algae in the reservoir that led to the kills.
Based on information gathered from the studies the Colorado Water Quality Control
Commission (CWQCC) established a reservoir total phosphorus standard of 35 mg/L. This
standard maintained that chlorophyll concentration levels in the reservoir would not exceed 15
mg/L as an average for the time period from July through September. An in-lake phosphorus
model, the Jones-Bachmann chlorophyll-phosphorus model, was incorporated in 1984 to define
the maximum allowable annual load of phosphorus from all combined sources that would
maintain the standard of 35 mg/L.
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Table 5.1. Cherry Creek Water Quality Trading Program Overview
Year Watershed Organization Formed

1985

Year Trading Guidelines Adopted

1998

Administrative Unit

Special Purpose District

Program Structure

Brokerage/Clearinghouse

Pollutant Traded

Phosphorus

Administration of Cherry Creek WQT Program
The mission of The Cherry Creek Basin Authority (Authority) is to “maintain beneficial
uses in the Cherry Creek Reservoir by preserving its water quality” (Annual Report, 2007). The
entity was formed by an intergovernmental agreement between point source wastewater
discharges in 1985, but the Authority became a recognized statutory body in 1988 when the
Colorado General Assembly enacted the Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority Act (R.
Parachini, personal interview, April 10, 2007). This act established the authority as a political
subdivision of the state. The act also empowered the authority to develop and implement
watershed plans in the basin, recommend and allocate wasteloads among sources in the
watershed, raise revenue through taxes and fees, and develop and implement programs for credits
or incentives for water quality control projects in the watershed. The Authority is comprised of
two counties, four cities, and seven special districts committed to promote and maintain water
quality in the watershed. The Authority’s members include: Arapahoe County and Douglas
County; the City of Aurora, City of Greenwood Village; Town of Castle Rock and Town of
Parker; Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater Authority, Cottonwood Water and Sanitation
District, Iverness Water and Sanitation District, Meridian Metropolitan District, Parker Water and
Sanitation District, Pinery Water and Sanitation District, and Lincoln Park Metropolitan District

88

(Stonegate) (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007). The Authority is legally mandated
by Regulation #72 to administer the basin (R. Parachini, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
Other entities that work closely with the Authority include the Colorado Department of State
Parks, the WQCD, the WQCC, the Natural Resources and Conservation Service, and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.
The Authority originally consisted of board members that represented the special
wastewater treatment districts. In 1996 the board encountered an issue with one wastewater
treatment plant seeking expansion within the watershed, but the plant did not have the sufficient
wasteload allocation for expansion. At this time other wastewater treatment plants recognized
that their next increment of expansion would be at or near their particular wasteload allocation.
The Authority members at the time incorporated the use of trading to obtain additional
phosphorus wasteload allocations and to provide additional means for the authority to obtain
credit for the substantial investment that it had made in non-point source control projects within
the watershed (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007). The Authority adopted trading
guidelines, but the entity spent most of its funding and time during the late 1990s lobbying to
gain significantly more flexibility in point source allocations for phosphorus. In the meantime the
water quality diminished substantially in the Cherry Creek Reservoir. Thousands of handwritten
letters were sent to Governor Bill Owens to persuade the state of Colorado to reject the
Authority’s plan to increase its allocation limits for phosphorus. The very affluent City of
Greenwood Village became very irate at this time with the Authority’s self-interested actions, and
several members of the community lobbied the Colorado General Assembly to take the
appropriate measures to focus the Authority on its mission to protect the watershed. Therefore, to
curb the political interests of the Authority and to increase the equitable water quality rights of
stakeholders in the basin the Colorado General Assembly passed the Colorado State Statute 25-
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8.5-111(3) in 2001 (R. Parachini, personal interview, April 10, 2007). The statute restructured
the representation of the board for the Authority and dictated that the Authority must spend at
least 60% of revenues on construction and maintenance of pollution reduction facilities (PRFs).
The remaining 40% can be allocated towards monitoring, planning, technical reports, or
administration. The Authority had been spending only 22% of its budget on water quality
improvements through PRFs.
The Authority receives funding for its activities from property taxes, Cherry Creek State
Park user fees, wastewater bill surcharges, and building permit fees. The 2006 budget for the
Authority was approximately $1,692,000 in revenue and approximately $2,896,000 in
expenditures (Annual Report, 2007). Approximately 66% of the Authority’s budgeted revenue
was tax based, 29% was from fees and surcharges on wastewater, and 5% was from
miscellaneous sources including grants.
Table 5.2 shows the makeup of the Authority after restructuring in 2001. It now consists
of a Board and Technical Advisory Committee (TAC).

Table 5.2. Cherry Creek Basin Authority Organizational Structure

Member Entities
County (Arapahoe, Douglas)
Municipality (Aurora, Castle Rock, Centennial,
Foxfield, Greenwood Village, Lone Tree, Parker)
Special Districts

Number of 1988
Board
Members
2
7

Number of 2001
Board & TAC
Members
2
5

1

1

7

N/A

Board Appointed

N/A

4

Other (Cherry Creek State Park, COE, DRCOG)

N/A

3

17

15

Appointed by the Governor

Total Members of Authority Board
(Authority Annual Report, 2007)
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The Authority conducts annual water quality monitoring in the Cherry Creek Reservoir
and basin. Reservoir water quality, reservoir inflow and loading, surface and groundwater quality
in the watershed, and effectiveness of Authority pollution reduction facilities (PRFs) are all
measured. Continued allocation of traded credits relies on both point and non-point source
compliance with Regulation #72 and abiding by their revised allocations. The Authority is
responsible for producing an annual report on watershed activities, and every three years the
CWQCC must update Regulation #72 as necessary. This triennial review provides flexibility for
improving the water quality of the watershed, and this review is critical to achieving current
needs of the dynamic basin (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007). The Authority was
awarded two Colorado Non-point Source Program grants on October 27, 2005. The two grant
projects are the “Cherry Creek State Park Wetlands” involving the design and construction of
Phase 1 of the multi-phase wetlands construction project, and “TMAL Actions” to conduct three
studies monitoring the outcomes specified in Regulation #72 (M. Wind, personal interview, April
11, 2007).
Water quality credits are not traded outside of the Authority. The Authority acts as a
brokerage service or clearinghouse, and the Authority maintains the liability and responsibility
that is incurred with trades that take place within the basin. The Authority must approve any
withdrawal from the Phosphorus Bank or Reserve Pool. For each potential trade the Authority
must consider the type of trade, trade ratios, monitoring and reporting needs, and other watershed
dynamics associated with phosphorus loading into the reservoir. In order for a point source to
purchase, lease, or create credits an application must be submitted to the Authority that justifies
the need to trade, describe the project’s design if applicable, provide a schedule for construction,
and deliver a plan for operation, maintenance, monitoring, and reporting.
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The Authority

considers comments from interested parties and holds a hearing before finalizing its decision over
a proposed sale, lease, or transfer of credits (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
Structure of the Cherry Creek Water Quality
Trading System
The amount of discharged phosphorus per year standard was initially set at 14,270
pounds in 1983 for the Cherry Creek Reservoir, and by 1985 the annual load was allocated
among wastewater treatment facilities (point sources), non-point sources, industrial, and septic
loadings (M. Wind, personal interview, April 11, 2007). Approximately 74% (10,300 pounds per
year [lb/yr]) was allocated to non-point sources and regulated stormwater sources, 15 %
(2,000 lb/yr) to municipal and industrial point sources, 8 % (1,170 lb/yr) to background sources,
and 3 % (450 lb/yr) to individual septic systems. Initially, an additional 3 percent was allocated to
reductions achieved by the Reserve Pool and Phosphorus Bank, but that additional allocation was
reallocated as part of the 2004 Triennial Review Hearing for Control Regulation #72 (Annual
Report, 2007).

Table 5.3. Cherry Creek Basin Load Allocations
Total
Phosphorus
Pounds/Year
10,506

Allocation Type
Non-point and Regulated Stormwater Sources
Background Source
Wastewater Facility Sources
Including Reserve Pool and Phosphorus Bank)
Industrial Process Wastewater Sources

1,170
2,094
50

Individual Sewage Disposal Systems

450

Total Maximum Annual Phosphorus Load

14,270

(Authority Annual Report, 2007)
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In 1985 the CWQCC approved the master plan for allocation and, concurrently, adopted
the Cherry Creek Reservoir Control Regulation which established the annual Total Maximum
Daily Load (TMDL). Although the 14,270 pound limit is most often referred to as a TMAL or
Total Maximum Annual Load. (R. Parachini, personal interview, April 10, 2007) After the
adoption of this phosphorus standard the governmental entities in the watershed at the time came
together to develop the Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Management Master Plan. This plan
was developed in order to prescribe a long-term focus for improving water quality in the Cherry
Creek Watershed Basin. The Cherry Creek Basin Authority (Authority) was formed by local
governments in the watershed in 1985 through an intergovernmental agreement. The authority
was developed in order to implement the master plan developed to manage phosphorus loads on
the reservoir through the TMAL (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
In 1989 the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE), through
its Water Quality Control Commission, adopted the Cherry Creek Reservoir Control Regulation:
Regulation #72. The regulation approved water quality trades for phosphorus reductions between
point and non-point source dischargers and provided the Authority with regulatory oversight
control of trading procedures. The CDPHE accepted trades with non-point sources despite the
fact that these sources were unregulated. At the time the CDPHE estimated that approximately
80% of the phosphorus load into the basin could be attributed to non-point sources (R. Parachini,
personal interview, April 10, 2007). Regulation #72 legally set forth policy guidelines for water
quality trading, and satisfied the state’s desire to incorporate a watershed program that would
allow growth while at the same time preserving the aquatic ecosystem of the basin.
In November 1997 the CWQCC approved the Cherry Creek Water Quality Trading
Program.

The trading program is administered by the Authority and allows point source

dischargers to receive credit from reductions of phosphorus from pollution reduction facilities
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(PRFs) (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007). In March of 1998 the Authority adopted
specific procedures, policies, and standards for trading in the watershed. These water quality
trading guidelines are much more detailed and comprehensive than the original control
regulation. The guidelines authorize two types of trades: authority phosphorus bank trades and
reserve pool trades. During Phase I of the trading program the Authority had only encouraged
trades in conjunction with the four existing pollution reduction facilities that were designed,
constructed, and maintained by the Authority. In Phase II of the trading program the Authority
will continue to include additional PRF projects that it has funded, and the authority will approve
PRFs developed by point sources as water quality credit generators (M. Wind, personal interview,
April 11, 2007).
Revisions to Regulation #72 in 2001 established the TMAL allocating phosphorus loads
into the basin to both point and non-point sources. In 2003 the Authority adopted the Cherry
Creek Basin Watershed Plan. This strategy put forth revised trading program guidelines that
comply with the 2001 modifications to the Regulation #72, and it provides a more detailed
framework for trades. The plan set the surface water standard for TP at 40 mg/L. According to
the guidelines, point sources have the opportunity to purchase or lease a total of 432 lbs of
phosphorus for new or increased phosphorus wasteload allocations. They also have the option
under Phase II of developing a PRF in order to generate phosphorus reduction credits.
The Cherry Creek Water Quality Trading Program provides water quality credits for
phosphorus reductions for non-point source projects involving existing developed areas that
originally lacked best management practices (PRFs), retrofits to PRFs in order to achieve a
greater level of phosphorus detention, or PRFs in a new development that reduce a greater
amount of phosphorus than what is required to comply with the TMAL. In the trading program
one credit is equivalent to 1 pound of phosphorus per year. Trading of credits functions through a
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clearinghouse structure, and the Authority is the broker that can sell credits to dischargers
needing to increase their allocation. A point source discharger may also trade directly with
another point source discharger if the buyer has made a valid attempt to minimize phosphorus
loadings (Breetz, 2004). Point sources must remove, prior to discharge, as much phosphorus as
possible through primary or secondary treatment applications. For point sources the 30 day
average concentration of phosphorus in effluent must not exceed 0.05 mg/L. Dischargers using
land application must achieve a 30-day average concentration of phosphorus less than 0.05 mg/L
divided by the return flow rate, unless lysimeters are used, in which case the effluent
concentration limit is 1.0 mg/L (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007). Such restrictions
aim to control the release of phosphorus in the solid phase into the watershed through stormwater
runoff.
The Cherry Creek Water Quality Trading Program has incorporated a number of safety
factors to provide for accountability. These factors are included in the program to account for
PRF project uncertainties.

Fate and transport considerations of non-point source PRFs are

individually taken into consideration in order to insure the decreased levels of phosphorus into the
reservoir. In the program a trade ratio is applied to the pounds of phosphorus removed by a PRF
to determine the pounds of credit that can be generated.

The trade ratios are specifically

determined for each new project, and they can be subject to change depending upon monitoring
assessments and changes in the effectiveness of the PRF. The minimum trade ratio used in
calculating credits exchanged concerning new PRFs is 2:1. Therefore, 2 pounds removed from a
non-point source project can be traded for a maximum of 1 pound of credit toward point source
discharges. The ratio can be adjusted up to a value of 3 on a project-specific basis. The trading
ratio is initially determined through best available scientific evidence involving similar types of
projects that are researched through literature reviews, and then credits are adjusted through site-
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specific monitoring.

Initial ratios may be increased or decreased based on performance

monitoring after the PRF is installed and is fully operational. There is not a fate and transport
model that has been developed to assess PRF site location ratio factors for the entire basin, but
trading ratios may be individually adjusted based on the location of the point source discharger in
relation to the PRF and the Cherry Creek Reservoir (M. Wind, personal interview, April 11,
2007).
Performance Record
The Cherry Creek Water Quality Trading Program functions as a clearinghouse. Trading
can occur if a point or non-point source in the basin implements measures to reduce its
phosphorus load below the reduced levels mandated by the TMAL.

The Authority either

approves or denies the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed reduction, and if the reduction is
approved then it becomes a credit that can be sold. The credit can then be purchased as an offset
by a discharger seeking to increase an allocated phosphorus load. The program has be developed
in a way that allows both trades that are either bought through the Authority or trades that are
transferred from credit generator to credit user. Non-point source credits that are generated from
Authority projects are placed into a Phosphorus Bank, and other basin projects created by
individual non-point sources are applied to a Reserve Pool. Either the Phosphorus Bank or
Reserve Pool converts non-point source reductions into available credits for point sources to
purchase.
The Authority set up these two types of exchanges to provide flexibility for dischargers
and maintain a level of phosphorus reduction control. Each exchange was originally worth up to
216 pounds of phosphorus per year.

The Phosphorus Bank obtained its 216 pounds of

phosphorus per year through four projects the Authority initiated during the 1990s and has been
maintaining them since then. The Reserve Pool could earn its 216 pounds of phosphorus per year
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through new non-point source control projects constructed within the basin. A point source
discharger had the opportunity to buy or lease up to 432 pounds of phosphorus per year of new or
increased allocations. In 2004 amendments were made to Regulation #72 that removed the upper
limit of 216 pounds of phosphorus per year that the Reserve Pool could achieve. These changes
were implemented to encourage more interest in trading by eliminating ceilings on a potential
trade (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
The Authority retains the right to purchase phosphorus reduction credits from non-point
source project owners and sell them to other dischargers who may need them to meet their
allocation.

From a Phosphorus Bank perspective the Authority has been constructing,

maintaining, and monitoring PRFs since the early 1990s. There are currently four projects in
operation that supply the Authority Phosphorus Bank with 216 credits. These PRFs include the
Shop Creek detention pond and wetlands established in 1991, Cottonwood Perimeter Road Pond
established in 1997, Quincy Drainage detention pond established in 1995, and improvements to
the East Shade Shelter streambank established in 1995 (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10,
2007). A point source discharger could purchase or lease credits from the Authority for a price
set by the authority. For example, a point source discharger needing an additional 40 credits of
phosphorus reduction credits, worth 116 credits with a 2.9:1 equivalence, could purchase twice
that, 232 credits, from the Authority’s Phosphorus Bank, which is now part of the non-point
source allocation. A base price for credits purchased from the Phosphorus Bank is set by the
Authority. An application to apply for credits costs $100, and an additional $500 must be
provided by the discharger to cover costs incurred by the Authority to evaluate the request for
credit withdrawal from the Phosphorus Bank. At the present time no discharger has requested a
withdrawal from the Phosphorus Bank, but Parker Water Sanitation District has shown interest
this year in leasing credits from the bank in order to retrofit wastewater treatment facilities. Once
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the retrofits are in place then the district will not need to lease the phosphorus credits from the
Authority. This would be a temporary transaction needed in order to comply with the Parker
Water Sanitation District phosphorus allocation (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
The four historic PRFs in the basin earned their credits primarily through erosion control
and wetland restoration. All four PRFs continue to reduce phosphorus loads into the Cherry
Creek Reservoir to date. The Authority monitors each PRF upstream and downstream of each
site to measure and compare phosphorus load reduction performance on an annual basis.
In the 1980s significant land conversion and development had significantly eroded one of
the major tributaries to the Cherry Creek Reservoir, Shop Creek (See Map 5.2). The Shop Creek
Water Quality Improvement Project created wetlands to stabilize channel erosion and reduce
phosphorus load to the Cherry Creek Reservoir. The project entailed the establishment of a 9
acre foot detention pond upstream of five wetland channels in a series. The detention pond
usually fills with water during a storm event, and then it drains slowly into the wetland areas.
This slow water movement allows time for the particulates with phosphorus to settle. All five
wetland channels add biological, chemical and physical treatment as well as settling time. From
1990 to 2000 phosphorus leaving the Shop Creek wetlands to enter the Cherry Creek
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Map 5.2. Cherry Creek Basin with Selected PRFs Identified (M. Wind, April 11, 2007)

Reservoir averaged 261 pounds less than that entering the detention pond.

This decrease

represented an average of 63% reduction of phosphorus during that timeframe. The total cost of
construction for the Shop Creek wetlands include the capital costs of $668,286, the annual
operation and maintenance costs of $38,824, and an annualized cost at a 20 year lifespan of
$72,238. The Authority has seen a decline in the productive capability of the Shop Creek
wetlands to immobilize phosphorus at the same rates that it has in the past.. There is also concern
over the future costs of retrieving and removal of the phosphorus that is immobilized in the
sediment within the Shop Creek wetlands (R. Parachini, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
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The Cottonwood Creek PRF involved both the improvements to roadways in the area and
the restoration of wetland vegetation through a channel area thereby reducing phosphorus
loadings. In 2004 the Authority measured an approximate reduction of about 742 pounds: 3,334
pounds before area and 2,592 pounds after. This decrease indicated an average annual load
reduction of approximately 22% (Authority, 2007). On average it has been estimated that the
Cottonwood Creek PRF reduces about 517 pounds per year.
Two other non-wetland PRFs implemented initial credit generators for the Phosphorus
Bank. Phosphorus loads that flowed into the Quincy Drainage detention pond were reduced by
restoring a vegetated infiltration basin. From 1996 to 1999 measurements indicated that average
load reductions of approximately 158 pounds. The East Side Shade Shelters area shoreline was
reconstructed. It had suffered from severe erosion and was stabilized through the incorporation
of vegetation and gravel benching along the shoreline. Actual monitoring data does not exist for
this PRF, but the Authority has estimated that approximately 18 pounds of phosphorus loadings
are reduced into the Cherry Creek Reservoir per year (M. Wind, personal interview, April 11,
2007).
All four historic PRFs reduce phosphorus loads by approximately 1,000 pounds annually,
and they contribute greatly to the scenic beauty and wildlife habitat of the Cherry Creek State
Recreation area.

In fact, wetland restoration and construction projects were chosen by the

Authority because of the ancillary benefits that they provide. The Cherry Creek State Recreation
area uses all four of the PRFs for educational, recreational, and preservation areas. From the
initial starting points of the Cherry Creek Water Quality Trading Program the Authority
envisioned the practice of restoring wetland areas and improving habitat areas for the rapidly
growing counties southeast of Denver (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
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Table 5.4. Cherry Creek Basin Net Credit Costs for PRFs Constructed to Year 2000
Pollution Reduction Facilities (PFRs)
Shop
Creek
Capital
Cost
Annual
OM&M Cost
Annualized
TC 20YR
PRF Life
Avg Annual
Pounds Reduced
Annual Cost
Per Pounds
Net Credits
Generated
(Pounds/YR)
Annual Cost Per
Credit

Cottonwood
Creek

Quincy
Drainage

East Side
Shade
Shelter

Total

Average

$668,286

$342,978

$218,672

$125,759

$1,355,695

$338,924

$38,824

$20,512

$13,144

$7520

$80,000

$20,000

$72,238

$37,661

$24,078

$13,808

$147,785

$36,946

261

517

158

18

954

238.5

$276.77

$72.85

$152.39

$767.11

N/A

$317.28

186

172

93

10

461

115.25

$388.38

$218.96

$258.90

$1380.80

N/A

$561.76

The Authority recognizes the life span changes of these four particular PRFs, and the
organization continues to pursue other PRFs intended to improve the water quality. In 2002 the
Authority contributed almost 17%, $118,000 of the funds needed for the Piney Creek
Reclamation project that was completed in 2004. This project established riparian vegetation and
soil erosion controls along 5,100 feet of shoreline to reduce approximately 90 pounds of
phosphorus annually from entering the Cherry Creek Reservoir. In 2003 the Authority expanded
upon the Cottonwood Creek Reclamation project to restore the natural wetlands capabilities in the
area just outside the Cherry Creek State Recreational area. The wetland areas along an 11,600
feet stretch of a stream were restored.

Phosphorus loadings were estimated to have been

decreased by approximately 730 pounds per year. The Cottonwood Creek Reclamation will cost
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$2,100,000 when it is completed with a long-term average annual cost of $330 per pound of
phosphorus per year. Within the past two years the Authority has developed the The Cherry
Creek State Park Wetlands Project representing a capital cost of $1,928,000 with a long-term
average cost of $280 per pound phosphorus per year. The project will be phased-in to minimize
impacts on the heavily used recreation area and the wetlands themselves. The project will restore
approximately 60 acres of wetlands and will immobilize 600 pounds of phosphorus per year. The
Authority has also been conducting several other feasibility studies to further restore, reclaim, and
construct wetlands in the Cherry Creek State Park. Credits from Authority these funded projects,
aside from the original four Phosphorus Bank PRFs, are not eligible for trading. The intent of
these projects has not been to compete against point source controls. Instead, the Authority
wishes to supplement the reductions that are being achieved through point source controls and
water quality trading activities. The Authority is focused on the entire watershed and plans to
continue to restore wetland areas regardless of credit production for trading. The Authority
envisions its role as something larger than a trading clearinghouse, and the organization assumes
the overarching lead role of improving the quality of water throughout the Cherry Creek Basin
(W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
The Reserve Pool supplies credits to the Authority from non-point source projects to
allow for growth and expansion. The Authority may purchase the Reserve Pool credits from
various point and non-point source groups within the basin. Any entity constructing or planning a
PRF may apply to the Authority for credits with assessments of how many credits will be
generated. When the Authority approves the credits then that entity may then buy those credits to
offset its own discharge, sell them to another discharger, or retire them. The Reserve Pool is no
longer capped at 216 credits, and prospective entities may achieve however many credits an
innovative approach may offer (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007). Ratios are
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assessed by the Authority and must fall within a 2:1 to 3:1 range. These ratios are set to assure
equivalence. From an additionality standpoint, only new PRFs installed to reduce phosphorus
loadings may be used to generate Reserve Pool credits (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10,
2007).
From a Reserve Pool perspective the Authority received and reviewed three trade project
applications in 2003. Two applications were presented by Parker Water Sanitation District
(PWSD), and one application was presented by the Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater
Authority (ACWWA) (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007). The applications that
PWSD had presented included two non-point source projects that involved the use of wetlands
technology to reduce phosphorus. PWSD withdrew both applications after the Authority found
them problematic in the initial review. The Authority did not conclude that the plans for the
restoration and construction of the two wetland sites were thorough enough to comply with
guidelines, and proper post-monitoring plans were not set to be in place after construction (W.
Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
In January of 2004 the Authority did grant ACWWA a conditional allocation of 57
pounds of phosphorus for the restored wetland area and detention pond two miles upstream from
Cherry Creek Reservoir along the Lone Tree Creek. This restoration initiative was speculated to
reduce 165 pounds of phosphorus per year at a trade ratio of approximately 2.9:1. ACWWA
refers to this site as L-3, and construction for this site was completed in 2005 (W. Koger, personal
interview, April 10, 2007). Pond L-3 was an existing wetland pond that was upgraded by adding
a concrete bottom forebay for sediment removal and a micropool (M. Trujillo, personal interview,
April 10, 2007). Monitoring equipment installation was incorporated in 2006 at the inflow and
outflow points of the wetland area, and annual reporting will be submitted to the Authority in
2007. The allocation of 57 pounds may be increased or decreased by the Authority based on the

103

monitoring outputs of L-3. Table 5.5 is a project cost summary (M. Trujillo, personal interview,
April 10, 2007).

Table 5.5. Cherry Creek Basin Pond L-3 Project Cost Summary
DOLLARS
($)
99,000

ITEMIZED COSTS
Design
ACWWA Staff

36,000

Construction

232,000

Geotechnical Inspection

4,000

Legal/Permit/Misc

5,000

Monitoring (Estimate)

50,000

TOTAL

426,000
$7473/pound

From ACWWA’s perspective the ability to increase its phosphorus discharge allocation
through non-point source credits represents a cost effective response to demographic pressures.
In 2003 ACWWA was only using approximately 90% of its phosphorus wasteload allocation
when it applied for the L-3 trade, but the organization anticipated the need for the credits.
ACWWA further rationalized that since the organization had already achieved the .05 mg/L
phosphorus discharge concentration using advanced technology the cost of upgrading its
treatment facilities would far exceed that of implementing non-point source projects. Therefore,
a $426,000 project that yields 57 pounds of credit (worth $456,000 at $8,000/lb) appears to be
financially favorable (W. Koger, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
In the spring of 2006 ACWWA applied for additional Reserve Pool credits through the
modification of two stormwater dry-detention ponds. These ponds are referred to as W-6 and W-
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7. Ponds W6 and W7 are currently non-wetland ponds that were upgraded to include detention
and water quality. The ponds are located in the Windmill Creek basin that is roughly 45%
developed and is anticipated to have buildout flows that could establish and support a wetland in
the micropool (Trujillo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).

Table 5.6. Cherry Creek Basin Pond W-6 & W-7 Project Cost Summary
(Water Quality Only)
DOLLARS
($)
54,000

ITEMIZED COSTS
Design
ACWWA Staff

23,000

Legal/Permit/Misc

5,000

Construction

220,000

Construction Services

26,000

Monitoring and Equipment (Estimate)

115,000

TOTAL

426,000
$15,821/pound

The ACWWA Lone Tree Creek Wastewater Treatment Facility will receive 28 pounds of
trade credits from this project at a 2.5:1 ratio. ACWWA is also in the process of building a new
wastewater treatment facility within the next 5 years. The organization will continue to monitor
and maintain there two credit sites and they are interested in developing new sites as well. Once
there new treatment facility is operational they will be able to trade excess credits that they have
invested in to other point source dischargers within the basin through the Authority (W. Koger,
personal interview, April 10, 2007). Table 5.6 shows the project cost summary for Cheery Creek
Basin Pond W-6 & W-7 for water quality only (M. Trujillo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
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Despite the progress that has been made concerning the Phosphorus Bank and the
Reserve Pool the Cherry Creek Reservoir chlorophyll standard of 15 mg/L has only been met in 3
of the past 15 years, and the phosphorus goal of 40 mg/L has never been achieved in the past 15
years. However, the phosphorus load totals have been lower than the TMAL of 14,270 pounds in
14 of the past 15 years. In 2006 the chlorophyll level reached 14.7 mg/L and phosphorus was 87
mg/L.

Table 5.7 lists the Cherry Creek Reservoir water quality (July-September average

concentration) and total phosphorus loads from 1992 to 2006 (Annual Report, 2007). The
phosphorus load total for 2006 was 6,185 pounds. Further limnological assessments in recent
years have determined that approximately 4,000 pounds of phosphorus may annually accumulate
in the Cherry Creek Reservoir based on the phosphorus sediments already accumulated. These
accumulated amounts of phosphorus act as an internal load for which the TMAL allocations do
not account for (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).
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Table 5.7. Cherry Creek Reservoir Water Quality (July-Sept. Average Concentration)
and Total Phosphorus Loads 1992-2006
Annual
Phosphrous
Load
(lbs/yr)
5,857

Year

Chlorophyll
a (mg/L)

Total
Phosphorus
(mg/L)

Total
Nitrogen
(mg/L)

Annual
Inflow
(ac-ft)

Standardized
Phosphorus
Load (lbs/ac-ft)

Net
Phosphorus
Load (lbs/yr)

1992

17.0

66

970

7,474

0.78

4,543

1993

14.4

62

826

4,110

5,905

0.70

3,399

1994

10.0

59

1,144

4,049

7,001

0.58

3,056

1995

9.4

48

913

7,972

11,781

0.68

5,923

1996

20.5

62

944

4,715

7,644

0.62

3,723

1997

22.3

96

1,120

5,761

10,362

0.56

4,765

1998

26.5

89

880

13,577

20,903

0.65

9,370

1999

28.9

81

753

17,471

27,739

0.63

7,821

2000

25.2

81

802

12,593

18,610

0.68

8,905

2001

26.1

87

757

9,837

17,250

0.57

4,995

2002

18.8

74

858

4,246

7,498

0.57

2,745

2003

25.8

90

1,121

8,568

14,929

0.57

3,590

2004

18.4

102

977

12,512

17,177

0.73

7,007

2005

17.1

116

990

10,047

18,534

0.54

6,378

2006

14.7

87

914

6,185

12,009

0.51

3,376

Mean

19.7

80.0

931

8,500

13,654

0.62

5,306

Median

18.8

81

914

7,972

12,009

0.62

4,765

(Authority Annual Report, 2007)

Although the described developments in the Cherry Creek Watershed have not resulted in
immediate measurable improvements to the Cherry Creek Reservoir’s water quality, the
watershed management strategies implemented thus far should provide a flexible and operational
structure for future water quality trading initiatives. These initiatives should reveal improvements
to the water quality of the reservoir in the future. From a broad perspective the Cherry Creek
Trading Program structure does meet the four criteria of an effective trading program involving
non-point sources include: equivalency, additionality, accountability, and efficiency (Fang &
Easter, 2003).

The Authority provides equivalency through trading ratios that qualitatively

account for spatial differences in loads. Additionality is recognized in the program and precludes
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a credit from counting towards a trade if it already existed or was required. The Authority
focuses on monitoring and verification of PRFs within the basin, and these essential components
provide accountability. Lastly, a point source discharger could increase its phosphorus allocation
through trading more cost-effectively than through implementing its own controls.
Impediments to Incorporating Wetlands into the
Cherry Creek WQT Program
Economic and institutional impediments to water quality trading in the Cherry Creek
Basin have stagnated the performance of the program, and the Cherry Creek Reservoir continues
to experience high chlorophyll levels that are environmentally hazardous. At the present time
only two point to non-point trades involving wetlands have been executed in the Cherry Creek
Basin program to date through the Reserve Pool program, and there have been no credit
exchanges through the Phosphorus Bank program. Both of these PRFs in these trades were
developed and maintained by a wastewater discharger (ACWWA). The credits were allocated by
the Authority, but the point to non-point trade actually occurred within the same organization.
From an entire basin perspective water quality standards for phosphorus remain in violation for
the Cherry Creek Reservoir. One of the major economic and institutional impediments of this
case that leads to the lack of demand for credits is the readily-affordable TMAL and the fact that
the cost of command-control compliance has been low. The initial allocations that were set at
14,270 pounds were set in a way as to allow for growth. As population continues to grow and
regulation increases, point source wastewater dischargers may advance as an integral element of
the trading program. In many cases the financial incentive that exists for point sources is that
PRF implementation to gain credits is typically more cost-effective than point source controls to
abide by their allocated credits. This incentive is lost when the point source already easily
complies with its load allocation. From an institutional standpoint the Cherry Creek TMAL
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allocations were distributed with growth in mind and trading will only achieve efficiency as this
growth is realized or the TMAL is lowered with redistributions of phosphorus allocations. In the
summer of 2007 the Authority will be reviewing the initial allocation of 14,270 pounds, and it has
been suggested that this allocation will be sliced in half (R. Parachini, personal interview, April
10, 2007; W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007).

The procedure to reduce the

phosphorus cap will be very political, and opponents to the reductions will claim that the cap has
been in place since 1985. The agencies that make up the Authority share many common interests,
but sometimes there are competing interests. The Authority has taken a significant amount of
time to mature, and it has taken the group some time to set the proper water quality policies in
conjunction with the understanding of the ecology of the Cherry Creek Watershed as a whole.
The future focus of the Authority will be to increase ways of coordinating with local governments
to decrease non-point phosphorus loads to the reservoir (W. Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10,
2007). The focus of the Authority is to provide structure to the trading program by allocating
property rights to the various dischargers within the basin.
From an economic standpoint the Cherry Creek Basin is just now beginning to gather
valued information concerning the ability for wetlands to reduce nutrient loads. The PRFs that
the Authority constructed and maintains have proven to be effective immobilizers of phosphorus.
Approximate reductions of phosphorus include: 42% reduction at Cottonwood-Peoria Pond, a
22% reduction at Cottonwood Perimeter Pond, a 63% reduction at Shop Creek, and over a 90%
reduction at Quincy Drainage (M. Wind, personal interview, April 11, 2007). These successes
have not translated into meeting the compliance goal of 40 mg/L of total phosphorus in the
Cherry Creek Reservoir, but this development may emerge over time. The Authority recently
discovered the problem of the internal loadings in the reservoir. From an economic informational
standpoint this occurrence indicates that the TMAL may be too lenient for the water body to

109

achieve the target of 40 mg/L of total phosphorus. The TMAL will be reassessed in the summer
of 2007, and the demand for credits should increase with a reduction in the total allocation. In the
beginning, point source allocations were typically large enough to preclude the need for credit
purchases. These types of purchases should be more attractive as population growth demands
and a smaller allocation pool encourages dischargers to purchase credits.
Economic and institutional impediments are found in this case concerning the
transactions costs of monitoring and verifying credits and identifying the appropriate scientific
information to assess wetland externalities. The wetlands that have been constructed or restored
in the Phosphorus Bank have been effective in reducing nutrient loads on the reservoir, and
extensive monitoring has taken place concerning these projects. To a lesser extent verification of
phosphorus reductions from the Reserve Pool (ACWWA) have been monitored. In 2007 and
early 2008 ACWWA should provide the Authority with monitoring information concerning their
wetland PRFs. This information should be very helpful to the Authority in assessing future PRF
credit projects. In the future the Authority should focus on more accurately accounting for fate
and transport issues. Equivalency factors are compromised in the determination of conversion
and trading ratios, and assessment of these factors should account for temporal dynamics and be
more quantitative in structure. More sound research must go into the development of delivery
ratios to better assess the dynamic nature of the ecosystem. The establishment of this type of
equivalency with more certainty must be achieved without burdening the program with added
transaction costs. At the present time financial incentives are not established enough, but in the
long run these incentives are critical to perpetuating the program. Monitoring and financial
information from the ACWWA sites should help improve Authority models, and future
transactions with the Authority should also increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the
program.
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Other institutional transaction costs were cited by stakeholders that have participated in
producing PRFs for water quality credits.

Once the information is gained concerning the

monitoring and financial aspects of creating wetland PRFs in the basin the Authority should focus
on streamlining the processes for application and assessment of PRFs within the Reserve Pool.
ACWWA officials claimed that the transaction process of applying for Reserve Pool credits and
acquiring was quite cumbersome (W. Koger, personal interview, April 10, 2007; M. Trujillo,
personal interview, April 10, 2007).

The transaction costs of developing a proposal and

presenting it before the Authority were great, and then ACWWA had to work with the Authority
over the course of year to receive an appropriate initial trading ratio for credits that were proposed
to be generated. The two credit approvals for ACWWA through the Authority were the first
applications to be approved and pass through the Reserve Pool process. The process between the
Authority and ACWWA was more of a slow and cumbersome phased movement through a
process that had never occurred before (M. Trujillo, personal interview, April 10, 2007). The
Authority believes that this process can be managed more efficiently as more trade applications
are presented.

The Authority plans on streamlining the application, approval/denial, and

confirmation process based on what it learned through the ACWWA credit approval process (W.
Ruzzo, personal interview, April 10, 2007). The Authority has worked well with the CDPHE and
USEPA, but both of these agencies have not been provided the resources concerning non-point
discharges to assist the Authority directly. The Authority has received grants from both entities,
but expertise concerning the trading program has come from within the Authority or outside
private consulting firms (J. Minter, personal interview, April 11, 2007; R. Parachini, personal
interview, April 10, 2007).
From an institutional standpoint, the Cherry Creek program also faces impediments
because of the fact that point sources are regulated and non-point sources are not. Currently, non-
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point sources face a total load allocation, and regulations do not apply to individual non-point
sources. In the future, local government entities will be looked upon to better monitor and
enforce non-point source PRFs in the basin as they relate to current unregulated entities. At the
present time the Authority places liability for the implementation of PRFs onto the point source
project owner.

The focus of responsibility for nutrient reductions placed on point sources

provides incentive for non-point sources to engage in trading where they otherwise may not have
(Breetz, 2004). This policy aspect follows the law stipulated by the Clean Water Act, Section
402, specifying that national pollutant discharge elimination system permits do not allow liability
to be transferred away from the NPDES permit holder who purchases water quality credits as a
compliance measure to the individual who produces and sells the credits, although liability can be
shared. The U.S. USEPA’s 1996 Water Quality Trading Framework provides two options for
this dilemma. The Authority chose the option to make point sources responsible for non-point
source reductions. The other option would place responsibility on the state to make sure that nonpoint source reductions are being attained (B. Crowder, personal interview, April 11, 2007).
Unfortunately, though, in the Cherry Creek Basin the incentive for the non-point sources forces a
liability issue to the point sources, and this shifts the focus of the point source dischargers to
retain control of their individual PRFs. Therefore, organizations like ACWWA will be more
inclined to construct their own PRF projects, and organizations like the Parker Water and
Sanitation District will purchase credits from the Authority through the Phosphorus Bank rather
than purchasing credits from other non-regulated non-point source dischargers.
The structure of the Cherry Creek Trading Program is in place after many years of
institutional development statutory directives. The Authority is committed to continuing the
process of incorporating wetlands into their water quality trading program. The Authority has
been unstable in past years because of political influences or because of inequitable
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representation by stakeholders in the basin, but the Authority has provided an institutional
mechanism for focusing on the water quality problems of the Cherry Creek Reservoir. The
Authority is guided by Regulation #72, and this rule is flexible enough to adapt to future
developments in the dynamic watershed. The flexibility of this rule is important because of the
anticipated future population growth in the area. Officials at ACWWA are pursuing trade
opportunities at present because they expect to increase the treatment capacity of their facilities
from the current 3 million gallons per day to over 6 million gallons per day in the next 20 to 30
years (W. Koger, personal interview, April 10, 2007). Population growth in the region will drive
the demand for trades, but at the present time the TMAL allocations are set at a level easily met
by all sources. The ease at which the phosphorous levels are met can be explained by observing
that the overall discharge loads have been lower than the TMAL for 14 out of the past 15 years.
However, the chlorophyll standard has only been met in 3 of those 15 years. Therefore, the
market allocation of total phosphorus load is not appropriately set with the water quality indicator
of chlorophyll a. A reduction in the total phosphorus load allocation would better represent the
correlation of phosphorus to chlorophyll in the reservoir.
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CHAPTER 6
LOWER BOISE RIVER WATER QUALITY TRADING
CASE STUDY

Background
The Lower Boise River (LBR) Watershed encompasses approximately 1,290 square
miles and is located in the southwestern part of Idaho. The main channel of the river flows
toward the northwest for approximately 64 miles from Lucky Peak Dam to its confluence with
the Snake River near Parma, Idaho. The LBR crosses through Ada County, Canyon County, and
the City of Boise (Map.6.1.). Eight other cities are located within the watershed and are adjacent
to the river. One-third of Idaho’s population is contained within the watershed, and this area is
growing rapidly (R. Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007). 15 sub-watersheds are located
within the basin, and 4 stream segments are listed on the 303(d) list for impaired waters.
Nutrients, bacteria, temperature, dissolved oxygen and sediment are all listed as problems in these
4 segments. Land use within the basin is quite diverse and includes: forestry, agriculture,
grazing, and urban development.

The water budget for the LBR depends upon snow

accumulation and melting events in the spring, and majority of the water that flows through the
basin is diverted in some capacity for irrigation or other demands (R. Finch, personal interview,
April 12, 2007).
In 1997 the USEPA began working with individual states in the Pacific Northwest to
assess and coordinate methods for handling the implementation of Total Maximum Daily Loads
(TMDLs) throughout the region. Idaho, Oregon, and Washington in the late 1990s were all faced
with the considerable challenge of implementing these TMDLs based on a strict court-ordered
schedule.
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Map 6.1. Lower Boise River Watershed Map (IDEQ, 2007)

USEPA Region 10 worked with Idaho, Oregon, and Washington to examine how water
quality trading could reduce the cost of meeting Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)
requirements.

The USEPA and the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ)

contracted with Ross & Associates in 1997 to examine the market feasibility of water quality
trading within the basin. In August of 1998 the initial trading structure and protocols were
developed on two trading simulations. Over the course of the next two years Ross & Associates
worked with a group of 40 to 50 stakeholders to fine tune the trading structure. Stakeholder
groups included agricultural interests, stormwater interests, wastewater interests, municipal
interests, and development interests. The initial grant and facilitation costs of creating the trading

115

framework with the inclusion of the stakeholder groups were estimated to be approximately
$120,000 (S. Burke, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
According to previous monitoring data and information provided by the USEPA and the
IDEQ the group of stakeholders focused the trading framework around one of the nutrient
pollutants of concern: phosphorus. The LBR in Idaho is highly enriched with phosphorus.
Monitoring sites at cities throughout the basin show that the highest concentrations of phosphorus
can be found at the mouth of the river near Parma (see Map above) (R. Finch, personal interview,
April 12, 2007). In 2005 the IDEQ conducted a study and found that the phosphorus level is not
currently high enough in LBR to cause algal blooms, but the study did reinforce previous
assessments that indicated that the loads in the LBR contribute to the high phosphorus
concentrations downstream in the Snake River (S. Burke, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
From the late 1990s to date the LBR has not been visibly impaired by algae blooms or other
aquatic growth, but the river is the largest contributor of phosphorus to the Brownlee Reservoir in
conjunction with the Snake River (M. Bridges, personal interview, April 12, 2007). Idaho law
requires that surface waters of the state cannot maintain visible slime growths or other nuisance
aquatic growths that impair designated beneficial uses (Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
[IDAPA] 16.01.02.200.06). The Brownlee Reservoir does suffer from excess nutrient loading,
dissolved oxygen problems, and prolonged algae blooms. In September 2004 the Snake RiverHell’s Canyon TMDL was issued. This TMDL presented allocations to the various tributaries
that flow into Snake River. Before the Snake River-Hell’s Canyon TMDL a sediment and
bacteria TMDL had mandated a “no net increase” of phosphorus along the LBR as an interim
measure for the phosphorus allocation until a well defined LBR phosphorus TMDL could be put
into place. The Snake River-Hell’s Canyon TMDL allocates a less than or equal to 0.07 mg/L
phosphorus concentration level from each tributary as measured at the mouth of the tributary
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between May through September (M. Bridges, personal interview, April 12, 2007). The 2005
IDEQ study in the LBR watershed found that phosphorus concentrations along river increase by
more than 10 times from Boise to the confluence with the Snake River. At a monitoring site in
Boise a concentration level of phosphorus was measured at 0.02 mg/L, and at a monitoring site
near the confluence with the Snake River a reading of 0.26 mg/L of phosphorus was registered
(IDEQ, 2005). It has been suggested that the TMDL for the Snake River-Hell’s Canyon area
could require the LBR TMDL to reduce phosphorus loads by up to 80% (M. Bridges, personal
interview, April 12, 2007). Now that the phosphorus TMDL is completed for the Sank RiverHell’s Canyon area, the phosphorus allocations for the LBR TMDL will be adjusted and
finalized.

Table 6.1. Lower Boise River Water Quality Trading Program Overview
Year Watershed Organization Formed

2000

Year Trading Guidelines Adopted

Program Structure

2001
Idaho Clean Wager Cooperative
(Non-profit NGO)
Contractual Market

Pollutant Traded

Phosphorus

Administrative Unit

The trading program has been developed to help comply with the current policy of no net
increase in total phosphorus established in the sediment and bacteria TMDL for LBR completed
in 1998 and approved by USEPA in 2000 (R. Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007) (Map
6.1). It is anticipated that the new LBR TMDL will be issued in late 2007 or early 2008 in
relation to the nutrient reduction goals accounted for in the Snake River-Hell’s Canyon TMDL
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(B. Stewart, personal interview, April 13, 2007). The allocations for the TMDL will be based on
the seasonal phosphorus loads during the irrigation months from April to October.
Administration of the Lower Boise River WQT Program
The regulatory driver for the water quality trading program is the TMDL that will be set
for the Lower Boise River in the near future. Currently, the Lower Boise River Watershed
Council is in the process of allocating discharge limits to stormwater districts, municipalities, and
irrigation (agricultural) districts. At the monthly meeting on April 12, 2007 the council met to
discuss the finalization of comments to the IDEQ and the USEPA concerning the TMDL for the
LBR. Debates occurred during the meeting considering the allocations for each group. (J. Bell,
personal interview, April 12, 2007). However, the group is close to finalizing the allocations to
present to the USEPA by July 2007 (B. Stewart, personal interview, April 13, 2007). The Lower
Boise River Watershed Council will continue to act as a advisory board to the water quality
trading program, but the actual trades that will take place within the basin will be tracked and
administered by the Idaho Clean Water Cooperative (ICWC).
The ICWC was formed in 2000 as a non-profit association to act as an information
gathering body to relay information to the USEPA, IDEQ, and the general public concerning the
trades within the basin. The ICWC is not a clearing house for trades, and it does maintain any
governmental or oversight authority for water quality trading transactions. The ICWC simply
acts as an entity that records and relays information concerning trades within the basin. The
ICWC is responsible for tracking trading activity and maintaining a trade tracking database (R.
Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007). The ICWC sets submittal timeframes for trade
notification forms and reduction credit certificates. The entity reviews trade contracts and accepts
or denies them based on completeness and consistency with the trading program requirements.
The ICWC tracks all trades in a central database that is transparent to regulatory agencies and the
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general public. The entity shows trading impacts on phosphorus allocations, and the non-profit
organization also reconciles all trades in the market area to account for buyer and seller
transaction balances and to ensure that credits are not used more than once. The ICWC also
produces trade summary reports and provides them to point sources that require them for NPDES
permit compliance (R. Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
The ICWC plans on recording trade activities through an online database program that is
easily accessible by federal agencies, state agencies, and other stakeholders within the watershed.
The concept for creating a non-governmental group to track the trading program was generated
by initial stakeholders to reduce the fears of trading partners of government intervention (R.
Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007). In the beginning the agricultural community did not
want to be involved in a regulatory process concerning water quality trading, but a compromise
was struck with this group to discuss water quality issues as long as water quantity issues
remained a separate issue (R. Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007). At the present time the
watershed is being greatly impacted by land conversion from agriculture to suburban or urban
land. Other stormwater and wastewater concerns are associated with these growth problems, but
agriculture still plays a primary role in the proposed trading program (R. Finch, personal
interview, April 12, 2007).
The ICWC provides transparency for water quality trading activity, but the formal rules
of the trading program are governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the
USEPA, IDEQ, and Idaho Soil Conservation Commission (ISCC). This MOU was signed on
April 27, 2001, and it defines the roles of the agencies in verifying credits purchased and used by
NPDES-permitted sources that choose to participate in the water quality trading program (L.
Woodruff, personal interview, April 13, 2007).
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There are also other regulatory drivers for the LBR water quality trading program. From
a statutory standpoint, there are rules that call for “no net increase” in phosphorus for the LBR
(IDAPA 16.01.02.054). These rules also specifically identify water quality trading as a tool for
meeting phosphorous mitigation requirements. These rules set forth a point source allocated
phosphorus reduction caps to dischargers along the LBR. Idaho has not assumed the authority
from the USEPA to distribute NPDES permits. Therefore, permits are issued by USEPA Region
10. non-point sources may also be subject to load allocations for phosphorus in the near future
with the implementation of the new LBR TMDL (L. Woodruff, personal interview, April 13,
2007).
Structure of the Lower Boise River Water
Quality Trading Program
The LBR Effluent Trading Demonstration Project was launched in 1998 as the first
effluent trading project in the Pacific Northwest (S. Burke, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
The project is designed to be a start-up program for phosphorus trading in the LBR watershed in
Idaho, and the USEPA and the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) have
invested a large amount of time and resources formatting the project so that it can possibly be a
guide for similar programs in other areas of the region and throughout the country. IDEQ signed
and interagency agreement with USEPA in 2000 to assume responsibility for the water quality
trading project. The interagency agreement provided guidance for continued support of the
program by allocating various responsibilities to several different agencies other than IDEQ
including:

the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,

the National Resource Conservation Service

(NRCS), the Idaho Soil Conservation Commission (ISCC), the Ada Soil and Water Conservation
District (ASWCD), and the Canyon Soil and Water Conservation District (CSCD). The focusing
goal of the project is to create a business-like trading framework that can be implemented to help
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achieve the nutrient reduction goals set by CWA Section 303(d). The guidelines of the program
include the requirements for parties to trade in a market-based manner, for the trades to be
environmentally and legally sound, and for the parties to interact with existing regulatory
programs to optimize pollution reduction initiatives.
State water quality programs in Idaho, Oregon, and Washington all supported the
exploration of water quality trading programs during the latter portion of the 1990s. Considerable
challenges faced by the states to develop and implement TMDLs based on a court order generated
a great deal of motivation to proactive search for ways of controlling pollutant loads within
watersheds (S. Burke, personal interview, April 12, 2007). Water quality trading was considered
by Idaho to be a flexible and cost-effective option to meet the policy of “no net increase” in
phosphorus established by the LBR sediment and bacteria TMDL.
The LBR Effluent Trading Demonstration Project has been developed through
interagency collaboration to produce a trading framework that can be used for nutrient trading
within the LBR watershed.

During the initial phases of the development of the trading

framework the stakeholders involved in the preliminary meetings held by Ross & Associates
agreed upon six objectives of the program. The stakeholder group concluded that they required
the program to be legally defensible and enforceable. They required that the ultimate goal of the
program would be to protect water quality. The stakeholders wanted all transactions to be
transparent to the general public. The group required that the program would maximize market
flexibility to minimize transaction costs. The participants wanted a program that did not create
other environmental problems, and they wanted the program to support active participation (M.
Bridges, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
The stakeholder group that was brought together by Ross & Associates also developed a
set of design principles that would guide trades and present cost-effective solutions to TMDL
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reduction regulations. These principles included the concepts of avoiding trade-by-trade changes
to the TMDL, avoiding multiple changes depending on trades to NPDES permits, providing well
defined compliance and enforcement efforts, creating environmentally equivalent reductions, and
minimizing trade transaction costs through individual private contracts.
The framework that was created by the initial stakeholder group established a step-bystep process for point source to non-point source trades. Step 1 consisted of identifying possible
trading partners. The trading framework does not define how buyers and sellers are to identify
possible trades. point sources may be able to contact sellers directly or through a third party
broker. The ISCC should play an important role in identifying potential trading opportunities
through education, outreach, and the cost share programs it already manages (S. Koberg, personal
interview, April 12, 2007). The second step of the trading process includes that calculation and
measurement of the water quality contribution for the non-point source participant. This analysis
is assessed through monitoring or assessing BMP design and performance. The third step
includes the pricing negotiations and the signing of the contract between the point source and the
non point source dischargers. Then, based on inspection of the BMP, the buyer signs and submits
the first “Reduction Credit Certificate.” The buyer and seller then sign a “Trade Notification
Form” and submit the document to the ICWC. Trade information is updated by the ICWC, and
the USEPA audits trades through NPDES permits (R. Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
The USEPA and the IDEQ review and verify BMP implementation procedures through
reports that are generated by the ISCC. The ISCC inspects BMPs installed by non-point sources
in the basin to document and monitor performance. Each agency may also visit BMP sites to
confirm their performance. The ultimate responsibility for ensuring the proper implementation of
the BMP lies with the NPDES permit holder. The point source wastewater dischargers that hold
the NPDES permits have the responsibility of inspecting the BMP’s performance, and these
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entities also receive copies of the ISCC’s inspection reports.

Performance guidance and

monitoring agreements can be incorporated into individual contracts. Compliance matters or
enforcement actions delivered by the USEPA or the IDEQ must deal with the NPDES permit
holder. The credit generator, BMP installer, does not carry any liability for the actual phosphorus
reductions (M. Bridges, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
IDEQ in collaboration with the ISCC developed a list of eligible BMPs for the LBR
Water Quality Trading Program (S. Burke, personal interview, April 12, 2007). The effectiveness
of each BMP that was listed was assessed to be different depending upon the particular region of
the state that it may be applied. The non-point source BMPs that are eligible to be traded range
from crop sequencing and nutrient management techniques to sediment basins and constructed
wetlands as shown in Table 6.2.
These BMPs represent the current eligible practices or implementations in order to
generate credits for the LBR water quality trading program. This list was finalized in 2002, and
life spans for individual BMPs are estimated based on dependability and effectiveness
assessments provided for in the general literature of nutrient management. Additional BMPs may
be incorporated over time or can be newly proposed by point or non-point sources (S. Burke,
personal interview, April 12, 2007). From the initial meetings that took place concerning the
trading programs it was decided that wetlands would be added to the initial BMP list generated by
ISCC and IDEQ (IDEQ, 2001).
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Table 6.2. Lower Boise River Water Quality Program Eligible BMPs for Trading
Effectiveness
Discount
(%)
95

Effectiveness
Uncertainty
(%)
10

1 Irrigation

N/A

N/A

1 Year

65-85

15

20 Years

Filter Strips

55

15

1 Season

Crop Sequencing

90

10

1 Season

85-95

15-25

20 Years

Not listed

Not listed

1 Season

Microirrigation

100

2

10 Years

Tailwater Recovery

100

5

15 Years

Surge Irrigation

50

5

15 Years

Sprinkler Irrigation

100

10

15 Years

Constructed Wetland

90

5

15 Years

BMP
Polyacrylamide
Nutrient Management
Sediment Basins

Underground Outlet
Straw in Furrows

Life Span

The BMP list that was developed by the IDEQ and the ISCC also includes procedures for
generating credits.

A reduction in phosphorus discharge amounts beyond the regulatory

requirement of the point source must be generated by a non-point in order to create credits that
can be traded in the water quality market. The reduction is calculated in reduced pounds of
phosphorus by one of two methods. The reduced pound of phosphorus is then converted to water
quality credits for trading purposes. The selection of the method used to analyze the amount of
phosphorus that is being reduced depends on data availability. The phosphorus reduction can be
monitored on-site and a specific assessment of reduction can be allocated for the credit, or the
estimated average reduction of a specific BMP can be calculated based on the nutrient literature.
The estimated average reduction method also incorporates a discount rate because of the potential
uncertainty in the effectiveness of the BMP and other installation and maintenance factors. The
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on-site monitored reduction methods incorporate inflow and outflow comparisons that quantify
grab samples taken during the implementation of the BMP (J. Bell, personal interview, April 12,
2007).
The estimated method of calculating the reduction of phosphorus from eligible BMPs
must be discounted based on the effectiveness of the BMP and uncertainties in the effectiveness
determination. These discounts are provided at the in the literature from the field, farm, and
watershed scale (S. Koberg, personal interview, April 12, 2007). At the present time constructed
wetlands literature lacks the sufficient data to determine efficiency or uncertainties of phosphorus
reductions at the watershed scale, and the ISCC does not recommend that wetlands be used
through the estimated method to generate credits. Therefore, the use of constructed wetlands in
the LBR watershed requires actual monitoring assessments of phosphorus reduction to determine
credits (S. Koberg, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
The LBR program has created three ways of factoring in location determinants for
providing better assessments of phosphorus reductions at the watershed scale. River location
ratios, delivery ratios, and site location figures have all been incorporated to address the dynamic
transitions of the phosphorus concentrations in the watershed as the concentrations apply to the
net impacts at Parma (the mouth of the LBR). Various types of trades within the watershed could
have the potential to cause local water quality impacts in the areas where trading occurs because
water diversions in the watershed are considerable. Therefore, irrigated diversions may be
returned to the river at a later point that may ultimately affect the phosphorus concentration at
Parma.

The localized impacts on water quality are smallest when the non-point source

implements a BMP upstream of the point source discharger. But, because of the diversions in the
LBR certain factors were incorporated to better assess phosphorus transport and fate issues (R.
Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
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The river location ratio factors in the influence of diversions that prevent phosphorus
from reaching the LBR mouth at Parma. This ratio provides a means to determine equivalent
loads between sources along the LBR (R. Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007). Each
municipality or tributary drain is assigned a ratio that is calculated and provides for diversions
along the river. As the river approaches Parma, phosphorus levels increase and the value of one
pound of reduction of phosphorus also increases compared to the lower value of phosphorus
reduction that would be found at the head of the river at Lucky Peak Dam.
In addition to diversions transmission loss can also occur with the water body itself, but
at the present time a water quality trading model for transmission of nutrients does not exist.
Therefore, the LBR trading program has incorporated a linear calculation that represents the
transmission loss along the river. This delivery ratio is calculated by subtracting the distance in
miles to the mouth of river from the BMP’s point of discharge by 100. Then the figure is divided
by 100. This figure is not scientifically sound based on phosphorus transmission in the river, but
it does provide some type of delivery ratio to weigh the possible outcomes of a properly
constructed BMP (R. Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
Site location factors were also included because of the transmission loss that may occur
between the BMP location where the phosphorus reduction takes place and the location of the
point source discharge to a river. Three site location factors were developed to account for this
transmission loss. A site factor of 0.6 was incorporated when land runoff flows into a canal that
is likely to be reused by a party downstream. A site factor of 0.8 was instituted for land runoff
that flows through or around other fields before it flows into a canal or drain. A site factor of 1.0
was decided upon when land runoff flows directly to a drain or stream through a ditch or
washbasin (R. Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
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The calculation of a credit depends on the different location and delivery factors
mentioned, but the determination of a credit in the LBR trading program begins with the
assessment of the amount of phosphorus produced at a given location. The ISCC estimates the
current phosphorus loads with the Surface Irrigation Soil Loss (SISL) tool. According to the
USDA this tool is currently the most accurate and simple method to estimate soil loss from
surface-irrigated croplands. The SISL is used to calculate the number of tons of lost soil that can
be assessed in a given irrigation season. The trading program has used baseline information
concerning phosphorus loading from 1996 as recommended by the ISCC (IDEQ, 2001). The
1996 baseline was also used for the original TMDL for sediment, and therefore, phosphorus
reductions can be compared to phosphorus loads from 1996 (S. Koberg, personal interview, April
12, 2007).
In most cases phosphorus discharges are higher during the beginning of the irrigation
season from April through October because there is more erosion from rain events and less
uptake by crop plants. The phosphorus reduction calculation is a culmination the effectiveness of
the BMP selected. Then an uncertainty factor is subtracted, multiplied by the river location ratio,
the delivery ration, and the site location factor. The final calculation is referred to as a “Parma
Pound” (S. Burke, personal interview, April 12, 2007; R. Finch, personal interview, April 12,
2007). The concept of the “Parma Pound” explains the fact that not all phosphorus pounds are
equal in the watershed because of diversions and water reuse in the basin. The “Parma Pounds”
are only allocated during the months of the irrigation season to reflect the phosphorus load
variability over the season. This irrigation season coincides with the seasonal TMDL reduction
requirements.
In order to produce “Parma Pounds” agricultural non-point sources are encouraged to
work with either the Ada Soil and Water Conservation District (ASWCD) or the Canyon Soil
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Conservation District (CSCD). Farmer can develop a conservation plan with these entities in
cooperation with NRCS (USDA) and the ISCC. BMPs are designed as part of these conservation
plans to address water quality concerns. The BMPs can be certified and installed according to
NRCS and participate in cost-share programs.

Once the BMP is operational it can begin

generating phosphorus reduction credits. Within the LBR watershed the BMPs will only operate
to reduce phosphorus during the irrigation season, and credits can only be made available during
this time.

Fully functioning and certified BMPs must be inspected prior to their seasonal

operation. Inspections can also take place at any time during the lifetime of the specific BMP (S.
Burke, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
Performance Record
The LBR Effluent Trading Demonstration Project set up a framework for trading
pollutant discharges among sources. The framework is a bilateral market structure that allows
trades to take place between point and non point dischargers. Buyers and sellers are expected to
agree upon individual contracts for credit delivery. Credits are generated and used on a monthly
basis during the irrigation season. Non point source credits are generated in given month, and
point sources must use those credits to offset nutrient loads within the same month.
Elements of a trading process were developed by an initial group of stakeholders
facilitated by Ross & Associates. Key elements of the initial trading drafts included the types of
permit conditions, necessary forms, agencies’ roles, and generation of credits. At the present time
no trades have occurred. The main reason for the lack of trades deals with the delays in finalizing
the LBR phosphorus TMDL. The politically influenced allocation of phosphorus loads to various
stakeholder groups has taken over seven years to implement, and there has been a large amount of
transaction costs that have been incurred in the process (R. Finch, personal interview, April 12,
2007). The expected value of phosphorus in the basin looks promising for a trading scenario
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because the stringent target set by the Snake River-Hell’s Canyon phosphorus TMDL will be
difficult to meet without point sources seeking trades. The cost to reduce phosphorus loads will
continue to increase as the final portion of the phosphorus reduction allocations are realized, and
trading will become a more viable option (S. Burke, personal interview, April 12, 2007). Once
the regulatory driver is in place the structure for trading should be able to help to direct and
promote trades within the basin.
The structure of the trading program was developed in a way that should minimize
administrative and governmental transaction costs. Administrative costs should be low because
the responsibility of finding trading opportunities is on the point sources. The regulatory focus
has been on defining the trading conditions instead of evaluating or brokering trades (R. Finch,
personal interview, April 12, 2007). Transaction costs were high initially during the beginning
phases of the program development, but future transaction costs could vary to a large extent based
on the mechanisms that arise to identify trades, communicate with trading partners, and negotiate
trade contracts.
Other cost savings of the program are directly associated with non-point source BMP
technology implementation versus point source technology implementation. Municipalities and
other point sources the LBR watershed estimated in 1999 that it would cost between $12 and
$178 to reduce one pound of phosphorus. Agriculture and stormwater stakeholders anticipated
that it would cost between $2 and $20 to reduce one pound of phosphorus for non-point sources.
Both the point source and the non-point source reduction estimates were based on 80%
phosphorus reduction levels. Therefore, it has been estimated that there could be a potential cost
savings of $10 to $158 per pound of phosphorus reduced within the LBR watershed if point
sources and non-point sources are able to cooperate through individual contracts (Environomics,
1999).
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In 2000 the LBR Effluent Trading Demonstration Project conducted a trading simulation
for a point source to non point trading scenario. Two eligible BMPs, constructed wetland and
sediment basin, were installed in a sequence for the simulation. The actual process included a
concept design of the two eligible BMPs, a sample permit, documentation, cost estimates, and
monitoring evaluation techniques (Ross & Associates, 2000).
The design of the BMPs entailed a system of running water through a series of drainage
areas through the constructed wetland and the sediment basin to mimic the continuous
agricultural runoff that is present during the irrigation season. The design of these BMPs took
into account the maintenance requirements for each system.

The wetland was designed to

provide for the accumulation of biomass by setting a target depth. The sediment basin was also
designed to store up to six years of sediment at a depth of 2 feet. Both systems were designed to
function with minimal flows through the operation of control gates to keep plants alive and
minimize decay.

The systems also had inflow and outflow monitoring sites to measure

phosphorus concentrations and flows.
The efficiency of constructed wetlands in removing phosphorus depends on the design,
maintenance, and flow rate of water through a designated area. Similar engineering constraints
can be identified for sediment basins as well. The constructed wetland and sediment basin
removed phosphorus at different rates using a flow rate of 15 cubic feet per second (cfs) and a
concentration of 0.366 mg/L of phosphorus. It was estimated that over thirty year life span the
sediment basin could remove up to 1,040 pounds of total phosphorus per irrigation season. The
constructed wetland was estimated to remove approximately 980 pounds of total phosphorus per
season. The combined total of these two BMPs if used in conjunction would equal a reduction of
approximately 2,020 pounds of total phosphorus per season. This would equal approximately
60,600 pounds over 30 years (Ross & Associates, 2007). This estimate could fluctuate over that
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period of time depending upon hydrologic conditions, climate change, or maintenance and
upkeep factors.
Probable costs for the design of the systems were also calculated in the simulation. A
public bid process helped to determine the cost estimate that included equipment, materials, and
labor in year 2000 dollars. The estimate of cost was initial investment capital that included
engineering, construction, and contingency.

Also assessed in this calculation was land

acquisition set at $10,000 per acre. Capital and operation and maintenance were estimated at
$3,004,000 and $145,800 respectively for a 54 acre construction site as can be seen in Table 6.3.
The operation and maintenance cost was composed of $71,800 for annual upkeep and $74,000 for
harvesting wetlands plants every five years. These costs with the inclusion of a 3% inflation rate
set an annualized cost for removal of phosphorus at $118 per pound. An average cost for
constructing wetland systems for treating stormwater has been estimated at $10,000 to $30,000
per acre (Reed, 1991). This simulation for the LBR watershed estimated that the cost to construct
this type of wetland structure would be approximately $67,000 per acre. In order to justify the
high cost of constructing this type of BMP the value of a “Parma Pound” will need to be high in
order to balance the cost with the value of implementing the BMP.
Stringent TMDL standards may make the option of constructing a type of wetland system
like this a more economically feasible option, but will the market arrangements of the LBR
trading program drive other types of more cost effective BMPs? point source stakeholders in the
basin are mainly focused on the least cost option for phosphorus reduction allocations, and they
are presently not inclined to choose a more costly BMP in order to receive reduced phosphorus
levels (D. Keil, personal interview, April 12, 2007).
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Table 6.3. Lower Boise River Constructed Wetland Simulation
Cost Summary
Simulation Feature

Quantity

Amount of Wetlands

54 acres

Life Span

30 years

Flow Rate

15 cfs

Effluent concentration

0.366 mg/L

Capital Cost

#3,004,000

O&M Cost
TP Removed by the Wetlands per Irrigation
Season
TP Removed per Irrigation Season
TP Removed per Life Span

$145,800
980 lbs
2,020 lbs
60,600 lbs

Annualized Cost per Pound of TP Removed

$118

(Ross & Associates, 2007)

Impediments to Incorporating Wetlands into the LBR WQT Program
The LBR Water Quality Trading program suffers from various economic and institutional
impediments.

The LBR Effluent Trading Demonstration Project has been successful in

developing a trading framework, but at the present time no trades have occurred. From an
economic standpoint, the USEPA and the IDEQ as well as other agencies spent several years
developing and formatting the trading structure, but the setting of the cap (TMDL) has not
occurred.

The lack of a trade driving cap (TMDL) that is enforceable disallows the program

from functioning at any level.
Secondly, property rights within the basin have not been assigned because a cap (TMDL)
has not been set. The LBR Effluent Trading Demonstration Project did incur high expenses and
intensive use of resources to develop the trading framework, but the property rights to discharge
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pollutants have not been assigned. Throughout the initial phases of the program the irrigation
districts and farmers in the watershed were skeptical about losing water rights by participating in
a program.

As the literature indicated, this case reveals that non-point sources have been

concerned that their participation in generating credits by reducing phosphorus loads might
encourage or facilitate their being subjected to increased regulations (King, 2005). This political
apprehension could account for some of the politically influenced delay of the LBR TMDL.
From another perspective, public comments by environmental interest groups within the
watershed initially expressed concerns about the ability of point sources to account for trades.
These groups felt that the program necessitated a trade-by-trade regulatory approval process (M.
Bridges, personal interview, April 12, 2007). The stakeholders that participate in the trading
program at the present are pleased that the LBR framework has established a highly effective and
locally tailored solution under the umbrella the Clean Water Act (CWA) and Idaho statutory
guidance to help resolve the phosphorus problems in the LBR watershed (R. Finch, personal
interview, April 12, 2007).
From an economic information standpoint, the LBR Effluent Trading Demonstration
Project has provided a list of BMPs that could prove to be practical and possibly cost-effective to
implement within the watershed. There was much time spent in calculating the estimations for
assessing a credit within the watershed. The spatial considerations that were accounted for
concerning the irrigated and diverted nature of the watershed were thoroughly analyzed. The
location ratios, delivery ratios, and site specific ratios all were developed to minimize localized
areas with high level of pollution in a watershed.

The background research for support

concerning the discounts developed to generate credits is incomplete. Transmission losses and
uptake capacity between the trading partners need greater study to refine discounts. Another
factor of the program that should be further researched concerns the issue of equivalency. Point
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sources within the basin discharge at a fairly constant rate over a twelve month period of time, but
irrigation during the earlier set portion of a given year produces more phosphorus through erosion
and less uptake by crops. Equivalency, in this situation, can be difficult to demonstrate or
calculate because of the dynamic fluctuations of phosphorus generated within a given timeframe.
From a monitoring and verification standpoint of the assessment of wetland externalities,
the program has witnessed a simulation using a constructed wetland model that could be
potentially duplicated in the basin. The estimated 2,020 pounds of reduced phosphorus could be
converted to “Parma Pounds” based on the location of the site within the watershed in relation to
the point source that has a contract for the credits the BMP is providing. The case study
confirmed the assessment of the literature that there is not enough consistent information
concerning the applicability for wetlands to reduce nutrients at the watershed scale. At the
present time the ISCC does not maintain enough data to determine efficiency or uncertainties
involved with constructed wetlands technology implemented to reduce phosphorus (M. Bridges,
personal interview, April 12, 2007). Therefore, if a constructed wetland were to be implemented
as a non-point source credit producer then phosphorus reductions must be measured on site
through inflow and outflow structures. Constructed wetlands within the basin could prove to be
as effective as the simulation or more effective at removing phosphorus based on their designs
and maintenance. But, at the present time there is not any interest from stakeholders within the
basin to certify wetlands as the BMP most favorable to be implemented. In fact, the current
political mindset of the basin focuses on reducing the phosphorus loads through the least possible
cost methods. Therefore, if some other BMP can effectively decrease phosphorus loads at a
lower cost than wetlands can, then the market will drive the demand for that type of BMP (R.
Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007)
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From an economic transaction costs standpoint, the durability and return on investment
on BMP structures are also concerns of stakeholders in the watershed (R. Finch, personal
interview, April 12, 2007). In the LBR Effluent Trading Demonstration Project the life span
assigned to BMPs reflected the professional judgments of scientists, regulators, and the most
current literature. Constructed wetlands were originally assigned a 5-year life span, but the
lifespan for a constructed wetland in the LBR BMP list is now assigned a 15 year limit based on a
technical focus group decision among participants during the early development of the water
quality trading program (S. Koberg, personal interview, April 12, 2007).

However, the

simulation that was managed in 2000 by Ross & Associates used a 30 year BMP lifespan. It is
most cost effective to use a constructed wetland for as long as they are functional because of the
high investment costs incurred to build them. Further research should focus on life span factors
of certain types of BMPs versus constructed wetlands to better assess cost of phosphorus
reduction in the watershed in the long-term. When dealing with the long-term effects and
lifespans of BMPs it should also be noted that intensive planning should take place when
analyzing the long-term fate of the phosphorus that is removed using BMPs such as constructed
wetlands or sediment basins. At some point in time the phosphorus must be harvested through
the removal of vegetation and sediment. The phosphorus that remains in this harvested material
must then be moved or disposed of in a fashion that does not lead to further environmental
problems in other locations.
From an institutional standpoint, the politically influenced processes of establishing
allocations for the LBR TMDL have delayed any regulatory enforcement criteria that may
generate needs for trading. There must be a driver for a water quality trading program to exist. If
there is not a cap set for the amount of a type of discharge then there is not any need to seek
reduction credits. As the literature has stated, drivers include a regulatory requirement or some
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other standard that allocates the maximum amount of a pollutant that can be discharged into a
watershed. A driver could be derived from a non-point sources’ ability to reduce pollutants most
cost-effectively that certain point sources. It is very important that a trading program educates
potential stakeholders that will be involved. From an institutional standpoint, the LBR Effluent
Trading Demonstration Project did a good initial job of including a vast number of stakeholders
during the beginning phases of development. Trading programs can be hampered by the lack of
an established or known trading framework. Additionally, from a transaction costs standpoint,
trading would fail to be effective if it is viewed as being too cumbersome for traders to use or
regulators to evaluate.
The growth in population within the LBR has been consistently rising in recent years, and
this strain has placed a great deal of pressure on point sources and non-point sources to minimize
phosphorus discharge increases into the watershed. At the present time the LBR does play a large
role in the dissolved oxygen problems that face the Brownlee Reservoir. The LBR is the major
contributor of phosphorus to the Brownlee Reservoir and the water quality along the LBR must
improve in order to prevent future environmental hazards within the watershed. At the present
time economic and institutional impediments hinder the operation of the trading market. There is
an institutional structure for the trading program that is becoming more viable politically as
TMDL allocations are distributed through the basin and more pressure is placed on point sources
to reduce phosphorus discharges, but property rights for pollution discharge have not been
assigned. Non-point sources in the basin seem wary that their participation in the program may
encourage the future subjection to regulations requiring load reductions. The future of the
program depends on the optimal setting, maintenance, and enforcement of the TMDL. Without
this trade driver then all of the other efforts of the program to reduce nutrient loads will not be
realized through this type of trading structure.
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CHAPTER 7
TAR-PAMLICO WATER QUALITY TRADING
CASE STUDY

Background
The Tar-Pamlico River Basin extends approximately 180 miles from the Piedmont of
North Carolina through the Coastal Plain to Pamlico Sound. The Tar River combines flows from
approximately 2,300 miles of freshwater streams before it enters the Pamlico River near
Washington, North Carolina. The entire basin covers approximately 5,400 square miles that
encompasses portions of 17 counties.

The Tar-Pamlico River Basin includes the cities of

Greenville, Rocky Mount, and Tarboro. Agriculture and forest are the main land uses in the
basin. Five of North Carolina’s 10 leading hog-producing counties and the leading chicken
producing county all reside within the basin. As of 1989 there were approximately 875 hog,
chicken, and dairy operations in the basin (Harding, 1990). The increasing population growth,
intensive agricultural practices, and expanding livestock operations have placed significant
environmental pressures on the Tar-Pamlico Basin over the past thirty years. In the mid-1980’s
the Pamlico River Estuary saw an increase in harmful algae blooms, low oxygen levels, increased
number of fish kills, and other stressful symptoms in the aquatic biota. In 1986 10% of all
chlorophyll-a samples taken in the Pamlico Estuary exceeded the state standard of 40 g/L (Steel,
1991).
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Map 7.1. Tar-Pamlico River Basin
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Following a severe record-setting fish kill in the Pamlico Sound in 1989 the North
Carolina Environmental Management Commission (NCEMC) designated the Tar-Pamlico
Watershed as nutrient sensitive waters. That same year the North Carolina Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (NCDENR) developed an initial management strategy that
focused on reducing nutrient loads from point source dischargers.
Initially, the NCEMC proposed to reduce nutrient loads upon the Pamlico Sound by
simply setting technology-based nutrient concentration limits on point sources. These regulations
were to be incorporated over the course of several years. In response to these actions the point
source dischargers in the basin formed the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association (Association). This
group along with the Environmental Defense Fund and the Pamlico Tar River Foundation
proposed a collective nutrient trading program to the state of North Carolina. By 1990 the state,
the Association, and the two environmental groups had signed an agreement marking the initial
phase of the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program. The agreement stipulated that the
Association would reduce their phosphorus and nitrogen loads to the estuary as a group by setting
a loading cap. If the Association exceeded this cap then point sources involved agreed to fund
agricultural Best Management Practices (BMPs) through the North Carolina Agricultural Cost
Share Program.
The initial agreement between the state of North Carolina, the Association, and the two
environmental groups allowed the point sources within the Association to find more costeffective ways to collectively meet their loading cap by allowing those facilities that were more
capable of removing nutrients to do so within the group framework. At the time of the initial
agreement economic models had documented that payments for BMPs were a more cost effective
way of reducing nutrients as compared to retrofits or treatment modifications implemented during
expansion (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007).
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Table 7.1. Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program Overview
Year Watershed Organization Formed

1989

Year Trading Guidelines Adopted

Program Structure

1992
NC Dept. of Water Quality/
Basin Association/
Agricultural Cost Share Program
In-Lieu Fee/Exceedance Tax

Pollutant Traded

Nitrogen & Phosphorus

Administrative Unit

Phase I of the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program began with the adoption of
the initial agreement between the Association, environmental groups, and the state of North
Carolina. The parties involved in the initial agreement began the process of implementing the
trading program by developing trading rules in 1992.

In 1991 the Association hired an

engineering firm to estimate nutrient reduction measures and costs at individual discharge
locations throughout the basin.

The Association also hired consultants to help develop an

estuarine water quality model to help determine an in-stream nutrient reduction target goal. A
target was set for nitrogen and phosphorus reductions was developed with the help of the
estuarine modeling initiative, and the nutrient discharge cap was approved in 1995
(Environomics, 1999). During Phase I the Association approved a model that predicted that a
45% total reduction from point sources and non-point sources would be necessary to meet instream water quality goals (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007).
Phase II of the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program began in 1995, and during
this phase the focus of nutrient reduction goals centered on non-point sources. The estuary model
that was designed during Phase I was implemented at this time to set a 30% reduction in nitrogen
and a no net increase of phosphorus loading for all sources to the estuary from 1991 conditions.
The parties that came together for the Phase II agreement include the Association, NCDWQ, and
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the North Carolina Division of Soil and Water Conservation (NCDSWC). The environmental
organizations Environmental Defense and Pamlico-Tar River Foundation (PTRF) were
participants in the Phase I agreement, but these groups opted out of the Phase II agreements
because they were not satisfied with the 30% reduction goal (M. Templeton, personal interview,
April 25, 2007). The Phase II strategy provided technical information that suggested that the
original 45% reduction in nitrogen loading would be infeasible given the limitations of point
source and non-point source treatment technologies and BMP effectiveness. It was recognized in
Phase II that there was some model error and uncertainty in the initial predictions confirmed
during Phase I.
Phase III of the program was developed and agreed upon in 2005. The third phase
continues the structure established in Phase II. Phase III rules were developed to improve and
refine the program by updating the Association membership, defining temporal water quality
issues within the basin, and revisiting alternate offset options. Better monitoring, modeling, and
documentation strategies have improved the knowledge of nitrogen and phosphorus fate to the
Pamlico Sound.

The Environmental Defense Fund and the Pamlico Tar River Foundation

returned as parties to the Phase III agreement. These organizations want to continue to work
cooperatively with other parties in order to ensure the protection of the estuary (J. Rudek,
personal interview, April 25, 2007).
Administration of the Tar-Pamlico River WQT Program
The initial partners involved in the effort to create the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality
Trading Strategy were the NCDWQ, the NCDSWC, the North Carolina Farm Bureau, North
Carolina Department of Agriculture, North Carolina State University, and the Association. The
initial group that formed the Association consisted of fourteen dischargers that equaled
approximately 90% of all point source discharges to the river (J. Huisman, personal interview,
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April 24, 2007).

During the initial phase of development the NCEMC brought together

stakeholder groups of affected parties throughout the basin and provided the participants with a
chance to express differing viewpoints. Stakeholders involved in the process included
environmental groups, municipalities, developers, businesses, and the general public (Husiman,
2007). The Association evolved from these initial stakeholder meetings and the organization is
now made up of
The initial agreement signed by the Association, NCEMC, NCDWQ, and Soil and Water
is the primary mechanism used to provide structure and assure accountability for the water quality
trading program. The NPDES permits, administered by the NCDWQ, provided to the parties in
the Association do not contain limits for nitrogen. Therefore, the parties in the Association are
not required by the CWA to readjust their permit limits if the members show they could meet
more stringent requirements.

This type of regulatory requirement to meet more stringent

requirements could penalize economic incentives to perform at a higher level of efficiency to
decrease nutrient discharges as a collective body. The NPDES permits contain a clause that
allows the NCDWQ to revise new discharge limits to individual members or the Association as a
whole if conditions in the agreement are violated (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24,
2007).
During the initial phase of the program it was estimated that to meet water quality
standards concerning nutrients it would cost point sources in the basin between $50 and 100
million in capital costs for technology upgrades. Instead of investing the totality of that amount of
funding to technology upgrades the Association has been instrumental in providing the financial
support for the water quality trading program (Breetz, 2004) During the initial two years of the
program the Association contributed $150,000 to fund additional NCDSWC personnel to assist in
BMP review and identification. These funds were necessary in order to design and establish the
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trading system. The Association also provided additional initial funding of almost $1 million
earmarked for agricultural BMPs. (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007). This funding
was acquired in large part through a USEPA grant. The Association has been able to bank the
credits that were generated from some of this money toward future cap exceedances (Templeton,
2007).
The Association operates as an advisory board to the state of North Carolina and the
group also coordinates actions of the trading program with point source members, agricultural
representatives, and environmental group representatives. The Association members include:
Belhaven, Bunn, Enfield, Franklin Water & Sewer Authority, Greenville Utilities, Louisburg,
Oxford, Pinetops, Robersonville, Rocky Mount, Scotland Neck, Spring Hope, Tarboro,
Warrenton, and Washington (Tar-Pamlico Association Meeting, 2007).
The NCEMC, NCDWQ, and the NCDSWC are the key administrative bodies for the TarPamlico Water Quality Trading Program.

These government agencies coordinate with the

Association and the trading program participants, but each of these agencies retain the ability to
take enforcement actions against point sources and non-point sources in the event that they are
not able to demonstrate compliance.
Structure of the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program
The Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program was not created to allow individual
trades between point sources and non-point sources to take place. The point source dischargers
pay an offset fee for each mass unit of pollutant by which as a group they exceed each year. The
funds that are collected are used directly by the voluntary agricultural cost share program
managed by the NCDSWC to implement BMPs. The cost share program pays farmers up to 75%
of the cost of installing nutrient reducing BMPs on farms that are located within the basin.
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The trading model for this program can best be described as a group cap-and-trade
program with an exceedance tax. point sources are assigned individual baseline maximum
nutrient loads and nutrient reduction goals. These allocations that are set by the Association in
accordance with the NCDWQ set the overall nutrient loading goals for the water body. The
trading program was designed specifically to target agricultural non-point source nutrient loads.
Offset credits from point sources are paid directly to the cost share program and are targeted
geographically for the most cost-effective nutrient reductions to the estuary. When the respective
point sources in the Association have purchased credits they are no longer liable for ensuring that
non-point source BMPs are installed and operating effectively. The state of North Carolina
assumes responsibility for the monitoring and verification of BMPs within the basin.

The

NCDSWC inspects local soil and water conservation districts after every five years to maintain
that the local districts are inspecting at least 5% of the contracts it allows into the program each
year. non-point sources that are found to be in noncompliance must return the cost share funds to
the state. The primary focus of the cost share program is to provide farmers with assistance
implementing agricultural BMPs aimed at reducing nutrients loads on the estuary.
The NCDWQ maintains authority over nutrient tradeoffs and allocations within the
program (Breetz, 2004). An agreed upon cap was assigned to the Association for combined
discharges in 1990 during the initial phase. The cap required a 44,000 pound per year reduction
in total nitrogen and phosphorus over five years (Kerr, 2000). The Association was also required
to: perform an optimization study for capital improvements to point source discharge facilities in
the basin; develop an estuarine model for nutrient loading; fund the initial design and
administration of the water quality trading program ($150,000 was provided by the
Association); make minimum payments into the offset fund for future non-point source BMPs
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even if cap was not exceeded; and perform water quality monitoring to document compliance
with the cap (Breetz, 2004).
Non-point source credits are purchased by the point sources at a fixed price. The price
considers the BMP life expectancy, area affected, farmers’ capital cost, maintenance costs, and
BMP effectiveness (McCarthy, 1996). BMP values were estimated based on literature reviews
that included empirical studies of conservation tillage, buffer strip, and terracing in the
Chesapeake Bay (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007). Structural BMPs have a credit
life of 10 years in the program, and non-structural BMPs have a credit life of 3 years.
The Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program established a fixed fee per pound of
total nitrogen. The standard trading ratio for the program is 2:1, and then there is a 10% cost
differential set to absorb administrative costs. The effective trading ratio is set at 2.1:1. The
fixed fee charged to point source dischargers that represented the 2.1:1 ratio was initially set at
$25.40 per pound. The credits expire after 10 years after the funds have been allocated by the
NCDSWC. The cost share program that is used as a tool to fund BMPs was a pre-existing
program throughout the state funded by the USDA’s NRCS. The Tar-Pamlico Water Quality
Trading Program funds 75% of the capital costs associated with voluntary implementation of
agricultural BMPs on farmland in the basin.
In 1986 a nutrient source budget was prepared for the Tar-Pamlico basin, and this budget
was revised in 1988 to reflect dynamic changes in the watershed.

In 1989 the NCDWQ

projected a 30.55 million gallons a day flow for all the Association members by 1994. The
NCDWQ estimated that total nutrient loading in 1994 would reach 1,278,000 pounds per year
based on trends during the late 1980s. The original agreement required mandatory phosphorus
and nitrogen limits for point sources to decrease by 1994 to an estimated 936,965 pounds per
year. Therefore, the NCDWQ, the Association, NCEDF, and the PTRF together established
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440,924 per year as the reduction goal for Phase I of the water quality trading program.
396,832 pounds per year were allocated for nitrogen reduction and 44,092 pounds per year were
allocated for phosphorus (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007).
A hydrodynamic model was incorporated during the initial phase of the program to
predict the impacts of nutrient loading in the estuary. The model focused on the basin area from
Greenville to Pamlico Point. This distance between the two sites covered approximately 60
miles. The calibration year for the model was 1991. This year was chosen because it was set as
the baseline year when point sources in the Association were required to perform nutrient
monitoring (Templeton, 2007). A critical portion of the river, near the town of Washington, was
chosen as the point where management strategies would be evaluated. This segment of the river
revealed the highest level of chlorophyll a and dissolved oxygen violations in the late 1980s
(Templeton, 2007).

There were plans to recalibrate the model to lower nutrient loading

conditions after the 30% nitrogen reductions were achieved in Phase II. This proposal was
suggested to better determine additional reductions that may be necessary in order to improve the
water quality of the estuary. The recalibration of the model has been postponed pending the
results of other estuary evaluations (Templeton, 2007).
During Phase II of the program, 1995 through 2004, the focus on improving water quality
shifted to include non-point sources based on the recognition that these contribute the majority of
nutrient loading to the watershed. The modeling completed by the Association in Phase I
estimated that non-point sources accounted for 92 percent of the nutrient loads (Templeton,
2007). Target reductions were set in Phase II at 2,778,000 pounds per year of total nitrogen and
397,000 pounds per year of total phosphorus based on the low flow year of 1991. Total nitrogen
loads were calculated to be 4.28 million pounds a year at the Washington site. During this phase
the 30% total nitrogen reductions goal for all sources was set at 1,285,000 pounds per year. point

146

sources were allocated 8% of this reduction and non-point sources were allocated 92%
(Templeton, 2007). An interim target of 60% progress towards the reduction was set in 1995 to
be achieved by 1999. The NCDWQ and the NCEMC stipulated that they would determine if
additional regulatory requirements were necessary if progress was at the 60% progression state by
1999 (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007). The goal of reaching 60% progress
toward the reduction goal was not met, and mandated rules on riparian buffers, fertilizer
application, stormwater, and agriculture were adopted by the NCEMC and went into effect in
2000 and 2001 (Templeton, 2007). The Phase II agreement reduced the fixed price of non-point
source credits to from approximately $25.40 per pound to $13 per pound. During Phase II the
Association has easily maintained discharges well below the caps assigned without needing to
purchase credits from non-point sources (Breetz, 2004).
The Phase III agreement is currently in progress and spans an additional 10 years from
2005 to 2015. Amendments may be added after every two years to address potential needs for
improvements (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007). During Phase III load reductions
were set using an agreed upon cap for point sources of 891,271 pounds per year for total nitrogen
and 161,070 pounds per year for total phosphorus. Total nitrogen and phosphorus caps for nonpoint sources were set at 2,109,220 pounds per year for total nitrogen and approximately
1,851,883 pounds per year for total phosphorus (Templeton, 2007). The agreement for Phase III
proposes to resolve temporal issues related to the lifespan of non-point source credits (currently
set for 10 years). The participants in Phase III are currently working to resolve issues concerning
life span and previously banked credits. The agreement also sets a 10 year estuary performance
goal with alternatives established to manage the water quality trading program. A process will be
determined to reassess and re-model the loads on the estuary if reports suggest that the water
quality is deteriorating (Templeton, 2007).
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Point sources within the Tar-Pamlico Basin meet trading program compliance measures
through weekly effluent monitoring for total nitrogen, total phosphorus, and flow. Association
facilities have been performing effluent monitoring reports for nutrients since 1991.

The

Association reports monitoring data to NCDWQ annually. Water quality monitoring is performed
at the standard defined in the NPDES permits for the individual point sources and as a collective
group. Guidelines have been developed by the NCDWQ for estimating flow and concentration if
this information is not provided by the point sources (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24,
2007).
From a non-point source perspective wetland technology has not been incorporated fully
as a primary method for reducing nutrient loads within the basin, but the methodologies
developed for assessing the progress of nutrient reduction goals for non-point sources are
applicable to assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of constructed and restored wetlands as
BMPs. The NCDWQ recognized early on in the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program
that measuring compliance with instream loading targets would have required a very costly and
complex model to estimate the edge of water non-point source nutrient discharge and nutrient
levels within the instream water column. A significant amount of quantitative water quality
monitoring over a number of years would be necessary to support that type of modeling (J.
Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007). Instead of that method of monitoring and modeling
the NCDWQ has developed procedures to assess compliance based on land use modification
accounting methods that provide estimates of nitrogen and phosphorus reductions based on the
type of BMP that is implemented.
The latest estimates of nutrient removal efficiencies are available for point sources and
non-point sources to interpret. The Association is currently involved in estimating the BMPs that
are most cost effective and efficient in the Tar-Pamlico Basin (Tar-Pamlico Association Meeting,
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2007).

The NCDWQ has developed estimates of nutrient removal efficiencies based on

monitored stormwater projects developed under the Tar-Pamlico and Neuse stormwater rules and
agency research.

Table 7.2. Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Removal Efficiencies for Stormwater BMPs
Practice

TN Efficiency (%)

TP Efficiency (%)

Wet Pond

25

40

Stormwater Wetland

40

35

Sand Filter

35

45

Bioretention

35

45

Grass Swale
Vegetated Filter Strip with
Level Spreader
50-Foot Restored Riparian
Buffer with Level Spreader
Dry Detention

20

20

20

35

30

30

10

10

(Bennett & Gannon, 2004)

Table 7.2 is the latest assessment developed by NCDWQ of approximate nutrient
removal efficiencies. This table has been used by the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading
Program to calculate estimates for non-point source pollution reductions (Bennett & Gannon,
2004).
Other types of tools have been developed to help assess non-point source reductions in
order to solidify the exchange value within the trading program. The Nitrogen Loss Evaluation
Worksheet (NLEW) and the Phosphorus Loss Assessment Tool (PLAT) were developed for
nitrogen and phosphorus accounting under the Tar-Pamlico agriculture rule. The NLEW was
developed as a field-based procedure to estimate changes in nitrogen losses from agricultural
management units. PLAT is a similar software program that determines the relative phosphorus
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losses from agricultural fields based on site specific information. Both models use data like
fertilization rates, crop and soil acreages, and areas of BMP implementation to estimate nutrient
exports to the Tar-Pamlico Watershed from agricultural land. The models were developed and
designed by groups including:

North Carolina State University, USDA’s NRCS, and the

NCDENR. Before these models were developed trade estimates for non-point source credits
relied on previous local cost share record and best professional judgment based on nutrient
reduction literature and documented projects (Gannon, 2003).
Performance Record
From the initial point in time of the creation of the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading
Program the Association has been able to meet nutrient reduction goals set by the nutrient cap
collectively through improvements in operational efficiencies.

At present, no trades have

occurred between point and non-point sources, but the Association did allocate nearly $1 million
to fund agricultural BMPs in anticipation of need non-point source credits in the future. The TarPamlico Water Quality Trading Program has allowed the Association to incur substantial
financial savings. Estimates for potential costs for technology upgrades were assessed at $7
million compared to the $1 million investment the association made in non-point source control
(DeAlessi, 2003).

The flexibility of the collective discharge goals has provided allocation

maneuverability for the Association. The members within of the Association have been able to
improve treatment efficiencies and devise future upgrade plans for technology so that
improvements in treatment efficiency are cost-effective (Allen & Taylor, 2000). As opportunities
for cost-effective technology upgrades are exhausted, trading will likely occur in the future.
Though, environmentalists have criticized the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program from
the initial start-up phases because many objectors contend that the caps were initially set too high
and the nutrient reduction target was set to low (J. Rudek, personal interview, April 25, 2007).
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The Association successfully met all the nutrient reduction goals that had been set for
Phase II, and by 2003 the group had decreased nitrogen and phosphorus discharges by 45% and
60% respectively (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007). After the agriculture rules
were implemented the non-point sources were successful in meeting their nutrient reduction goals
by collectively decreasing nitrogen discharges by 45% as of 2003 (J. Huisman, personal
interview, April 24, 2007). The watershed wide efforts to reduce nutrients in the basin have
resulted in the reduction of impaired acreage in the estuary by approximately 90% (J. Huisman,
personal interview, April 24, 2007). In fact, one segment of the Pamlico estuary has been
removed from the 303(d) list for chlorophyll a (USEPA, 2005).
The Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program has provided flexibility and financial
investment relief for the Association, but there have been significant public investments made in
order to establish the program. The USEPA’s Office of Water (2005) compiled a listing of
overall costs of the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program. The NCDSWC contribute
$12.5 million between 1992 and 2003 through the North Carolina Agriculture Cost Share
Program. The Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program, administered by the NCDSWC, has
provided approximately $33 million to the Tar-Pamlico River Basin since 1998. Over $2.5
million in CWA section 319 expenditures were allocated to the program between 1995 and 2003.
This funding from all sources supported a variety of non-point source projects in the Tar-Pamlico
Basin. BMP implementations, monitoring and model tools, technical assistance and education,
and program creation and structure development were all supported by these funding vehicles.
Impediments to Incorporating Wetlands into the
Tar-Pamlico WQT Program
The Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program has suffered from economic and
institutional impediments. The Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program has been assessed as
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being successful at reducing nutrient loads, but point to non-point trades have not occurred at
present. By 2003, nitrogen had been reduced in the Tar-Pamlico by 34 percent over 10 years
(Gannon, 2003). An institutional structure is set in place so that this option is available if needed
in the future. Some stakeholders claim that the success of a trading program should not be
measured by the number of trades taking place (A. Coan, personal interview, April 24, 2007).
Others have claimed that there have been no trades because the trading cap has been set too high
(J. Rudek, personal interview, April 25, 2007). In fact, from an economic standpoint the cap must
be set at an optimal level in order to reflect scarcity. If this does not occur then the correct
allocation of property rights for pollution cannot be assigned.
Population growth, intensive agricultural practices, and expanding livestock operations
are engulfing the basin at a rampant pace. Some improvements have been realized concerning the
ecological quality of the Pamlico Sound, but it is imperative that monitoring assessments and
political factors enable future reduction caps to be set in the most optimal way to continue to
improve water quality within the Tar-Pamlico Basin. From an economic standpoint further
information is lacking in the program concerning the reduction capabilities of non-point sources
and the positive and negative externalities that are associated with them. At the present time, the
Association is in the process of funding basin-wide studies to assess the performance capabilities
of various types of BMPs (J. Rudek, personal interview, April 25, 2007).
From an institutional standpoint, the NCDWQ has set plans to develop a more robust
offset rate for exceedences of the phosphorus cap, and the agency also plans on creating a better
estimation of the lifespan of current BMPs in the basin that includes the assessment of the
geographic distribution of the projects. The NCDWQ also plans on negotiating an agreement
with the Association concerning the payment longevity and credit life initiation of BMPs
implemented within the basin (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007). There are not
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any plans by the NCDWQ or the Association to emphasize the importance of incorporating
wetlands technology into the Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program. The program relies
upon the cost share program of the state to deliver non-point source credits through agricultural
BMPs, and at the present time financial estimates for wetland BMPs are estimated to be greater
than other BMP choices. Farmers choose what types of BMPs they want to install or practice,
and in most cases they will choose the least costly or most productive reducer of nitrogen or
phosphorus. The choice not to incorporate wetlands by farmers may be a rational choice, but
there is a level of institutional failure that is revealed from this standpoint at the state level. There
are not any financial incentives or other market driven incentives for farmers to choose wetlands
over other BMPs. Funding sources for the farmers play a key role in what type of BMPs they
choose. Funding sources for non-point source reductions also influence the trading program as a
whole.

One key factor that hampered the progress of non-point source nutrient reduction

activities from an economic standpoint during early part of Phase II was limited funding, or lack
of, resources to facilitate monitoring and verification of non-point source BMP implementation
(A. Coan, personal interview, April 24, 2007). During Phase I the Association paid for an initial
banking of non-point source credits, but by Phase II that money had already been absorbed. The
Association was not required to pay for credits in Phase II unless the group exceeded its nutrient
cap.
From an institutional standpoint the program has targeted agricultural BMPs as its focus
for non-point source credits. The type of BMP eligible for generating nutrient reduction credits
was intentionally left broad so that farmers would be able to choose any BMP listed with the cost
share program to generate credits (J. Huisman, personal interview, April 24, 2007). The only
limitation to the use of the cost share program for water quality trading purposes is that with the
agricultural rules for the basin the nutrient reductions from BMP projects designed to satisfy the
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30% total nitrogen reduction required of all agricultural operations cannot also be used to
generate nutrient offset credits. But, there has not been a consistent level of monitoring and
assessment of BMPs to verify that the agricultural offsets are improving water quality.
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CHAPTER 8
NEUSE RIVER WATER QUALITY TRADING
CASE STUDY

Background
The Neuse River Basin is located in the eastern plain of North Carolina that lies directly
to the south of the Tar-Pamlico River Basin and to the north of the Cape Fear River Basin. The
river flows from Raleigh, North Carolina toward the east-southeast and empties into the Pamlico
Sound. The Neuse River Basin covers approximately 6,192 square miles, and portions of the
watershed lie in some of the most densely populated areas of North Carolina. One sixth of the
state’s population lives within 19 counties that lie within the basin. Approximately 1.5 million
get their drinking water from and/or discharge wastewater in the Neuse River (Neuse River
Foundation, 2007). Of the 9.2 million acres of land area within the basin, approximately 490,000
acres are forested wetlands, and about 24,000 acres are non-forested wetlands that include salt
and freshwater marshes (Neuse River Foundation, 2007).
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Map 8.1. Neuse River Watershed Map (NCDENR,2007)

In many communities along the Neuse River, population growth has increased
dramatically as well as an increase in infrastructure needs.

Since the 1950s wastewater

discharges have increased by 650%, and approximately 100 million gallons of partially treated
wastewater enters the Neuse River each day. At the present time more than 400 point source
discharge permits exist for the basin, and approximately 2 million hogs reside in intensive
livestock operation sites along the river (Neuse River Foundation, 2007). The rapid growth of
population and hog farms within the basin has led to an overloading within the watershed of
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nutrients, especially nitrogen. Nitrogen levels within the basin have caused smaller tributaries to
clog up from algae and vegetation growth, and the state of North Carolina has previously
instituted fishing and shellfishing closures because of the monitored high levels of pollution.
Recurring massive fish kills have taken place in the Neuse River Basin since 1991. In 1991
dissolved oxygen problems and Pfiesteria caused more that 1 billion fish kills in the watershed
(NCRWA, 2007). By 1995, 1996, and 1997 the American Rivers environmental group classified
the Neuse River as on of North America’s most threatened watersheds (Neuse River Foundation,
2007).

Table 8.1. Neuse River Water Quality Trading Program Overview
Year Watershed Organization Formed

2002

Year Trading Guidelines Adopted

Program Structure

1997
NC Dept. of Water Quality/
Ecosystem Enhancement Program/
Basin Association
In-Lieu-Fee/Exceedance Tax

Pollutant Traded

Nitrogen

Administrative Unit

In 1988 the state of North Carolina developed the original Nutrient Management Strategy
(Neuse NSW Strategy). At this time most of the nutrient problems in the watershed were
occurring in the lower freshwater segments of the river near the mouth of the basin, and
phosphorus was determined to be the limiting nutrient (NCDENR, 1998). For many years the
main focus of nutrient reduction was placed on reducing phosphorus. During this period of time
specific goals were not established for the reduction of total nitrogen. It was not until 1997 that a
nitrogen trading program was included in the Neuse River Basin Nutrient Sensitive Waters
Management Strategy. At this point in time the focus shifted from phosphorus to nitrogen, and
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the Agricultural Cost Share Program was identified as the primary mechanism for reducing
nitrogen from non-point sources within the basin.

This idea was based on the previously

implemented Tar-Pamlico Water Quality Trading Program created just to the north of the Neuse
River Basin where monitoring and modeling during the early part of the 1990s indicated that
nitrogen appeared to be the more important nutrient compared to phosphorus for the brackish
estuarine waters that formed the river basin.
The first watershed plan for the Neuse River Basin was developed in 1993. By this time
it was becoming more and more evident through monitoring techniques and grab samples that
nitrogen was becoming a major concern along the river. The new plan recommended that the
Neuse Nutrient Sensitive Waters Strategy be reassessed before it was updated in 1998
(NCDENR, 1998). In 1995 between 20 and 100 million fish were killed in the same areas as the
1991 fish kill event, and this episode provided further impetus to revise and update nutrient
controls (Neuse River Foundation, 2007). The Neuse Nutrient Sensitive Waters Strategy was
revised by the North Carolina Department of Water Quality in 1997, and the new version focused
on nitrogen and established the Neuse Nutrient Sensitive Waters Rules. These new rules were
implemented to meet and maintain a 30% nitrogen reduction goal by 2003 while at the same time
retaining the technology-based concentration limits for total phosphorus. The impacts of the fish
kills in the watershed also led to the basin being listed on the 303(d) impaired waters list by the
USEPA. In 2001 the USEPA Region 4 approved a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for the
Neuse River Basin (Environomics, 1999).
The Neuse Nutrient Sensitive Waters Rules and the TMDL were developed by North
Carolina in an effort to address the major known sources of nutrients in proactive manner
(NCDENR, 1998). At the time the TMDL was established it was estimated that point sources
contributed approximately 24 % of the nitrogen and phosphorus loading to the estuary. In 1995 it
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was estimated that there were over 111 discharges in the basin, but 32 discharges accounted for
over 95% of the total phosphorus loading to the estuary (M. Templeton, personal interview, April
25, 2007).
In 1997 more than 600 people participated in the public hearing process for the
development of the Neuse River Basin Nutrient Sensitive Management Strategy. Point sources
during public hearings expressed concerns that strigent nutrient allocations would be
burdensomely expensive, and they were interested in more cost-effective and flexible regulatory
structures (Breetz, 2004).

Water quality trading opportunities were discussed and the Tar-

Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program, which had entered into Phase II at that point, was used as a
pre-program model for the Neuse Trading Program. The draft rules were finally brought to the
public for comment before being adopted in December 1997.
Administration of the Neuse River WQT Program
By 1997 the Neuse River Basin Nutrient Sensitive Waters Management Strategy had
established nitrogen allocations and control options to improve water quality in the Neuse River
Basin. The strategy included elements of point source to non-point source trading for nitrogen
allocations and point to non-point source offsets for nitrogen loading (Breetz, 2004). The strategy
established a group compliance option that included those point source dischargers that released
over 5 million gallons per day.

The Neuse River Compliance Association (NRCA) was

established in 2002 from this group of dischargers, and in 2003 the group was issued a combined
discharge NPDES permit. The 22 member group, primarily containing large municipalities, was
allotted a collective NPDES permit for nitrogen based on the sum of the members’ individual
nitrogen allocations established in the TMDL (M. Templeton, personal interview, April 25,
2007).
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The North Carolina Department of Water Quality (NCDWQ) and the North Carolina
Ecosystem Enhancement Program (EEP) serve as administrative entities funded by the state to
oversee and assist in the operations of the Neuse Nutrient Sensitive Waters Strategy. The Neuse
River Basin Rules serve as a regulatory guide for compliance, and it is the responsibility of the
point source or non-point source to demonstrate nutrient reductions at the individual or group
level. The total nitrogen limit for the NRCA is specified in the group NPDES permit, but the
NRCA manages the individual discharges of members through an internal fee structure (M.
Templeton, personal interview, April 25, 2007).
Each individual member within the NRCA has been assigned an allocation that is subject
to change based on the ongoing transactions and shifts in costs of compliance among the other
NRCA members. The individual parties involved with the NRCA monitor discharges and report
individual discharges to the NCDWQ on a monthly basis. This type of reporting is done in
accordance with their individual NPDES permits. The individual entities also provide discharge
information to the NRCA, and the NRCA compiles the individual reports and provides a biannual report to the NCDWQ (M. Templeton, personal interview, May 25, 2007).
The NCDWQ oversees compliance of the NRCA group nitrogen cap, but if new or
expanding dischargers cannot secure nitrogen allocations from other point sources within the
NRCA, they can purchase non-point source offsets by paying into a North Carolina Wetlands
Restoration Fund. Offset payments are paid to the Ecosystem Enhancement Program (EEP) that
administers the wetlands fund, and the transactions are tracked by the In-Lieu Fee Coordinator
based in Raleigh, NC. The EEP works with local governments to identifying potential restoration
projects, and the EEP establishes contracts with private companies to restore or construct wetland
areas. The offset BMP projects are required to be located no farther from the Pamlico Estuary
than the point source discharging entity (S. Klimek, personal interview, April 25, 2007). Wetland
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restoration projects are awarded to private contractors that have demonstrated partnerships with
EEP. The contractors provide design and construction expertise, and they are responsible for up
to one year of performance monitoring of the BMP (S. Klimek, personal interview, April 25,
2007). After one year of performance monitoring by the be private contractor the state of North
Carolina takes on the responsibility that the installed BMP will perform at a certain estimated
level. EEP is responsible for monitoring and verifying performance of offsets that have been
created through the in-lieu fee program.
The EEP was created in 2003 by the state of North Carolina for the purpose of restoring
and protecting wetland areas and waterways. The EEP combines ongoing wetland restoration
initiatives with the NCDENR and efforts made by the North Carolina Department of
Transportation.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) also has signed off on the

agreement to coordinate with the EEP. All of these agencies work with the EEP because the
entity is the main operational body for the state of North Carolina that deals with wetlands
mitigation banking, in-lieu fee programs for environmental offsets, and other North Carolina
Department of Transportation offset procedures (S. Klimek, personal interview, April 25, 2007).
EEP is funded through the in-lieu fees that are paid to them for non-point source offsets, through
general tax revenue allocation provided by the state of North Carolina, and a direct transfer of tax
revenue per year from the North Carolina Department of Transportation (K. Williams, personal
interview, April 25, 2007).
Structure of the Neuse River Water Quality Trading Program
In 1998 point sources were discharging 4.1 million pounds of nitrogen per year into the
Neuse River Estuary. In order to achieve a 30% reduction set by the Neuse Rules point sources
needed to reduce their nitrogen contribution by 2.8 million pounds per year. Nitrogen allocated
to individual dischargers was based on the ratio of their permitted flow to the total permitted flow
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of all point sources within the basin (Templeton, 2007).

Before the TMDL process was

concluded the 30% nitrogen reduction goal was established through a series of modeling analyses
developed to evaluate the effects of various nutrient reduction scenarios. The results from the
models confirmed that the 30% reduction in nitrogen from the 1995 baseline for total nitrogen
would be a reasonable initial target for the watershed (Templeton, 2007).
The 30% reduction target determined the initial standard to set individual nitrogen export
reduction allocations throughout the basin. Local governments were assigned a nitrogen export
standard of 3.6 pounds of nitrogen per acre per year to meet the overall load reduction on the
watershed. Non-point source loading for the Neuse River Watershed was originally estimated
using export coefficients for different land cover types. Export coefficients use land cover
information to determine the amount of nitrogen, or some other substance, expected to be
transported from land to water through runoff. LANDSAT imagery was used to interpret land
cover classification through GIS programs for the time period ranging from 1993 to 1995
(NCDENR, 1998). The modeling revealed that nutrient loads from agricultural operations within
the Neuse River Basin account for more than 50% of the nitrogen load. Point sources were
identified as contributing approximately 24% of the nitrogen load, and the inputs came from
urban areas, forested land, and influxes from interactions with air (Templeton, 2007).
The system established for point source to non-point source trades in the Neuse River
Watershed can best be described as an exceedance tax and in-lieu fee program. Trading parties
within the basin include members of the NRCA, any other discharger holding an allocation, and
other landowners.

Landowners may voluntarily participate in the trading program, but

agricultural BMPs are not eligible for trading within this program (M. Templeton, personal
interview, April 25, 2007; J. Huisman, personal interview, April 25, 2007). Non-point source
trades are conducted indirectly through the North Carolina Wetlands Restoration Fund at a fixed
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price of $11 per pound of nitrogen per year. Landowners who apply for grants from the Wetlands
Restoration Fund in order to establish non-point source BMPs are indirect trading partners, but
the responsibility rests with the state for ensuring nutrient offset projects are implemented and
successful (M. Templeton, personal interview, April 25, 2007).
The original unit offset payment accepted for the Neuse Rules, $11 per pound, was set to
include operation and maintenance of restoring wetland areas for 30 years. New or expanding
point sources that belong to the NRCA have their offset rates multiplied by 200% to account for
uncertainty (K. Williams, personal interview, April 25, 2007). Therefore, a point source
discharger in the NRCA that needs to purchase 1 pound of nitrogen through the EEP would an
effective fee of $660 per pound. The $11 per pound rate was initially assessed by the NCDWQ
with help from environmental economists at North Carolina State University (M. Templeton,
personal interview, April 25, 2007). The figure was based on the cost of restoring degraded
wetlands along the Neuse River. Most recently, however, there have been revisions made to the
offset rate that raises the figure to $57 per pound of nitrogen reduced (S. Klimek, personal
interview, April 25, 2007). A shift in focus of the EEP from site specific wetland restoration to
stormwater BMPs has effectively changed the price. The $57 per pound offset rate reflects the
higher price of this sort of BMP. At the present time the change from $11 per pound to $57 per
pound has not taken place, and political debates are ongoing concerning this issue of increasing
the price per pound of nitrogen in both houses of the North Carolina Legislature.
The Neuse Rules also created a mechanism for non-point source to non-point source
trades. The Neuse Stormwater Requirements (15A NCAC 2B.0235) set a nitrogen discharge
standard for local governments based on population and growth rate. These local governments
are required to develop stormwater management plans and have them approved by the North
Carolina Environmental Management Commission (NCEMC).
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If local governments do not

comply with the regulation then they will be subject to NPDES permitting requirements enforced
by the NCDWQ. The regulation is designed to help the local governments ensure that nutrient
reduction goals are met. Developers have the option through these local government entities to
install stormwater BMPs to satisfy standards.

These developers may choose to purchase

stormwater BMPs credits that will meet the allowable level, 3.6 pounds of nitrogen per acre per
year, through the EEP program.

New developments within the watershed are required to

implement on-site stormwater controls at least to assure that nitrogen export does not exceed 6 to
10 pounds per acre per year from residential and commercial properties. Additional purchases of
reduction credit may be purchased through the EEP for $11 per pound of nitrogen reduced in
order to meet the 3.6 pounds of nitrogen per acre per year requirement (K. Williams, personal
interview, April 25, 2007).
The trade structure of the Neuse Water Quality Trading Program has been constructed
within the water quality protection programs developed by the state of North Carolina. There are
no trading ratios for point to non-point trades, but there is a target price per pound of nitrogen
discharged into the watershed. The state provides the linkage between point and non-point
sources and the state of North Carolina assumes the responsibility for ensuring that the payments
made into the Wetlands Restoration Fund result in non-point source nitrogen reductions. Point
sources within the NRCA provide reporting data specified within their NPDES permits, but the
EEP is responsible for verifying reductions from specific non-point source site nitrogen reduction
BMPs.
Performance Record
The goal of the Neuse River Trading Program was to provide another option for
achieving regulatory compliance concerning nitrogen allocations (Breetz, 2004).

The 30%

reduction goal has been met in recent years by the NRCA, and further reductions have been
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discussed as possible goal initiatives throughout the basin. (M. Templeton, personal interview,
April 25, 2007) Non-point source loads from agriculture have been reduced by considerably and
almost 200 acres of riparian buffers have been preserved along the watershed (M. Templeton,
personal interview, April 25, 2007).
The Neuse Rules that have been enforced by the NCDWQ have provided the regulatory
authority to decrease nitrogen levels that have been discharged by point sources within the basin.
This reduction has been measured through NPDES reports. But, it is too early to tell if the EEP
has been efficient and effective in its role to decrease nitrogen loads from non-point sources (M.
Templeton, personal interview, April 25, 2007).
The EEP manages the North Carolina Wetland Restoration Fund. The EEP uses the fund
to restore and construct wetlands and other BMPs throughout the watershed. The construction
costs for wetlands can fall into three main categories: land acquisition, construction, and
maintenance. Cost estimates compiled by Wossink and Hunt (2003) (Table 8.2) have been used
by the EEP to develop the following cost estimates for various components of wetland
construction. Table 8.2 provides a cost comparison for four stormwater BMPs for a 10-acre
watershed and the nutrient removal efficiencies of each BMP.
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Table 8.2. Neuse River Cost Comparison of Four BMPs for 10 Acre Watershed
Practice
Construction Cost
Annual Maintenance Cost
Opportunity Cost of Land
($217,800/acre)
Present Value of Total Cost
Annualized Cost Per Acre
Watershed
Annualized Cost Per
Pound Nitrogen Removed

Wet Pond
($)
65,357

Wetland
($)
11,740

Bioretention
Clay Soils
($)
124,445

Bioretention
Sandy Soils
($)
7,843

4,411

752

583

583

43,560

65,340

65,340

65,340

146,474

83,486

194,751

78,137

1,721

981

2,288

918

61

45

51

20

Impediments to Incorporating Wetlands into the
Neuse River WQT Program
Economic and institutional impediments have been revealed throughout the Neuse River
Water Quality Trading program. The state of North Carolina has recognized that wetlands play a
valuable role in the removal of nutrients from stormwater runoff. The state has specifically
targeted wetland restoration and construction initiatives as key components of reducing nitrogen
levels within the watershed for this trading program. The NCDWQ has provided the enforcement
of the Neuse Rules to set the standard total nitrogen removal efficiencies, and the EEP receives
payments for nitrogen discharges that exceed allocated amounts. The EEP then proceeds to pay
for wetlands restoration and stormwater BMP construction within the watershed.
The Neuse River Water Quality Trading Program has been successful at reducing nutrient
loads, but there is still much to be accomplished. In a seven year period of time from the
implementation of the Neuse Rules the basin has experienced a 37% load decrease of nitrogen
(M. Templeton, personal interview, April 25, 2007). At the present time no point source to nonpoint source trades have occurred because the state of North Carolina acts as an intermediary
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body between the two groups. The state assumes the transaction burden of trading by collecting
payments from point sources that do not meet their allocations. The transactions that take place
through the state as an in-lieu fee clearinghouse are politically influenced by the setting of the
fixed price for nitrogen reduction. At the present time there is a highly contested debate taking
place in both houses of the North Carolina as to what the true cost of a pound of nitrogen should
be within the Neuse River. This institutional failure to identify the appropriate price for nitrogen
reduction greatly encumbers the program from operating efficiently.
The Neuse River Water Quality Trading Program assigned legal requirements at the
beginning stages of implementation to require certain discharge levels from point sources and
non-point sources, but these two groups were not integrated as independent trading partners.
Under the Neuse Rules for agriculture, farmers can implement BMPs voluntarily or participate in
their individual county plans, but they cannot trade directly with point sources. Trading between
agricultural non-point sources and other point sources was not initially authorized because there
was concern in the beginning stages of the program that farmers would not be able to meet their
own 30% reduction goals for nitrogen. Therefore, it was believed that these agricultural entities
would not be able to easily generate excess reductions beyond their 30% reduction allocations.
The Neuse Strategy has benefited from a significant amount of new resources funded by
the state of North Carolina. The additional funding has decreased transaction costs for point
sources and non-point sources in the basin, but new assignments and responsibilities have been
assumed by state agencies like the NCDWQ and the EEP. The state has become the intermediary
between point sources and non-point sources. However, the significant investments that have
been made into the EEP have made it less likely that point sources and non-point sources will
directly work together to decrease nitrogen loads. There is no incentive for non-point sources to
decrease loads as long as the EEP is responsible for providing offsets for point source discharges.
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Therefore, there is no incentive for agricultural operations to reduce allocations beyond their 30%
reduction standards.
Population continues to rapidly expand in the Neuse River Basin and water quality
indicators within the basin still indicate that there is a nitrogen overload problem that has not been
solved completely. An in-lieu fee structure has been arranged by the state of North Carolina to
facilitate trading between point and non-point sources, but there are economic and institutional
issues that have arisen concerning the appropriate fixed price for a pound of nitrogen reduction.
A full cost analysis of this fixed price must be assessed in order to fully compensate nitrogen
point discharges with appropriate nitrogen non-point offsets. This price should be determined by
measuring the amount of nitrogen that is reduced by several types of wetland BMPs that have
been created by the EEP. Then, costs to maintain these sites and monitor these sites should be
calculated. A price for the number of pounds of nitrogen removed from the system could be
determined based on these measurements.
At the present time economic information is severely lacking, there are no precise
measurements of the amount of nitrogen reduction that is taking place within the basin. The
additional state funding used to develop the EEP should also be used to assess and verify the
performance of the restored and created wetland sites within the basin. Precise monitoring and
verification would greatly improve the ability for policy makers to assess the performance of the
EEP and the performance of the Neuse River Water Quality Trading Program.
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CHAPTER 9
CASE STUDY SYNTHESIS

General Overview
The four case studies in this research analysis identified some of the key economic and
institutional impediments constraining water quality trading programs that promote point source
to non-point source water quality trades including those programs listing wetlands as a BMP
option. Each of the four case studies represents a different way of incorporating a water quality
trading program that includes wetlands nutrient reduction techniques. The four case studies
analyzed revealed distinctive environmental water quality stressors and human settlement
pressures with market and institutional constraints. The watersheds ranged in size from the
smallest, Cherry Creek, at 245,500 acres to almost 4 million acres, the Neuse River Basin. All
four watersheds have experienced some extreme form of nutrient related environmental
degradation episode or series of hazardous events over the course of several years. Vast fish kills
within each basin have been the most dramatic and profound focusing events within the basins to
date. Two programs identified phosphorus as the watershed limiting nutrient to be traded:
Cherry Creek and Lower Boise. The Tar-Pamlico program focused both on phosphorus and
nitrogen, and the Neuse program dealt exclusively with nitrogen (Table 9.1).
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Table 9.1. Pollutant Traded Analysis Matrix

Program
Factor

Cherry Creek, CO

Lower Boise,
ID

Tar-Pamlico, NC

Neuse, NC

Pollutant
Traded

phosphorus

phosphorus

nitrogen &
phosphorus

nitrogen

Three of the four programs engaged extensively with agricultural interests within their
particular trading programs: the Lower Boise, the Tar-Pamlico, and the Neuse (Table 9.2). The
Lower Boise Water Quality Trading Program incorporated the issues of the various irrigation
districts within the basin while the Tar-Pamlico and Neuse programs accounted for the intensive
hog, poultry, and other livestock operations within their basins. The Cherry Creek Basin was
predominantly an urban and suburban environment, and the other three basins continue to
experience increased population growth pressures.

Table 9.2. Eligible Parties Analysis Matrix

Program
Factor

Cherry Creek, CO

Lower Boise,
ID

Eligible
Parties

Authority members
and other approved
authority groups

Any entity in
the basin; entry
into the market
not restricted

Tar-Pamlico, NC

Neuse, NC

Association members
and agriculture

Association
members;
agriculture
BMPs not
allowed

Three of the four watersheds flow through large population growth centers with more
than 200,000 residents: Cherry Creek flows through Denver, Colorado; the Lower Boise River
flows through Boise, Idaho; and the Neuse River flows through Raleigh, North Carolina. In these
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three areas urban and suburban population growth is increasing at explosive rates. The TarPamlico River Basin also has seen increased population growth in cities of Greenville, Rocky
Mount, and Tarboro.
Three out of the four programs had formally formed watershed organizational groups
before they had adopted trading guidelines. The Neuse Water Quality Trading Program instituted
trading guidelines in 1997, and then the Neuse River Compliance Association (NRCA) was
formed after the state of North Carolina allotted a collective NPDES permit to the 22 largest
dischargers within the basin (Table 9.2).
The federal government, USEPA, only played a direct role in developing one of the
programs, the Lower Boise River Water Quality Trading Program. The Cherry Creek Water
Quality Trading Program was initially formed through the Cherry Creek Basin Authority. That
entity was created by an intergovernmental agreement and a state statute later provided the
organization with certain water quality protection powers. The Tar-Pamlico Association formed
from initial stakeholder group meetings held by the state of North Carolina concerning the water
quality issues within the basin. The North Carolina Division of Water Quality (NCDWQ) played
the key role in the developing the Neuse River Water Quality Trading Program because they set
the regulatory discharge constraint (total maximum daily load TMDL) for the basin which
directed the formation of the trading program (Table 9.3).
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Table 9.3. Stakeholders Analysis Matrix

Program
Factor

Cherry Creek, CO

Lower Boise,
ID

Tar-Pamlico, NC

Neuse, NC

Stakeholders

Authority, Colorado
State Water Quality
Regulators, Parks,
Municipalities

EPA, IDEQ,
ICWC, ISCC,
irrigation
districts

Wastewater
Association,
NCDENR, NCDWQ,
NCDSWC,
Environmental
Defense

NCDWQ,
EEP,
Association,
local
governments

The Neuse River Water Quality Trading Program is the only program of the four cases
that has a fully operational TMDL as a regulatory discharge limiting constraint for point sources
(Table 9.4). The Lower Boise River Water Quality Trading Program is expected to phase-in an
operational TMDL sometime within the next year. The Cherry Creek Program uses a total
maximum annual load (TMAL) criterion. The Tar-Pamlico Program has a cap set for nutrients,
but this constraint is not officially recognized as a regulatory TMDL.

Table 9.4. TMDL Status Analysis Matrix

Program
Factor

Cherry Creek, CO

Lower Boise,
ID

Tar-Pamlico, NC

Neuse, NC

TMDL
Status

TMAL
implemented;
being reassessed

TMDL currently
under review

None: loading caps
established for
nitrogen and
phosphorus

TMDL
established

Differences between the case studies were revealed in the many methods of program
administration, structure for trading, and performance of different trading strategies. These
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differences can be explained through a distinct set of factors that include trading drivers like
regulatory TMDLs or other caps on nutrient loads, local culture and politics, investment and
development influence from federal, state, and local government agencies, and the creation and
development of water quality trading organizational bodies.

Further interpretation of the

differences between the four case studies can be explained through a discussion and analysis of
the specific economic and institutional impediments that hinder the trading programs from
operating effectively or prevent the incorporation of wetlands into the individual water quality
trading program.
Distinctive Institutional Arrangements
Each of the four water quality trading programs has its own distinct type of
administration.

The initial program structure and stakeholder groups helped to define the

administrative units. The Neuse program was developed and is maintained through the NCDWQ
and the EEP. Funding for the program is generated through nitrogen offset fees and other state
revenues. The state of North Carolina and the Association split responsibilities in the TarPamlico program. The Association provides funding for the North Carolina Agricultural Cost
Share Program, and the state of North Carolina assumes the responsibility for providing and
managing non-point source credits. The Authority in the Cherry Creek program levies taxes,
charges development fees, and issues recreation fees in order to financially support the trading
program, but the state does have some control concerning the Authority because seven members
of the 17 member Authority Board are appointed by the Governor of Colorado. The Lower Boise
program initially was funded through EPA and IDEQ grants. These agencies, however, do not
maintain any amount of control over the program. The ICWC, a non-profit entity, tracks trades
and presents the trade contracts to the corresponding agencies and general public in a transparent
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way, but contracts between the independent point sources and non-point sources direct the trades
along this watershed (Table 9.5).

Table 9.5. Administrative Roles Analysis Matrix

Program
Factor

Cherry Creek, CO

Lower Boise,
ID

Tar-Pamlico, NC

Neuse, NC

Administrative
Roles

Authority
responsible for
trade interactions
(tracking,
enforcement, credit
verification)

ICWC tracks
trades; binding
contracts define
point/non-point
interactions

State of North
Carolina and
Association split
responsibilities
(liability for credits
rest on cost share
program)

State of North
Carolina
through the
NCDWQ and
the EEP

Dissimilar Trading Structures
Multiple models exist for program structure used to guide and regulate trading programs,
and the four case studies present the various ways this can be accomplished. The Tar-Pamlico
program in North Carolina established an association of point source dischargers who were
collectively regulated and allowed to trade among themselves to achieve group compliance. The
non-point source entities attached to the established association of point sources were arranged
through the state agricultural cost share program. The Neuse Program developed a TMDL and
then an association of point sources was formed in order to meet nutrient reduction standards.
The non-point controls for this program were left to the EEP to provide for offsetting nutrient
reductions (Table 9.6). Neither of these North Carolina trading programs have experienced any
trades to date. The flexibility afforded by the group compliance option has allowed members
within the Tar-Pamlico and Neuse compliance associations to trade amongst themselves. Trading
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may occur within these programs as population growth pressures or agricultural pressures
increase and opportunities for cost-effective technology upgrades are exhausted.
The Cherry Creek program has established a Phosphorous Bank and a Reserve Pool to
accomplish non-point source reductions in the basin, and the TMAL is set to be reduced by half
sometime in the near future. The LBR program in Idaho allows for trades to occur freely between
any potential trading partners. The ICWC is required to report trades to the regulatory authority
and the general public for review (Table 9.6).

Table 9.6. Program Structure & Market Mechanisms Analysis Matrix

Program
Factor

Cherry Creek, CO

Lower Boise,
ID

Tar-Pamlico, NC

Neuse, NC

Program
Structure

Brokerage/
Clearinghouse

Contractual
Market

In-Lieu
Fee/Exceedance
Tax

In-Lieu
Fee/Exceedance
Tax

Phosphorus Bank
& Reserve Pool

estimated
average
reduction or
on-site
monitoring
assessment
through
contracts

credits generated
on-going basis; point
sources purchase as
needed

point sources
pay fee to EEP
($11 per pound
of nitrogen)

Market
Mechanisms

A strong determinant for the feasibility of trades can be the understanding of the nutrient
cap limitations in comparison to the type and number of exchanges that take place within a given
program. The Cherry Creek trading program illustrates this point clearly. The load allocations
were initially assigned to point sources in 1985 allowing for projected growth capacity. The point
sources have been able to easily operate within their compliance limit since the time of allocation,
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and that is why there is no demand for trades. As point sources continue to grow, it will become
more difficult for them to operate within the same load allocation limits. It should become
feasible at some future point with the reduction of the TMAL and the increase in point source
capacity that water quality trades will become economically preferable in comparison to facility
upgrades. In contrast to this program there have been no direct trades in either North Carolina
programs, and the state continues to be responsible for offsetting point source discharges. In the
Lower Boise program it is necessary that the TMDL be set at the appropriate level to induce
trading between point sources and non-point sources. If the level of nutrient loading allowed is
set too high then trading will not occur. There is an absolute need for an appropriate TMDL to be
set in order to reflect scarcity. If a limitation is not constructed then there will not be a market for
nutrient reducing credits. The enforcement activities that surround the set allocations of nutrient
discharge will also affect participation in trading.

If there is sufficient enforcement of the

discharge limits then there could be an increased necessity to trade, but if the likelihood of
enforcement is remote then dischargers may decide to game the system instead of participating in
the program. The issue is one of in-stream capacity, and if the trading system does not reflect
scarcity then market forces will not operate effectively as a resource allocation medium.
In each of the trading programs studied it was revealed that non-point source nutrient
loads exceed point source loads in these basins. The focus of all four programs was to create an
incentive for non-point sources to control their discharges through trading the load reductions for
a price that was less than the cost of nutrient reducing technology upgrades for the point sources
within the basin. Non-point sources have several disincentives for participating in a water quality
trading program. They may be able to acquire financial gains from the programs, but these gains
also may include the new compliance requirements through contracts (in the Lower Boise) or
through state mandated rules (Neuse and Tar-Pamlico). Regulation of non-point sources may be
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increasingly applicable if reliable methods of monitoring and verification are developed to isolate
and quantify non-point source load reductions (Table 9.7). For a water quality trading program to
work efficiently and effectively a thorough understanding of nutrient loading on a watershed
scale is necessary to align the right incentives for non-point source dischargers to generate
credits.

Table 9.7. Regulatory Context Analysis Matrix

Program
Factor

Cherry Creek,
CO

Lower Boise, ID

Tar-Pamlico, NC

Neuse, NC

Regulatory
Context

Colorado State
regulations
specific to basin;
trades managed
by Authority

State of Idaho
has statutory
trading rules;
LBR is water
quality limited by
sediment and
pathogens

Association has
bubble NPDES
permit; State of North
Carolina has point
source, storm water,
and agriculture
discharge rules

State of North
Carolina has
point source,
storm water,
and agriculture
discharge rules
for the basin

Motivation to generate water quality credits with the incorporation of wetland may be
driven by ancillary benefits to property owners. Individual non-point source dischargers may
increase the value of their property or profit from other multiple benefits like habitat creation for
hunting or fishing, flood mitigation, or carbon reduction. At the present time these multiple
benefits are undervalued or not accounted for in the water quality trading programs referenced.
Though, the Cherry Creek program and the Neuse program have focused their programs heavily
on providing the extensive ancillary benefits that can be provided by wetland areas.
Performance Records
Only one of the four programs has experienced at least one point to non-point source
trade. The Cherry Creek Program has processed two trades that have included the incorporation
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of a restored wetland site and a constructed wetland site. Through this process the stakeholders
involved in the process quite vividly described the laborious process of applying for, negotiating,
assessing, and monitoring credits. The application, negotiation, and assessment of the credits
took place over the course of a year, and the monitoring for the trades is still taking place to date.
These types of transaction costs are a major deterrent for trading programs.
The most frequently cited problem discussed by individuals that were interviewed for the
case studies pertained to high transaction costs.

These stakeholders and agency officials

discussed the time consuming and difficult process of gaining political acceptance for trading.
Cultural barriers and mistrust from environmental groups and non-point source stakeholders
made initial participation in the programs difficult. Educational efforts were used in all four
programs to instruct stakeholder groups of the particular trading process. The administrative cost
to the regulatory agencies that managed the programs was mentioned by stakeholders in both
North Carolina programs and Cherry Creek. The lengthy and expensive process of creating
TMDLs or setting appropriate caps on discharges was mentioned as a high transaction cost, and
the scientific uncertainties in non-point source credit evaluation procedures relating to wetlands
nutrient reducing techniques was cited as a source for high transactions cost for all four programs.
Specifically, in the Cherry Creek Trading Program the TMAL was originally set to allow for
growth and increased capacity, but trades are not in high demand because point sources can easily
maintain discharges within their allocations. From an institutional standpoint the cap (TMAL,
TMDL, or other standard) should be set at a point that reflects scarcity. Without this standard
there cannot be an effective market for water quality credits. In the Tar-Pamlico and Neuse
Programs the state of North Carolina accepts the transfer of liability and the majority of
transaction costs. In the Lower Boise Program the initial transactions costs of allocating the
nutrient discharge limits for the TMDL have slowed the process of actual trading.
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Transaction costs occur at every stage of the trading process, but the four trading
programs handle these costs differently. The time spent on permit negotiation, the search for
trading partners, administrative expenditures, transparent communication between permittees and
government agencies, regulatory staff time, and monitoring and verification initiatives are all
handled according to the structure of the program. In both the Neuse program and the TarPamlico program the state of North Carolina shouldered most of the transaction costs through the
North Carolina Agricultural Cost Share Program (for the Tar-Pamlico) and through the North
Carolina Ecosystem Enhancement Program (for the Neuse).

The control and oversight for

environmental accountability in North Carolina for these two programs is attained at the expense
of higher staff costs for agency staff. The Association in the Tar-Pamlico program helped to
provide funding for additional staff resources for the North Carolina Agricultural Cost Share
Program, but the Neuse program costs were solely based on the figure of $11 per pound of
nitrogen removed. In the Cherry Creek and Lower Boise programs the transaction costs were
mainly shouldered by the point sources that were required to meet certain discharge allocations
based on their NPDES permits.
Water quality programs have taken different approaches in dealing with issues of
property rights and transfer of liability. The question of who would be liable if a BMP project
fails is addressed slightly differently in each of the programs included in the four case studies. In
the Cherry Creek Reserve Pool and Lower Boise programs the credit purchaser is not offered a
release from liability if the non-point source reduction technology implementation is ineffective.
The point sources in these cases may be required to continuously monitor and maintain the nonpoint source credit site to reduce nutrient loads. In the Tar-Pamlico, Neuse, and Cherry Creek
Phosphorus Bank programs the liability is taken on by a third party. The transfer of liability from
the credit purchaser to the third party (the State of North Carolina or the Authority) assists in
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allowing the point source purchasers to rapidly avoid verification needs and transaction costs.
The Cherry Creek Reserve Pool and the Lower Boise programs expose the point sources to risk.
The risk that these entities take on concerns the notion that purchasing water quality credits does
not eliminate the possibility that the same discharge issue could arise again some time in the
future. The purchase does not eliminate their liability. The additional costs associated with
monitoring and verifying BMPs included with this type of risk makes the notion of water quality
trading less appealing to point sources.
From a non-point source perspective water quality trading programs do not tend to be
structured in a way that compensates credit generators for the risks taken to implement BMPs. In
the Lower Boise program non-point sources were not driven by regulation, but these stakeholders
realized the opportunity to improve their property with outside funds without having to monitor
or assess reduction loads (R. Finch, personal interview, April 12, 2007). In properly functioning
markets investors build their cost of risk and uncertainty into the price of their goods. For water
quality trading programs, increased understanding of the ancillary benefits of BMPs like wetlands
may generate understanding of value beyond water quality credit prices.

This type of

representation of the implementation may increase the attractiveness of participating in a trading
program to non-point sources.
The key economic issue that makes water quality trading appealing is the efficiency that
is created when one discharge source is able to more cost-effectively reduce its outputs compared
to another source. Without this guideline then the program is not financially viable. It is
necessary that economic considerations are incorporated into performance assessments of trading
programs in order for the programs to be considered viable tools to achieve water quality
standards. The economic trading barriers that were revealed in the case studies presented were
highlighted the economic impediments that were discovered in the literature. The inability to set
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appropriate caps, the inappropriate allocation of property rights (nutrient allocations set through
TMDLs), the lack of information concerning non-point source reductions, inaccurate assessments
of positive and negative externalities, and high transaction costs were all economic impediments
that were brought forth by the case studies. These types of economic barriers prevent equitable
and efficient negotiations from occurring.

Negotiations do not occur because the lack of

economic information increases the risk in relation to the return on investment to the point source,
non-point source, or to both parties.
There are also several political constraints that were observed in the case studies
presented that dealt with the institutional settings affecting the performance of the programs.
Institutional impediments that were identified by the literature were also revealed in the cases,
and are directly related to the economic impediments. The inability for government agencies to
set caps, the inability to assign property rights, the lack of good information, the inability for the
government entity to account for positive and negative externalities, and the inability to
efficiently manage transaction costs were all institutional failures highlighted in the case studies.
One of the institutional impediment examples within the cases dealt with the effective
implementation of the programs. The Cherry Creek Authority was given a statutory mandate by
the State of Colorado to provide for the use of trading within the basin. The North Carolina
programs were provided with state regulations and nutrient limiting caps in order to direct trading
initiatives. Therefore, from an institutional setting everything is in place to direct trades based on
water quality regulation. But, as the case studies revealed, effective implementation of the
programs did not occur immediately because of insufficient funding, undeveloped property rights,
lack of political will, or stakeholder inexperience with the understanding of the water quality
trading concept.
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Impediments to Incorporating Wetlands into a WQT Program
The literature and cases have revealed several important economic and institutional
impediments that prevent water quality trading programs from operating effectively. The case
studies revealed that a water quality trading market cannot exist without the creation of a market
framework that reflects scarcity. Scarcity can be imposed through the implementation of a cap
(TMDL) that limits the amount of nutrients that can be discharged into a watershed. This cap that
mirrors resource constraints is absolutely necessary in order for a market to function.
The case studies revealed that only two point to non-point trades that have occurred
within the four research sites, and both of these took place within the Cherry Creek Basin. The
lack of trades is directly related to the lack of a cap that is set at a level that reflects artificial
scarcity. If there is no enforceable cap, then there is no real market for water quality credits.
The case studies also revealed that transaction costs play a large role in the operation of
these programs.

If a cap is set and enforced, then transaction costs are another economic

impediment to trading. At the present time the case studies revealed that there is a lack of good
information that assesses the ability of wetlands to remove nutrients at the watershed scale.
Monitoring, in order to gather information to lessen transaction costs, is essentially necessary for
wetlands to perform as nutrient reducing non-point source credit generators. Most water quality
trading programs bypass performance monitoring for quantifying nutrient load reductions from
non-point sources. Instead of monitoring, these programs use conservative estimates derived
from scientific literature of effectiveness of a type of BMP to reduce nutrient loads. For instance,
a larger amount of wetland acreage may be required to achieve the desired nutrient load reduction
through the conservative estimate compared to actual monitoring information targets. Safety
factors are used to increase confidence in performance, but this type of conservative estimation is
flawed because there is never a true assessment of the amount of nutrients that the non-point
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source credit is reducing. The Cherry Creek program is a notable exception to this type of
estimation. The Authority requires direct measurement of nutrient load reduction. This type of
information can be gathered in the basin by creating inflow and outflow points for a restored or
constructed wetland. The Lower Boise program also proposed performance monitoring for
constructed wetlands, but this proposal is only an option. The alternative choice for non-point
sources would be to earn credits through a ratio derived by estimation rather than direct
monitoring. The other two water quality trading program case studies did not record actual
performance in reducing nutrient loads. The assessment of nutrient load reductions from nonpoint sources was presumed based on estimates and safety factors.
An institutional impediment that was discovered through the case studies, revealed that
the rationale for not monitoring non-point reduction sites is based on the idea that monitoring is
not feasible because accurate measurements cannot be attained from various types of non-point
source BMPs. It also has been assumed that it is more cost effective to overestimate the size of a
particular wetland site (or BMP area) to overcome uncertainty rather than to directly monitor.
This institutional assumption may stem from the fact that there is a wealth of scientific
information concerning the nutrient removing capabilities of various types of wetlands, but the
available information has not been compiled in a way that would be useful in determining the
possible performance of restored or constructed wetlands in reducing nutrient loads. In the
Lower Boise program case study, the ISCC presented the opinion that constructed wetlands
should not be used for creating non-point source credits because at the present time there is not
any watershed scale data on the effectiveness of wetlands to reduced nutrient loads. Most
information concerning the uncertainties of wetland nutrient reduction capabilities have been
measured at single sites. Many interrelated parameters need further study in order to better
understand the watershed effects that can altered through the incorporation of restored and
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constructed wetland technology. Some of the parameters include: specific drainage patterns over
time, relative location of a wetland within the watershed, type of wetland, seasonality dynamics,
and temporal changes in nutrient reduction performance rates with varying loads over time.
Another institutional impediment that was identified by the case studies dealt with the
assessment of risk and uncertainty.

The Cherry Creek program case study revealed an

opportunity to reduce uncertainty and increase water quality trading program potential by
establishing objective and reliable means of determining performance of restored and constructed
wetlands.

The Authority’s approach is to develop cost-effective guidelines for collecting

monitoring guidelines. The original restored wetlands in the Phosphorus Bank have provided
valuable monitoring assessments of wetland capacities to reduce and immobilize phosphorus
loads. The EEP that handles the non-point source reductions for the Neuse program uses a
combination of existing information and new research to develop general performance data to
inform the creation of generalized calculation guidelines for estimating non-point source
reductions. The EEP acknowledges the dynamic nature of wetlands in the Neuse Basin, and the
agency is involved in assessing nutrient retention rates within the context of the larger geographic
scale (S. Klimek, personal interview, April 25, 2007). Additional applications like establishing
baseline nutrient levels and mapping wetland sites within the watershed should provide better
quantifications of nutrient fate and transport. The Cherry Creek and Neuse program officials
indicated that wetlands were the preferred BMP for those particular watersheds. Both programs
are interested in continuing to promote the incorporation of wetland technology into their
watershed water quality trading programs (Table 9.8). From an institutional standpoint, the
Cherry Creek and Neuse programs have identified the positive externalities associated with
incorporating wetlands within their watersheds, but the ancillary benefits that wetlands provide
are either undervalued or non-existent in the Lower Boise and Tar-Pamlico programs. The case
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studies have revealed that is it imperative that institutional arrangements be set in order to
incorporate wetlands into a water quality trading program. Without institutional identification of
the value of these resources the market may fail to distinguish these BMPs versus other types of
pollution reduction technologies.

Table 9.8. Future Wetland Incorporation Analysis Matrix

Program
Factor

Cherry Creek, CO

Lower Boise, ID

Tar-Pamlico, NC

Neuse, NC

Future Plans
to
Incorporate
Wetlands
into their
Program

Yes--Authority is
focused on
continued use of
wetlands for
nutrient reduction
and other ancillary
benefits

No--Market will
determine least
cost solution to
reducing
phosphorous loads

No-focus is on
agriculture BMPs
financed by the
cost share
program;

Yes--EEP is
focused on
wetland
restoration
initiatives
throughout the
basin

All four case studies revealed the importance of scientific information in determining
how wetlands reduce nutrient loads within a given watershed. The cases brought forth the need
for water quality trading programs to better assess time limits concerning the useful life of water
quality credits that have been generated by wetlands. Various life spans were discussed in the
trading programs presented, but there may be additional regulatory implications associated with
the wetland areas when credits expire. The potential option value of the land may be diminished
if the wetland could become regulated under the Clean Water Act after the useful water quality
credit life is used up. This potential aspect could be a deterrent of incorporating constructed
wetlands into a water quality trading programs. Further policy implications will need to be
addressed by the federal and state governments concerning the incorporation of wetlands into a
water quality trading program. If the policy guidelines continue to support and encourage the use
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of restored or constructed wetlands in water quality trading programs then the long-term
regulatory implications of this type of inclusion will need to be more clearly validated.
Lastly, the case studies did reveal that even without an effective market for trading, there
was evidence that suggested that institutional benefits that can be gained through cooperation
among various stakeholder groups.

Some stakeholders claimed that the success of trading

programs should be measured in more general terms instead of the number of trades that have
occurred. All four of the cases provided evidence supporting the idea that very diverse groups of
stakeholders had been brought together to identify, assess, and try to solve a severe water quality
problem within a basin. In fact, this benefit of coordination and cooperation was suggested as
being the most successful aspect of the Tar-Pamlico program by a couple of individuals that were
interviewed (A. Coan, personal interview, April 24, 2007; J. Huisman, personal interview, April
25, 2007).
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CHAPTER 10
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary
The common assumption based on economic theory that suggests that market-based
approaches can be directly substituted for outdated or inefficient traditional regulatory procedures
has not been supported by evidence in the case studies presented. Market based environmental
trading programs are often touted as alternatives to market regulation, but the markets are only
successful to the degree that there are binding caps and allowances that are well defined. Water
quality trading programs require supportive legislation, strong institutions, and effective
monitoring and enforcement procedures to be viable. At the present time an increased level of
administrative intensity for water quality trading is necessary because of the high level of
uncertainty of non-point source reductions. This conclusion follows the transaction costs theory
provided by Williamson (1985; 1996) discussed in the literature review.
As the literature suggests and the case studies reveal, all aspects of markets for water
quality trading are determined by regulatory decisions. These markets are not an alternative to
regulation, but rather, a supplement. Public involvement, statutory requirements, monitoring
assessments, and enforcement actions on the surface may not be substantially different from
traditional regulatory approaches in the broad assessment of water quality trading programs.
Therefore, the determination of water quality trading would not be considered a direct
replacement for regulatory requirements. In fact, the application could be looked upon as an
additional tool to provide watersheds with an option to provide structure in order to meet or
exceed regulatory standards. A strong institutional base is required in order for a water quality
trading program to be implemented within a watershed. It is absolutely necessary that resource
scarcity be reflected through institutional guidelines. The literature and the case studies show the
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importance of defining the enforceable cap that is necessary in order to create and maintain a
market.

Once that base is defined then various types of trading structures may form in

accordance with stakeholder demands, desires, and political influences.
Water quality trading programs are quite complex, and the incorporation of wetlands
within the programs increases the complexity in many ways. Two of the case studies, Cherry
Creek and the Neuse River, illustrated the feasibility of incorporating wetland technology into a
water quality trading program, but there are several aspects of these types of programs that may
increase uncertainty and risk factors.

The Cherry Creek program requires monitoring and

verification of non-point source reduction credits, but the Neuse River program assesses an $11
per pound nitrogen reduction fee for non-point source mitigation efforts managed by the EEP. If
this price is inclusive of all the costs of restoring or constructing wetland acres then the fee is
compensating for the nitrogen discharges by point sources. If this price is too low then there is a
gap in the funding for wetland restoration and construction initiatives, and funds must come from
other sources.
There are two vague areas concerning the ability for wetlands to reduce non-point source
nutrient loads. The information gaps that exist in these areas involve the ability to quantify the
performance of multiple wetland areas in reducing nutrient loads and the ability to interpret
nutrient load reductions by wetlands spatially throughout a particular watershed. The dynamic
nature of many types of wetlands increases the complexity of these ambiguous areas of study.
Many factors influence nutrient removal efficiency within wetlands and further research needs to
establish wetland monitoring strategies that allow for quality assurance mechanisms. There is
also a need to conduct research on the long-term fate of nutrients removed or immobilized using
constructed wetlands and to compile scientific information that analyzes the effectiveness of
certain types of wetlands in removing nutrients and the long-term removal capacity over time.
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The literature review and case studies in this report illustrate the need for additional
policy research for water quality trading programs to successfully integrate non-point source
nutrient load reduction through the use of constructed wetlands.
Economic Impediments
The setting of a nutrient cap and the allocation of property rights is the most important
part of making a water quality trading program effectively viable.

The literature provides

information discussing the importance of setting a cap in order to reflect scarcity, but the case
studies truly reveal that the cap must be set at the optimal level in order to create demand and
supply within a water quality trading market. At the present time, risk, is entirely assumed by
either point sources or a state. Total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) allocate individual nutrient
loads to point sources, but non-point sources receive one lump allocation. Therefore, point
sources are required to decrease their loads based on individual allocations while non-point
sources are not responsible for individual loads. The state of North Carolina in the Tar-Pamlico
and Neuse programs accepted the property rights responsibility for decreasing non-point sources
loads. In the Cherry Creek program the responsibility for reducing nutrient loads rests with the
Authority. In the Lower Boise program the responsibility is shared between the point source and
the non-point source through a contractual agreement. Although in this program, the property
rights have not been defined because the TMDL has not been adopted. Property rights must be
assigned in order to distribute equitable pollution rights along with liability for failure to decrease
loads. Property rights must be clearly documented in reports based on a temporal scale. If these
allocations are not arranged then the relationship between a point source’s impairment and the
actual site providing abatement may be unclear. Liability assessments must be distributed to
point or non-point sources as in the Lower Boise program, or a third party will have to accept the
responsibility. At present, according to the Clean Water Act (CWA), the third party must be the
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state in which a program is managed or a statutory body like the Authority in the Cherry Creek
program because point sources cannot transfer liability.
A significant driver that may entice point sources to purchase water quality credits is the
precision with which the permittee can meet nutrient allocations through direct purchases. The
traditional option for point sources is to purchase expensive pollution abatement technology.
These costs are often “lumpy.” For instance, the point source may be required to purchase 50
units of reduction when perhaps only 10 units are needed. Therefore, water quality trading would
be a viable option because a point source could purchase 10 units from a point source in order to
smooth out his cost curve.

However, the problem that arises concerns the lack of readily

available information to both credit buyers and sellers and the assessment of positive externalities
generated by wetlands.
The literature and the case studies revealed that at the present time there is a lack of
information concerning nutrient reductions by non-point sources.

The information of how

wetlands perform in nutrient reduction is varied. Abundant performance monitoring data for site
specific areas exists, but the results show wide variations in the ability for wetlands to reduce
nutrient loads. Also, there has not been any watershed scale analysis of how wetlands function to
reduce nutrient loads. Effects of seasonality, geography, hydrology, wetland type, and scale are
not documented in most watersheds. There is a great deal of data on specific functions of wetland
sites, but there are many gaps that are left to be filled concerning how wetlands remove or
immobilize nutrients.

There is also a lack of information concerning the nutrient removal

capabilities of wetlands over time. It has been discovered that nutrient removal capabilities may
degrade over time (i.e. Shop Creek at Cherry Creek), but the variations in this process are not
fully understood or explained. Uncertainty in understanding how wetlands remove nutrients
creates risk that is difficult to quantify.

In some instances wetlands may be more easily
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monitored that other BMPs, but design specifications for wetlands do not guarantee that nutrient
loads will be reduced by an exact amount in all situations. Without good information directing
the water quality credit exchanges, then there is a lack of understanding of what is taking place.
In fact, buyers and sellers cannot assess the commodity (pounds of nutrient removed) that is being
developed for trading. In order to improve the understanding of wetlands ability to reduce
nutrient loads, there is a need to monitor and verify nutrient reduction performance at the
watershed scale.
Nutrient input information for point sources and non-point sources is also important to
understand as well as nutrient output. Further information is needed to understand the nutrient
output from both point sources and non-point sources. Credits should only be constructed in a
equivalent manner in order to offset point source discharges. From a regulatory standpoint there
is a lack of information concerning new technologies that might be mandated by USEPA in order
to decrease the influx of hormone inhibitors in the watersheds throughout the country.
Regulations may cause point sources to upgrade technology that would decrease overall nutrient
loads discharged from these entities. Most point source dischargers have not exhausted their
preferable alternatives for nutrient reduction, and there is additional regulatory uncertainty in the
knowledge that watershed nutrient criteria are now being developed in some states. With this
regulatory uncertainty both point sources and non-point sources could perhaps be taking a risk by
investing in a practice that may change based on nutrient rules that are adopted in the near future.
Non-point source reduction information is important in order to define the commodity
being traded, but other information is also necessary in order to allow a trading program to
operate efficiently and effectively.

At the present time wetland performance is typically

estimated or modeled, and ratios are applied in order to mitigate uncertainty. Methods for
monitoring and verification vary widely throughout the country, and there is no standard
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approach to assess credits. This lack of information drastically increases transactions costs. In
the Cherry Creek program there was no standard way to account for the restored and constructed
wetland areas that the Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater Authority (ACWWA)
implemented. The process of individually applying for credits from the Authority took a great
deal of time and expense. The Authority did not have a process that allowed for a standard
approach to monitoring and verification, and this caused inefficiency. The Lower Boise and TarPamlico programs have lists of BMPs that can be incorporated into their programs. These lists
also provide nutrient reduction levels that are based on current literature, but these lists are only
estimates. These estimates incorporate safety factors, but the commodity is not defined enough in
order to minimize risk and uncertainty. Therefore, more information must be provided to credit
generators and purchasers in order to fully assess what is being traded.
The final major economic impediment for incorporating wetlands into a water quality
trading program at the watershed scale deals the choice by non-point sources to install wetland
BMPs. As mentioned, if wetlands were similar to other nutrient abatement technology then credit
producers would choose from all available BMPs within a trading program in a way that
minimized their cost. These producers would choose wetlands if they represented the least cost
method of creating credits. In some situations wetlands may present the least cost option, but in
the case studies presented the wetlands that were discussed were not the least cost option. The
wetlands that were restored and constructed in the Cherry Creek program were expensive
compared to the installation of buffer strips or other BMPs. In the Lower Boise and the TarPamlico programs other agricultural BMPs like no-tillage practices were less expensive. In the
Neuse program the focus was on wetland restoration, but at the present time the charge of $11/per
pound of reduced nitrogen does not necessarily encapsulate the total cost of restoring wetlands
within the basin.
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From an economic standpoint wetlands could be emphasized over other types of BMPs.
For instance, the Neuse program specifically funds wetland restoration projects through the state
EEP program. There may be other ways of emphasizing the importance of wetland technology in
the reduction of nutrients through trading ratios and multiple markets. A higher level of certainty
of nutrient reduction that can be gained through an inflow/outflow monitored wetland (like
Cherry Creek) would yield a lower ratio and a better estimation of the commodity being traded to
the point source. As well, if credit producers were able to sell different types of functions then
wetlands may be the preferred method of choice when reducing nutrients in a water quality
trading program. If pollution targets are set optimally (TMDLs) and information costs are low
then non-point sources should be able to trade credits for flood mitigation, habitat, carbon
sequestration, etc.

By providing a market for some of these positive externalities, private

landowners may begin to at least consider using wetlands as nutrient reducing BMPs.
The case studies from the research presented extends the current literature to emphasize
the absolute importance of reflecting scarcity within a water quality trading program. To do this
there must be a nutrient cap that is set and enforced for a watershed. Secondly, transaction costs
must be minimized with increased monitoring and verification that improves information about
wetland nutrient reduction capabilities. Lastly, the case studies revealed that wetlands may not be
chosen as nutrient reducing BMPs based simply on their performance. Other BMPs may be
substituted for wetlands.

Therefore, at the present time institutional arrangements must be

defined in order to focus attention on wetlands as nutrient reducers as well as producers of other
ancillary benefits. In the future, multiple markets for environmental goods (habitat, flood control,
carbon sequestration) may help to define wetlands as the preferred BMP choice for land use
change within watersheds.
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Institutional Impediments
The concept of water quality trading is rooted in section 402 of the Clean Water Act
(CWA).

TMDLs were an original part of the FWPCA of 1972, but the application and

enforcement of these standards have been almost non-existent to date. As the case studies
verified, water quality trading ultimately depends upon a capped nutrient limitation. This cap in
most cases could be a regulatory issued TMDL. Without this cap, property rights cannot be
allocated and there is a lack of scarcity that is generated by the manufactured market. Ultimately,
as the case studies have revealed, the institutional failure of not being able to correctly set a cap
limitation is the ruin of water quality trading programs. Other economic and institutional issues
become secondary when discussing the importance of setting a cap. It is important to set and
allocate nutrient load caps at the level that is most equitable to all stakeholders while also
reducing total effluent loads. Demand for water quality trading credits is absolutely determined
by the initial distribution of rights to pollute under the initial cap that is set or through changes in
the technology based or water quality based effluent limitations (TBELs or WQBELs) set by
USEPA or states. Under USEPA all NPDES permittees must only purchase credits to meet
WQBELs.

All NPDES permittees must meet the TBELs without the purchase of credits.

Therefore, credit providers (non-point sources) must be able to provide for the level of demand
that exists between these two effluent limitations. If the WQBELs are not set at a stringent
enough level in order to meet a TMDL then point sources can meet their allocation limits without
searching for non-point source credits. This notion of meeting allocation limits without the need
for non-point source credits was made very apparent in three of the four case studies presented.
The Cherry Creek program’s total maximum annual load (TMAL) that was set in 1985 was set at
a level that has been consistently attainable, and all point source dischargers have met their
allocation load permits since the cap was set. There have not been large demands for trades in the
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Tar-Pamlico or Neuse programs because point sources have been able to stay well below their
permit allocation loads. The TMDL has not been officially set for the Lower Boise River, but
allocation discussions have taken place since 2000. The lack of properly set limit that is equitable
and firm can greatly inhibit a trading program from operating efficiently and effectively. A water
quality credit provider and purchaser have a difficult time planning a production or purchasing
strategy in sizing up the watershed market for nutrient reductions when an exact and enforceable
measure is not set. In order to assess demand in water quality trading a credit producer or
purchaser must have an intimate knowledge of the regulatory forces that drive discharge
limitations. If a cap is not correctly allocated and maintained or if the cap is not enforceable then
there is no demand to purchase nutrient reduction credits.
A second institutional impediment that was highlighted by the case study research dealt
with the allocation of property rights and focused on the transfer of liability. The literature
suggested that environmental trading markets are inherently risky, but the case studies further
clarified the relationship between risk and liability concerning water quality trading markets. The
National Pollution Discharge Elimination (NPDES) Permits held by point sources does not allow
liability to be transferred to a non-permit holder. Those point sources that purchase water quality
credits do not relieve themselves from the responsibility of meeting their permit requirements.
The inability to transfer this NPDES liability is one of the issues that face point sources when
dealing with non-point sources. This inability is also the reason why most water quality trading
programs can be described as offset programs instead of true trading programs. Institutional
arrangements like the state of North Carolina in the Tar-Pamlico and Neuse cases and the
Authority in the Cherry Creek case take on the liability for the transactions that take place
between point and non-point sources. The liability is never transferred in these programs from
the point source to the non-point source. In the Lower Boise program the liability is shared
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through a contractual arrangement between the point source and the non-point source. In this
scenario the contract provides a safety mechanism for the point source place some responsibility
on the non-point source to reduce nutrient loads. But, the point source does not entirely transfer
its liability and it is ultimately responsible for its discharge allocations including non-point source
credit purchases.
The literature also points to the importance of baseline information in order to direct how
credits are generated from a supply side after a cap is implemented. In theory, institutional forces
are responsible for setting baselines for the allocation of nutrient loads. Baseline allocations are
important in order to determine if the water quality trading program is actually improving the
environment by decreasing nutrient loads on a watershed. The case studies revealed that some
water quality trading programs do not assess baseline criterion before they implement trading
procedures, and in some cases it is not apparent that baseline assessments and allocations match
TMDL limits. For instance, the Tar-Pamlico program was the only program out of the four case
studies that initially set baseline conditions for the entire watershed. But, the nutrient cap was set
too high and trading did not become feasible. The program, however, incorporated the use of a
computer model to assess baseline allocations, but the Association members did not demand
water quality credits from non-point sources because they easily were able to meet their
allocation loads as a group. The state of North Carolina had to develop agricultural rules in order
to decrease nutrient loads from non-point sources instead of using market forces to drive the
demand for non-point source credits. The agricultural community now has to meet the rules
stipulated by the state while they still may receive subsidies for implementing BMPs. The TarPamlico example serves as a reminder of institutional failure, and it demonstrates that if the
correct baselines are not implemented then a trading program will be inefficient. On the other
hand, in the Cherry Creek program the Authority set individual baseline assessments for the
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wetland credit generating projects installed by the Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater
Authority (ACWWA). Both baseline assessments were measured before installation, and trading
ratios for projects were determined from these baselines. The accounting for credits in the Cherry
Creek program only assessed individual areas, and it did not assess the overall change in the
quality of the watershed based on changes incorporated through the additional BMP offsets.
Although in relation to the specific projects, the restored wetland area did receive a better credit
production ratio as compared to the constructed wetland. This information serves as an example
of why there is a need for further research to determine nutrient reduction capabilities of wetland
areas within specific watersheds to distinguish restored credits from constructed credits during
baseline analyses. The case studies reveal that baselines are absolutely necessary in order to
determine that trading is improving the quality of the water at the watershed scale.
Another institutional impediment that was revealed in the Lower Boise River and the
Tar-Pamlico case studies is fact that point sources are regulated through the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and the majority of non-point sources are not. Potential water quality trading credit
providers as revealed in three of the four case studies presented are largely members of the
agricultural community. This group waged a long and successful battle to exempt themselves
from the regulations of the CWA, and therefore there is some apprehension about the regulatory
control that may arrive with the acceptance of a water quality trading program. The current
political reality is that the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resources Conservation
Service (NRCS) is charged with supporting conservation through green payments. Policymakers
at the NRCS view water quality trading markets as a way to distribute green payments to benefit
farmers. Point sources may hesitate to participate in program with non-point sources that receive
subsidies to install BMPs. As well, the subsidies that are distributed to potential credit producers
may not be delivered to potential trading parties in an equitable way. Therefore, the subsidies
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would decrease the costs for some credit producers and allow them to sell their credits to point
sources at a lower price compared to other credit producers that did not receive subsidy payments.
The literature also provides insight as to the importance of monitoring and verification in
order to assess positive and negative externalities. But, the case studies reveal that monitoring in
most instances does not take place. Some water quality trading programs do not actively monitor
non-point source effluent reductions at all. Some programs like the Tar-Pamlico program spotcheck BMP sites to make sure that they are installed properly. The Cherry Creek program
directly monitors inflow and outflow of its wetland sites.

This method of inflow/outflow

monitoring is applicable because of the wetland BMPs, and this method may not work for other
types of BMPs like buffer strips, conservation tillage, or other practices. At the present time it is
unclear what level of monitoring is necessary concerning water quality trading in order to provide
a level of confidence to buyers, sellers, and regulators while at the same time decreasing nutrient
loads in a specified waterbody. Although monitoring and verification are crucial aspects of a
water quality trading program, monitoring and verification activities do increase transaction costs,
but they reassure the purchaser of credits and the regulatory body that the commodity being
traded actually exists. Therefore, some level of monitoring has to exist in order to provide
assurance that the water quality trading program is actually improving water quality.
The last institutional impediment that was identified through this research dealt with the
focus of institutional structure of the trading program on wetlands. The literature suggested that,
at present, markets fail to account for the positive externalities that are associated with wetlands.
The case studies highlighted this market failure and also provided examples of the institutional
failure to account for these public benefits that are generated by wetlands. Wetlands have other
functions that directly or indirectly benefit humans, but economic theory suggests that credit
producers will not consider these functions because they do not affect profit.
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Therefore,

“bounded rationality” takes place in programs like the Lower Boise River. The principal (point
source) contracts with the agent (non-point source) to decrease nutrient loads by a certain amount.
The agent (non-point source) chooses the first satisfactory solution to decrease the nutrient level
in accordance with the point-source. Stakeholders in the Lower Boise do not take into account
the positive externalities that are created by wetland areas, and thus this type of approach to
nutrient reduction may be overlooked. The Tar-Pamlico program does not have a preference for
wetland BMPs, and therefore, this type of technology may be overlooked by stakeholders within
the basin. The Cherry Creek and Neuse programs specifically focus on wetland areas, but both of
these programs are managed directly by government agencies. The government agencies in these
two cases have focused their attention on wetlands because of the ancillary benefits that are
provided in conjunction with water quality enhancement. At the present time analysis does not
provide information that suggests that wetlands would always provide a higher level of certainty
compared to other BMPs when reducing nutrient loads. Similarly, the many functions that
wetlands provide cannot be captured in multiple markets. There are not markets in the U.S., at
present, for carbon sequestration, habitat, or flood mitigation. Therefore, with this lack of
information it is important for policymakers to prescribe wetland techniques as a preferred
method of nutrient abatement in order for them to be incorporated within a water quality trading
program.
Conclusions
Water quality trading in the United States is still in its infancy, and the following
conclusions provide insight concerning the major challenges that face this innovative approach to
improving water quality.
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Economic Impediments
The central economic issue concerning water quality trading programs is that there are
not effective market conditions within the case studies analyzed to allow for effective trading to
take place. For a water quality trading market to exist their must be a cap that is defined and
enforceable that reflects effective resource scarcity. The main reason that trading within water
quality markets has not been robust is the fact that the costs associated with noncompliance are
not high.
The following discussion of economic impediments focus on determining value and risk
associated with strategies that use wetlands to reduce nutrient loads within a water quality trading
context. These recommendations are incorporated to address the economic gaps and barriers that
complicate the uncertainties and risks associated with water quality trading.

Economic

recommendations include setting a nutrient cap to reflect scarcity, a better method of assigning
and enforcing property rights in relation to the set nutrient cap, the institutional acts of providing
information and improving regulatory practices, the assessment of the economic functions of
wetlands, and the further research of adopting multiple markets for wetland functions to promote
a credit producer’s ability to sell different credits in different markets.
One of the major issues discovered by this research was the inability set an optimal
trading cap and to assign property rights from this cap. From an economic perspective a better
method for assigning property rights and assessing liability should be adopted.

Increased

enforcement activities and stronger penalties for point source discharge violations could increase
demands for water quality trading credits, and the allocation of property rights at the beginning a
program’s development would help credit producers and purchasers forecast future production
strategies and help to reduce the applicability of market failure. The setting of a cap and the
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allocation of property rights would also allow regulators to better assess reduction capabilities
and the overall performance record of the program.
The improvement of regulatory practices could decrease economic transaction costs at
present. Improved monitoring and verification techniques, improved credit assessments, and
improved credit process negotiation would greatly enhance trade potential if the initial caps are
properly set. The improvements to regulatory practices would require investment by government
agencies to increase staff levels and expertise, simplify and standardize policies and practices,
and upgrade equipment. Also, increased focus should be placed on applying current knowledge
of monitoring and verification of wetlands into standardized procedures at the watershed scale
within water quality trading programs. Therefore, monitoring and verification could have a more
direct impact on the trading ratios that are assigned to particular non-point source BMPs.
Assessing the economic value of the functions of wetlands would provide a more
comprehensive understanding to stakeholders of the monetary worth of the resource compared to
other option values for land use or development. A better understanding of how wetlands remove
nutrients is needed. From the literature it is apparent that there is a great deal of information that
has already been generated concerning the functions of wetlands.
nutrient uptake capabilities should be compiled and analyzed.

Information concerning

Information gaps should be

identified from this compilation in order to direct the next steps that should be taken to better
define the performance of various types of wetlands in removing nutrients within specific venues
of the country. This information is vital to defining the applicability of incorporating wetlands
into a specific water quality trading program. Water quality trading programs will also require
site specific assessment work in order to incorporate wetlands in a watershed scale program.
Valuable economic information also could be gained through the investigation of the
feasibility of making trading credits available for multiple environmental amenities. At present,
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markets either undervalue or disregard many environmental amenities provided by wetlands.
These amenities could be assessed as marketable commodities and may include water quality,
flood control, habitat, or carbon sequestration. These ancillary benefits could be provided by
implementing restored or constructed wetlands, and then the additional wetland benefits could be
better accounted for. This type of research would require the assessment of market valuations of
specific functions over time.

Multiple ecological values could increase the opportunity to

improve the return on investment that non-point sources are able to retrieve based on the
construction of a type of wetland on their property. This notion of stacking credits could offset
the lost opportunity costs associated with the non-use of the designated land for other purposes.
Institutional Impediments
Politics determines many of the regulatory factors and policies that guide the
administration, structure, and performance of water quality trading programs. Ultimately, it is
institutional failure that causes water quality markets not to succeed. Water quality trading
markets are artificial, and the institutional structure that directs them is responsible for their
achievements or failures.
Additional focus must be set on defining the correct cap limits while allowing these limits
to be adjusted readily in order to adapt to the dynamic changes that take place within a particular
watershed. For instance, the TMAL for the Cherry Creek program was set in 1985. It may be
revised within the next year, but the program has still not met its chlorophyll a standards. The
political process of setting a TMDL is extremely complex, and arrangements should be made so
that these cap structures should be incrementally modified based on relevant information that is
derived from ongoing monitoring that takes place within a particular watershed.
It was revealed through the case studies that at the present time point sources must share
liability with non-point sources or the state may assume liability for non-point source discharge
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reductions. In order to decrease the institutional problem of liability for water quality trading
programs further policy analysis is recommended to estimate the benefits and costs of modifying
section 402 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) to allow the transfer of liability from NPDES
permittees to non-point source credit generators.
Baselines should be set in order to ascertain the performance of a particular water quality
trading program. Consistent and standardized monitoring and verification of the water quality
within a watershed as well and individual non-point source sites should be a focus of a trading
program. Rules of engagement should be identified early in the program, and these rules should
be agreed upon by all stakeholders. Audit plans must be made transparent and implicit in nature
to prevent confusion or misrepresentation. This type of monitoring is necessary in order to
determine the level of water quality before a program is developed, and it is also necessary in
order to define the water quality trading credit that is created from the reduction of nutrients by a
specific BMP. Wetlands should be incorporated in order to assess inflow/outflow BMPs because
of the way in which they can be designed or restored. Other types of BMPs may not be as easily
monitored or verified.
Point sources are regulated and non-point sources are not. Therefore, there is a need for a
binding constraint that ties these two types of stakeholders together. A contractual agreement,
like the one proposed in the Lower Boise, is a mechanism to achieve this type of constraint.
There are transactions costs associated with these types of contracts, but without the transfer of
liability from one entity to the other the contract for services is the only mechanism to legally
bind the two parties.
If point sources and non-point sources are not able to arrange contracts with each other
then a statutory body or the state must take on the responsibility for reducing non-point source
nutrient loads. Through an open market contractual agreement, like the Lower Boise, the non-
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point source is free to choose the BMP that will be most effective at the lowest cost. At present,
there are not markets to assess ancillary benefits of wetlands, and in some cases these BMPs may
not be the lowest cost technologies to reduce nutrient loads. Therefore it is recommended that
institutions (government agencies) better define the ancillary benefits that wetlands provide in
order to prescribe or promote their use in water quality trading programs. This is the case in both
the Cherry Creek program and the Neuse program. Institutionally, beneficial ratios may be
created or other mechanisms could be developed by agencies in order to differentiate the public
benefits that wetlands provide versus other BMPs.

If wetland assessments cannot be

accomplished through the institutional venue then the current lack of information about the ability
for wetlands to reduce nutrient loads (as well as other ancillary benefits) will be overlooked by
those landowners.

These stakeholders may look to “satifice” their rational decisions by

minimizing their costs in choosing the abatement technology that reduces nutrient loads, but may
not provide all of the positive externalities that are associated with wetlands.
Conditions under which Water Quality Trading
is a Viable Option
As previously discussed, certain economic and institutional components are necessary for
water quality trading market to operate efficiently and effectively. Within a particular watershed
there are conditions that must be met before water quality trading can be determined to be a
viable option for nutrient reduction. First, there must be an in-depth understanding of the nutrient
pollution problem within the particular basin. It is critical that a water quality assessment be
taken throughout the watershed at various points of emphasis. This type of monitoring and
verification is absolutely necessary in order to define the baseline conditions and the nutrient
reduction cap for a trading program. In fact, this type of broad based monitoring throughout the
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watershed is necessary in order to verify the effectiveness of any type of nutrient reduction
program, with or without markets.
Secondly, there is a need to accurately measure in-stream capacity. If the monitoring and
assessment of the watershed determines that there is a significant nutrient problem, then the
amount of nutrient input to the basin from point sources and non-point sources must be identified.
For instance, there needs to be an understanding of the nutrient load contribution levels from
point sources and non-point sources.

Unfortunately, nutrient problems are almost always

discovered through tragic environmental focusing events like fish kills. The understanding of the
specific nutrient problem within a basin coupled with knowledge of where the loads are coming
from would provide a great deal of baseline information necessary in order to evaluate water
quality trading as a policy option. An optimal cap must be set for critical constituents in relation
to baseline and in-stream capacity information, and then ongoing monitoring of the watershed
must take place in order to verify changes to water quality.
The next condition necessary for the assessing the option to incorporate water quality
trading programs focuses on the number and type of potential buyers and sellers of water quality
credits. There must be a certain number of interested point and non-point sources within a basin
for a trading program to develop. Point sources are regulated, and may be required to participate
in a program to meet certain reductions, but non-point sources must participate in a program in
order to decrease significant nutrient load amounts within specific watersheds. A condition that
would greatly increase the option to implement a water quality trading program would be the
incorporation of some type of binding constraint that linked point sources to non-point sources.
As previously discussed, transfer of liability is a significant issue for point sources, and more
linkages between these two groups would greatly improve the cooperation of participants within a
trading program.
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Another condition that is absolutely necessary for an effective water quality trading
program to become a viable option is the retrieval and incorporation of better information
concerning non-point source nutrient reductions. At the present time, as revealed by the case
studies, monitoring and verification is not necessarily a condition of incorporating a trading
program. The knowledge of what levels of nutrients are being reduced at non-point source credit
sites is essential if the effectiveness of a water quality trading program is to be measured. Better
information for all BMPs is necessary, and wetlands should be specifically targeted for further
monitoring research because of possibility of measuring direct inflows and outflows.
Lastly, both positive and negative externalities must be considered when assessing the
conditions under which water quality trading is a viable option. When a cap is set and enforced,
and monitoring takes place throughout a particular basin, there is still the need to assess the
benefits and costs that are being generated by the program. For instance, if the nutrient levels for
a particular basin are being monitored and the assessments show that the water quality trading is
reducing nutrient loads then measurements will suggest that water quality has improved. But,
there must also be consideration for the land use, ecological, and hydrological changes that have
taken place within the basin to improve the water quality. Planning decisions must be arranged
before a water quality trading program is adopted in order to estimate the positive and negative
externalities that would evolve from this type of policy option.
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Appendix A
List of Individuals Interviewed

Name

Affiliated Trading Organization/Program/Department

Richard Parachini

Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment

Wilbur Koger

Authority Engineer, Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater Authority

Molly Trujillo

Project Manager, Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater Authority

William Ruzzo

Representative for the Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority

Michelle Wind

Representative for the Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority

Brad Crowder

Economist, U.S. EPA Region 8

Jill Minter

Water Quality Trading Coordinator, U.S. EPA Region 8

Susan Burke

State Water Quality Programs, Idaho Dept. of Environmental Quality

Marti Bridges

TMDL Program Manager, Idaho Dept. of Environmental Quality

Robbin Finch

Water Quality Manager, City of Boise, Idaho

Johanna Bell

Stormwater Program Coordinator, City of Boise, Idaho

Bill Stewart

Environmental Protection Specialist, U.S. EPA Region 10

Leigh Woodruff

TMDL Coordinator, U.S. EPA Region 10

Scott Koberg

Idaho Division of Soil and Water Conservation

David Keil

Representative for the Lower Boise River Watershed Council

Ann Coan

Natural Resources Director, North Carolina Farm Bureau Federation

John Husiman

Environmental Specialist, North Carolina Division of Water Quality

Joseph Rudek

Senior Scientist, Environmental Defense

Steve Coffey

Tar-Pamlico River Coordinator, NCDSWC

Suzanne Klimek

Director of Operations, North Carolina Ecosystem Enhancement Program

Kelly Williams

In-lieu Fee Coordinator, North Carolina Ecosystem Enhancement Program

Natalie Jones

Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program Manager, NCDSWC

Michael Templeton

Environmental Engineer, North Carolina Division of Water Quality
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Appendix B
Research Questions for Case Study Interviews
(G. Michael Mikota, 2007)
Research Question:
Is the incorporation of wetlands technology to enhance water quality trading programs
economically and politically feasible at the watershed scale?
Specific Information Needed:
Background
• History
• Issues
• Driving force for the establishment of trading system
• Administrative Unit – oversight
• Stakeholders
• Structure of trading system
Track Record
• # of permit trades (point to point and point to non-point)
• Water quality impact
• Costs of program
Impediments
• Market failure issues
o Info – current available info – is info readily accessible
o Externalities
o Initial distribution of credits
o Transaction costs of creating a trading program
•

Institutional failure (arrangements/impediments)
o Current transactions
o Setting of a cap (TMDL, TMAL, etc.)
o Starting point for trading between point sources and non-point sources
(baselines)

Case Specific Questions:
Program Background:
(1) What was the motivation for creating this WQT program?
(2) What ecological, cost savings, cost postponement or flexible paths to compliance goals
were set during the initial WQT program creation discussions?
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Appendix B (continued)
Research Questions for Case Study Interviews
(G. Michael Mikota, 2007)

(3) Who are the major stakeholders (participants)? Did these groups belong to certain
associations or other cooperative organizations before the WQT program was
implemented?

(4) What are the regulatory drivers for the WQT program, and how are they enforced?
(TMAL, TMDL, etc.)
(5) Why were wetlands included on the list of BMPs that could be implemented to generate
WQT credits? Were wetlands targeted as a primary BMP, or were they included as
another option for landowners?
Trade Structure Information with Focus on Wetland Credits (Technical and Economic
Performance):
(1) How is a credit determined?
What types of information do credit buyers need to know from credit producers,
and how can watershed groups or wetland owners provide this information? Are
credits weighted by performance? Are there any incentives to choose one BMP
over another? (cost, performance, other benefits?)
(2) What types of trading ratios or other mechanisms are implemented in order to
deal with uncertainty?
How are credits verified? Are credits needed year round? How do we account
for seasonality (dependent upon region or rainfall)? Are spikes allowed in
nutrient loads during winter months when BMPs (wetlands) are not functioning
as sinks?
(3) How are Equivalency, Additionality, and Accountability (Fang and Easter, 2003)
standards used to make the program efficient?
Equivalency: Temporal, spatial, or chemical differences?
Additionality: Prevention of double counting by ensuring that a nutrient control
activity counts toward only one objective if multiple objectives are met.
Accountability: What types of monitoring and oversight techniques are used to
ensure proper implementation of all program requirements?
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Appendix B (continued)
Research Questions for Case Study Interviews
(G. Michael Mikota, 2007)
(4) What is the market structure of the program and why was this structure chosen?
(bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers, etc.)
Does the type of market structure play a role in bringing together point sources
and non-point sources? What are some of the mechanisms used for trade
identification and communication? (education, outreach, third party facilitation,
incorporation of evolved watershed groups)

(5) Is there a WQT program watershed administration or governing body? (an authority or
local agency?)
Does this (or would this) type of administrative agency improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the program? Would this type of entity be needed if trade
levels increased and more activity took place?
Outcomes with Focus on Wetland Incorporation (Administrative Performance):
(1) What types and volume of trades have occurred, and how many trades have included
wetlands?
(2) What have been the administrative costs for implementing and maintaining this program?
(3) Have there been any realized cost savings?
(4) Has the program achieved the goals that were set in the beginning?

Organization (Federal, State, or Local Government) Specific Questions:
(1) Are there better alternatives for improving water quality at lower costs then WQT? (If so,
what are they? Do they allow for less uncertainty and risk?)
(2) What types of binding constraints will be necessary to link point sources to non-point
sources?
(3) At the present time there is no standard approach to performance monitoring for wetland
nutrient reduction. Methods and metrics vary widely. Would a type of standardization
assessment technique be beneficial in assessing program requirements?
(4) How are monitoring and verification costs (and other administrative costs) paid for?
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Appendix B (continued)
Research Questions for Case Study Interviews
(G. Michael Mikota, 2007)
(5) Please describe any program obstacles that have been significant to date?
(6) What level of non-point source involvement has been realized, and what types of
incentives are in place to engage those individuals in trading?
(7) Are wetlands a preferred type of restored BMP for your organization versus others
(buffer strip, no-till, etc.)? Based on your knowledge of this watershed, do you think that
stakeholders would be inclined to implement a restored wetland BMP versus some other
type?
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